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U.S. Landpower in East Asia: Building Allied Institutional Capability

U.S. Landpower in East Asia: Building Allied Institutional Capability. Eric Setzekorn Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Outline. Post 9/11 U.S. Army Policy South Korea and Taiwan Initiatives Force Modernization/Manpower Drawdown Missile Systems Issue

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U.S. Landpower in East Asia: Building Allied Institutional Capability

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  1. U.S. Landpower in East Asia: Building Allied Institutional Capability Eric Setzekorn Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History

  2. Outline • Post 9/11 U.S. Army Policy • South Korea and Taiwan Initiatives • Force Modernization/Manpower Drawdown • Missile Systems • Issue • Reserve System/Social Support • Overall Assessment of 2001-2015 is Positive • Use of U.S. Army “Templates” has been successful. • Future Outlook is Negative • No Clear U.S. Ability to Assist

  3. Taiwan: Force Modernization • Reduced Army Strength • 1990: 430,000 • 2015: 230,000 • 2020: 175,000 • New Structure • BCT • New Equipment • CM-32 Yunpao (雲豹) • Thunderbolt 2000 (雷霆 2000) • AH-64 (31) • UH-60 (60)

  4. South Korea: Force Modernization • Reduced Army Strength • 1998: 620,000 • 2015: 495,000 • 2022: 375,000 Planned • New Structures • Increase in Brigade Formations • New Equipment • KUH-1 Surion (~250) • AH-64E (36) • K-2 Black Panther MBT • K-9 Thunder SPG

  5. U.S. Army Missile Capabilities • “Survivability, Sustainability and Persistence,” CSBA • Layers of Defense • Storage and Resupply • Multiple Hardened Launch Sites • Mobile or Dispersed Assets • Joint Fires • Sensors • ATACMS • Issues: INF/MTCR

  6. Acquisition of U.S. Army Systems • SK/Taiwan Late to Missile Defense (Post-2006) • Budgets/Politics/U.S. Restrictions • Taiwan 2008-2011 • 6 Billion USD: 450 Pac-3 Missiles • 2.5 Billion USD: EWR • ATACMS (pending-?) • South Korea • 1.5 Billion USD: 140 PAC-3 • 750 Million USD: 200 ATACMS (Now locally produced) • 20 Billion USD: Planned 2014-2018: Some Indigenous/Some U.S.

  7. Reserve Forces • Increasing Important • Demographics Limit Active Component • Civil Defense/Disaster Relief • Inactive Reserve System • No Associated Equipment or Staff • Taiwan • 2.6 million reserves (140,000 train per year) • 2.5-5.5 day training cycle • South Korea • 2.9 million (Bi-annual training, Total of Four Sessions) • 2.5 days of training

  8. Demographic Challenge Source: Taiwan, Ministry of National Defense Report, 2011

  9. Reserve Force Training • Training Schedule • Friday 1700 Report • Saturday: Opening Ceremony, Rifle Marksmanship (6-10 rounds), Hike (2-3 miles) • Sunday: Classroom Training, Clean-Up, Closing Ceremony • 1300 Dismissal

  10. Taiwan: Social Issues • Low Public Trust • Perception of High Injury and Suicide rate Among Conscripts • Hung Case • Massive Demonstrations • Two Defense Ministers Resign • End of UCMJ • Failed Volunteer System • Continued Conscription

  11. South Korea: Social Issues • Low Public Trust • Concern Over Abuse and Suicide of Conscripts • Shootings by Soldiers • Yoon Case-May 2014 • 16 Officers Disciplined • SGT Receives 45 year sentence • CSA Kwan Oh-Sung Resigns • South Korean Volunteer System Still Tentative

  12. Conclusion • U.S. Army Strategic Landpower Has Been Boosted Since 9/11 by Action of South Korea and Taiwan • Adoption of U.S. Organizational Structures • Purchase of U.S. Equipment • Result: Smaller, More Capable Forces • Future Issues are More Difficult • No U.S. “Template” to Solve Social/Demographics Issues • U.S. Experience with Conscripts is Outdated • “National Guard” Difficult with Local Political System

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