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The Inevitability of the Cold War: Long-Term Factors and Key Issues

Explore the reasons behind the emergence of the Cold War and whether it could have been avoided. This inquiry delves into long-term factors, such as Stalinism, Poland, and the Atlantic Charter, as well as key issues like the breakdown of the US-Soviet alliance, conflict during the war, and differing peace aims. Gain insights into the events that shaped this historical period.

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The Inevitability of the Cold War: Long-Term Factors and Key Issues

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  1. Emergence of the Cold War Inquiry Question; To what extent was the Cold War inevitable?

  2. in‘security’? – concerns/actions • Long term factors ie ‘Stalinism’ • Poland egKatyn/Warsaw and Yalta • Atlantic Charter 1941 • ‘Free elections’ • ‘Salami tactics’ • Iran • Soviet ‘expansionism’ • WW2 Western Front • Tehran and Yalta • Japan/Truman • Potsdam • Manhattan Project • ‘Percentages agreement’ • ‘Western expansionism’

  3. 3. BREAKDOWN OF ALLIANCE: AN OVERVIEW • 1917-1944: CAUSES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE • A) LONG TERM CAUSES • B) CONFLICT DURING THE WAR TIME • C) DIFFERENT PEACE AIMS • 1945: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE THE LONG TELEGRAM • 1946: THE COLD WAR STARTS CHURCHILL´S SPEECH

  4. 4. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR • A) LONG TERM CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR • 1. 1917: U.S. HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM • 2. THE “SHOW TRIALS” IN THE SOVIET UNION (1936, 1937, 1938) • 3. 1939: THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN IN 1939. • B) CONFLICT DURING THE WAR TIME • 1. CRACKS IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ALLIANCE • A) ARGUMENT ABOUT THE OPENING OF SECOND FRONT AGAINST GERMANY • B) STALIN´S SUSPICION • C) THE MANHATTAN PROJECT

  5. 4. CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR • C) DIFFERENT PEACE AIMS • ROOSEVELT´S KEY POST-WAR AIMS • INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND CO-OPERATION (UN) • NO FORMAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE • SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY (FREE SPEECH, FREE ELECTIONS) • FREE TRADE (OPEN DOOR) • RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD ECONOMY (IM, WORLD BANK) • STALIN´S KEY POST-WAR AIMS • CO-OPERATION WITH AMERICA • RUSSIAN SECURITY • SPHERE OF INFLUENCE ON SOVIET PERIMETER • RESTORATION OF RUSSIA´S 1914 BORDERS • LIMITING GERMAN POWER • ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET UNION

  6. 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES • A) POLAND • THE YALTA CONFERENCE IN FEBRUARY 1945 AND THE POLISH-QUESTION. • (WHERE THE WEST: 1) OBJECTED THE REVISION OF POLAND´S EASTERN BORDERS; 2) ASKEÐ FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE LONDON POLES IN THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE; 3) WANTED FREE POLISH ELECTION) • IN THE LIGHT OF • THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE 1943. • (IN TEHRAN CHURCHILL HAD SUGGESTED A PERMANENT CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE´S FRONTIERS. RUSSIA COULD REGAIN HER 1914 BOUNDARIES BY ABSORBING EASTERN POLAND, WHILE POLAND WOULD BE CONPENSATED BY RECEIVING PARTS OF EASTERN GERMANY) • AND • THE BILATERAL MEETING IN MOSCOW IN OCTOBER 1944. • (IN THE BILATERAL MEETING IN MOSCOW THE INFORMAL PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED WHERE CHURCHILL ACCEPTED THAT USSR SHOULD HAVE ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE). • THE POLISH QUESTION AND STALIN´S RESPONSE • RUSSIANS DID NOT CONCLUDE FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND • STALIN ABSORBED EASTERN POLAND • HE INITIALLY KEPT HIS PROMISE TO INCLUDE LONDON POLES IN THE LUBLIN COMMITTEE.

  7. 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES • B) ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION • JANUARY 1945. RUSSIA ASKS FOR $ 6 BILLION LOAN AND AMERICAN CONDITIONS • THE TERMINATION OF THE LEND-LEASE IN MAY 1945 • FURTHER REQUEST FOR AMERICAN LOAN IN AUGUST 1945 REJECTED • RUSSIA DID NOT WANT TO BE A MEMBER OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK

  8. 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES • C) ATOMIC WEAPONS • 16 JULY 1945. THE FIRST AMERICAN ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED. AMERICAN ATOMIC MONOPOLY • A) WORRIED STALIN • B) INFLUENCED AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION • C) THE ATOMIC DIPLOMACY

  9. 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES • D) GERMANY • THE YALTA CONFERENCE • AGREEMENTS. (SHARED POST-WAR OBJECTIVES OF USA AND USSR ON GERMANY) • A) LIMITING THE POWER OF GERMANY • B) GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARISATION • C) GERMANY DIVIDED AMONG THE VICTORS INTO FOUR ZONES OF OCCUPATION • D) THE WINNERS ENTITLED TO TAKE REPARATIONS FROM ITS OWN ZONE • E) RUSSIA GRANTED ADDITIONAL REPARATION FROM THE THREE WESTERN ZONES IN EXCHANGE FOR FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS FROM THE SOVIET ZONE • F) THE FOUR ZONES A SINGLE ECONOMIC AREA • DISAGREEMENT OR DIFFERENCES OVER THE YALTA AND POTSDAM AGREEMENTS ABOUT GERMANY • A) GERMAN COAL OUTPUT • 1. USSR: GERMAN COAL AS A REPARATION • 2. USA: GERMAN COAL TO ASSIST IN THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE • B) THE SOVIETS WERE TREATING THEIR ZONE AS A SELFCONTAINED ECONOMIC ENTITY. DID NOT SUPPLY FOOD TO THE WESTERN ZONE • C) DIAGREEMENT OVER THE RUSSIAN DEMAND OF ACCESS TO THE COAL AND STEEL OUTPUT OF THE RUHR VALLEY • D) THE USSR AND THE USA READ DIFFERENT MEANINGS INTO THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT

  10. 5. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE US-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945: KEY ISSUES • E) AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST PRESUPPOSED SOVIET EXPANSION • A) SOVIET OCCUPATION IN MANCHURIA AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE • B) SOVIET OCCUPATIONIN KOREA AND AMERICAN RESPONSE • C) THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PROTEST AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN IRAN • D) THE AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE MOVEMENT OF YOGOSLAVIAN FORCES INTO TRIESTE • E) AMERICAN $ 25 MILLION LOAN TO GREECE.

  11. 6. THE COLD WAR STARTS • 1946: NEW PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION • 1. GEORGE KENNAN´S LONG TELEGRAM IN FEBRUARY 1946. OFFERED A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY • RUSSIAN RULERS HAD ALWAYS BEEN WEAK • NEEDED TO INVENT EXTERNAL ENEMY • THAT ENEMY WAS THE WEST • THEREFORE USSR WAS INEVITABLY EXPANSIONIST AND HOSTILE TO THE WEST • MARXISM-LENINISM WAS THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION • BECAUSE HE TAUGHT THAT COMMUNIST STATES COULD NOT CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH CAPITALIST STATES • 2. WINSTON´S CHURCHILL´S SPEECH IN MARCH 1946 ABOUT THE “IRON CURTAIN”. • “IRON CURTAIN” HAD DESCENDED ACROSS EUROPE FROM STETTIN TO TRIESTE • BEHIND IT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING AN EMPIRE IN EASTERN EUROPE • BEYOND IT THEY WERE ATTEMTING TO PROJECT THEIR POWER BY DIRECTING COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE TO WORK AGAINST ELECTED GOVERNMENTS • 3. SHIFT IN THE PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE US AGAINST THE SOVIET UINION. (IN OTHER WORDS: CHURCHILL´S SPEECH HARDENED THE PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE USA AGAINST THE USSR).

  12. Lightbody p.12-17 • Aims and Interests • TWE did the Soviet quest for security in Eastern Europe against the American quest for liberty make the Cold War inevitable? • Mutual Mistrust • Why did the Wartime Allies fail to reach agreement over the future of Europe?

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