Aristotle

1. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics

2. Overview • The NE is a work in practical ethics. I.e., Aristotle explains how we can lead a satisfying life. • The NE fits into Aristotle’s overall philosophy: it is deeply teleological, speaks of the way in which humans differ from others (a genus-species definition), explains our happiness (eudaimonia) in terms of our telos/diferentia/function, and provides a way in which we can actualize our potential. • As elsewhere, A. rejects many aspects of Plato’s thought. Here, he rejects the notion that there is a single Form of Goodness. For A., there are many virtues.

3. Book I, Ch. 1 • Everything aims at an end which is good. • Hence, the good is what we all aim at. • People disagree over what good is. • Is it an activity or a product of an activity? • Some ends are merely mid-way points to some other end. Subordinate ends are less valuable than more ultimate ends.

4. I, 2 • There must be an ultimate end in order to avoid an infinite regress. I.e., there must be a single end at which all things aim. • This raises two questions: (1) what is this end, and (2) what ‘science’ investigates it. • The NE as a whole is required to answer (1). • Re. (2), A says it’s political science (rather than ethics) since it looks at the end of the community and not just an individual. At other points, though, he says its ethics.

5. I, 3 • “Our discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity fits the subject-matter…” (1094b 13). • Ethics and politics are relatively inexact. We can only “indicate the truth roughly and in outline.” • Politics and ethics require life experience as our ‘data’. Hence, the young are not suitable students for these subjects. • Plus, they rely too much on uncontrolled feelings.

6. I, 4 & 5 • Eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness) is the good toward which we all aim. • People disagree over what happiness is • Life of gratification (pleasure)? Too superficial and “slavish” • Life of political activity (honour)? Too superficial, dependent on those bestowing honour. Virtue - actuality • Life of study (contemplation)? • Wealth? Instrumental only

7. I, 6 (Not in text) • Here, A rejects Plato and the Form of the Good • (1) Good has no meaning common to all its applications • (2) no “Form of Good” separate from its particular manifestations • (3) If there were, it would be useless for practical purposes.

8. I, 7 • Instrumental vs. Intrinsic value. We are looking for later. • Formal properties of happiness • Final • Complete • Self sufficient • Happiness is like this.

9. I, 7 Function of a human (1097b 23 ff.) substantive conditions of happiness • Teleology and differentia • Potentiality/actuality -- scale of life • “the human function is the soul’s activity that expresses reason … or requires reason” • “The human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue” (1098a 16).

10. I, 9 • How is happiness acquired? • By learning? By habituation? By other training? Divine provenance? • Aristotle will argue that it is a sort of habituation • A life can only be assessed in its totality

11. Book II, Ch. 1 • Two kinds of virtue (arete/excellence): intellectual and moral. • Intellectual virtue can be taught and learned from a book. • Moral virtue cannot be learned in this way: it requires time and experience and results from habit (like learning a skill such as piano playing or skating). • No virtues arise entirely by nature although they are not contrary to nature either. We all have the potential to be virtuous.

12. II, 1 • Potentiality actuality again • Through habituation, we develop a state of character, which is a propensity to act in one way rather than another. • It is important, then, to begin doing the right activities early, thus building the right habits and propensities

13. II, 2 • This is a practical work aimed at action. We don’t simply want to understand what good or virtue is, we want to become virtuous and good. • Not an exact science • Tendency `that these sorts of stets naturally tend to be ruined by excess and deficiency.` • E.g., strength/health and exercise

14. II, 2 • The same is true of the moral virtues; e.g., temperance, bravery, etc. • `For if someone avoids and is afraid of everything, standing firm against nothing, he becomes cowardly, but if he is afraid of nothing at all and goes to face everything, he becomes rash. Similarly, if he gratifies himself with every pleasure, and refrains from none, he becomes intemperate, but if he avoids them all, as boors do, he becomes some sort of insensible person` (1104a).

15. II, 2 • A`s points here relate again to potentiality and actuality. We are all potentially strong, but we have to do the right things – eat and exercise well – in order to actualize this potential. • Similarly, we are all, e.g., potentially brave, but we need to be in the right situations and stand up to our fears (and to not entirely dismiss them either) if we are to actualize this potential

16. II, 2 • Problems? • Not all virtues are means. E.g., justice • Some situations are simply to be avoided. We don`t actualize our potential for fidelity by putting ourselves in situations that test it.

17. II, 3 • Even though ethics for A primarily involves action, it also requires right reason and correct feeling. • Connection between virtue and pleasure. E.g., a temperate person is one who (comes to) finds pleasure in moderation.

18. II, 3 • Two psychological points: • (1) typically we tend to engage in behaviour that we find pleasurable and avoid those we find painful. • (2) We must become habituated in such a way that we find pleasure in the prope/virtuous activity. I.e., we must internalize these causes of behaviour (which we will do best through proper education). • Early behaviour modicfication?

19. II, 4 • Paradox: How can you become good by doing good acts? Doesn't doing good acts imply that you are already good, not becoming so? • A. points to 3 characteristics of being virtuous: • (1) we must know what we are doing (and not simply following someone else's instructions or being lucky). • (2) we must choose the correct actions for their own sake. • (3) the action must proceed from a firm and stable character.

20. II, 5 • Does virtue arise from feelings, capacities, and states (of character)? • Feelings: accompanied by pleasure and pain • Capacities: to experience these feelings • States: the way we deal with our feelings – moderately, or an extreme • A. states that we are virtuous in terms of our state of character – i.e., the way we deal with our feelings.

21. II, 5 • We are neither praised or blamed for our feelings themselves whether it`s anger or fear. In some ways, these are given to us (at least initially). It`s how we come to deal with them, and how, through habituation we come eventually to take pleasure in our moderation (of whatever feelings). • States of character, then, is the genus of virtue.

22. II, 6 • What is the differentia here? I.e., what type of state of character is virtue? • Virtues will enable us to perform well/excellently. • “In everything continuous and divisible, we can take more, less or equal, and each of them either in the object itself or relative to us; and the equal is some intermediate between excess and deficiency.” (1106a 26-28).

23. II, 6 • A says virtue deals with the relative (subjective) mean, not the objective one. • `Virtue, then, is (a) a state that decides, (b) consisting in a mean, (c) the mean relative to us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason, (e) i.e., to the reason by reference to which the intelligent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency`(1107a 1-5).

24. II, 6 • This scheme does not cover all vices. E.g., adultery, theft, murder, etc.

25. Virtues and Vices