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Desirable Properties of Post-Election Procedures. Al Stone April 5, 2006 CMSC 691V. Source Material. “Report of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project: What Is What Could Be”, 2001 Comprehensive and Far-Reaching First seminal report in response to the 2000 Florida election debacle.
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Desirable Properties of Post-Election Procedures Al Stone April 5, 2006 CMSC 691V
Source Material • “Report of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project: What Is What Could Be”, 2001 • Comprehensive and Far-Reaching • First seminal report in response to the 2000 Florida election debacle. • “Insuring the Integrity of the Electoral Process: Recommendations for Consistent and Complete Reporting of Election Data”, Oct. 2004, Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project • “Building Consensus on Election Reform”, August 2001, The Constitution Project’s Forum on Election Reform
Presentation Framework • Desirable Properties of Elections • Definition of Post-Election Procedures • Application of Properties • Existing Best Practices in Other Industries • Suggestions • Caltech/MIT • The Constitution Project • Analysis and Discussion
An Election MUST Have… • Vote Integrity • Voter Privacy • Resistance to Disruption • Voting System Reliability • Election Completeness • (Lack of) System Complexity* • Accessibility*
Election Process (Cradle to Grave) • Unearth election materials • Set up election • Carry out voting on Election Day • Close the polls • Collection of Election Materials • Transport Election Materials • Recount • Lock Down and Protect Election Materials • EXECUTE (8) FOR n years; GOTO (1);
Post-Election Processes • Collection of Materials • “Box up” votes, collect smartcards, etc. • Shut down and disconnect machines. • Transportation • Recount • Transport votes, any equipment to recount location • Lockup and Protection
Collection of Materials • Physical Security • Proper Containers • Careful Collection • Graceful Shutdown • Tamper Tape
Caltech/MIT Suggestions: “Insuring the Integrity of the Electoral Process” • Inventory of Equipment • Number of Ballots Cast • Number of Votes for Federal Office • Number of Registered Voters • Voter Count from Check-In List • Absentee Ballot Count • Challenged and Returned Absentee Ballots • Challenged Provisional Ballots • Number of Early Voters • Transportation Records • Storage Records
The Stanley Cup • Fisher Peak, BC and Mt. Elbert, CO • Auto Glass Plant • Roller Coaster, Universal Studios • Motorcycle Passenger • Jetski Passenger • Baptismal Font • Rideau Canal Dropkick 1905 • Geraniums 1906 • Flat Tire Roadside Luck 1924 • Buoyancy Tests 1991 and 1993 • Slovakian Debut 2003 • Air Canada Weight Restrictions 2004
Transportation • Secure Vehicles • Non-stop Transport • Careful, Secure Loading and Unloading • Police Presence • Absentee Issues
Recount • Motivated Election Workers • Secure, Private Tabulation • Collection of Materials • Auditing of Materials • Scheduling • Capable Equipment
Lockup and Surveillance • Perimeter Security • Environmental Factors • Secure, Proper Containers • Periodic Inspection • Capacity Issues • Summary Re-Evaluation of Location
Insider Threat • Maine, 1998 • “Two legislative aides plead guilty to breaking into a ballot storage area in the Maine State House and tampering with the ballots being stored pending a recount of two close elections for the state legislature.” – Caltech/MIT Report, pg 42.
Other Industries • Banking – It’s only money! • Pros: Vaults, Armed Guards, Armored Vehicles, Trained and Secure Tellers, Strict Policies, Periodic Audits, Ink Traps, Seamless Absentee Banking • Cons: Money, Identity Fraud, Robberies, Insurance “Safety Net”, ATM Security Flaws • Shipping – What security? • Pros: Principles of Competition (Speed, Integrity, Privacy, Completion), Legal Backing, Tracking Software, Tamper Detection • Cons: No Resistance, Inaccuracy, Delays
Caltech/MIT Suggestions: “What Is, What Could Be” • Auditable Equipment For Recounts • Restricted Absentee Voting With Uniform Reporting of Results • Coercion, Fraud/Security, Accuracy, and Speed • Periodic Equipment Auditing • Less Ambiguous Recount Processes • AMVA system • Replaceable components decrease likelihood of corrupt vendors • All Voting Machines should implement multiple means of recording votes
Constitution Project Suggestions • Sufficient Time for Counting and Contesting Procedures • States define “valid vote” • States establish recount rules • States provide post-election audits
Analysis and Conclusions • Secure vs. Cost-Effective • No longer limited by other properties, but by money priorities • Auditing • Recount or no, more than just votes • Decentralization • State-defined priorities • Lessen the Impact of Absentee Issues • Care and Accuracy vs. Speed