Heung Youl Youm Professor, Soonchunhyang University, Korea Rapporteur, Q.9/SG17, ITU-T

1. Heung Youl Youm Professor, Soonchunhyang University, Korea Rapporteur, Q.9/SG17, ITU-T hyyoum@sch.ac.kr CJK IT Standards Meeting (Collaboration of Security Activity between CJK On NGN and N-RFID Security)

2. Contents • NGN Security • N-RFID Security • Conclusions

3. NGN Security

4. ITU-T FGNGN output for NGN security • FGNGN output • The output of FGNGN moves to SG13, which is lead SG on NGN. • Security requirement for NGN release 1 • Security requirements for the Service Stratum • Security requirements for Transport Stratum • Guideline for NGN release 1 • General • Security of the NGN subsystems

5. Role of each SG for NGN security in ITU-T SG17 Security mechanisms and protocols for NGN security SG16 SG4 SG13 Multimedia security For NGN Management security For NGN Requirements Framework for NGN security SG11 Security of signaling planes For NGN

6. List of new draft recommendations on NGN security (1/2) • SG4 • Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Management • Question 7/SG4: Requirements for business to business and customer to business management interfaces • Question 11/SG4: Protocols for management interfaces • M.NGN-Xsec, Security Requirements for X-Interface • SG11 • Lead Study Group on signalling and protocols • Question 7: Signaling and control requirements and protocols to support attachment in NGN environments • Q.NGN-nacf.sec, Security Signaling Protocol for Network Attachment , Korea

7. List of new draft recommendations on NGN security(2/2) • SG16 • Lead Study Group on multimedia terminals, systems and applications • Question25/16: Multimedia Security in Next-Generation Networks (NGN-MM-SEC) • H.460.spn, Security protocol negotiation • H.FSIC, Federated Architecture for Secure Internet Conferencing • SG17 • Lead Study Group on Telecommunication Security • Question 5: Security Architecture and Framework  • X.akm, Framework for authentication and key management for link layer security of NGN, Korea

8. Key standardization items for NGN security • Cryptographic primitives for NGN security • Key management and Global PKI for NGN • Security for NGN host and network mobility • Security policy issues • Security for access network including link layer security • Adoption of existing standardization produced by other SDOs, like IETF, 3GPP, 3GPP2. • Privacy issues • Guideline for Disaster recovery and emergence telecommunication service • RFID security issues through NGN

9. N-RFID Security

10. Security session of ITU-T N-RFID workshop (Jan. 2006. Geneva) • Three presentations • Security Issues in RFID and Sensor Networks, Kyo-Il Chung, ETRI, Korea • Authentication and privacy capabilities suitable for RFID capabilities suitable for RFID, M. Robshaw, France Telecom R&D, France • Malicious Traceability within RFID Systems, Gildas Avoine, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

11. Observations for N-RFID security(1/2) • Light weight security protocol should be developed to provide the confidentiality, anonymity, un-traceability and forgery protection to counter all types of threats in network-based RFID. • The dedicated techniques may be well-suited to RFID tags and offer a safe foundation. • Preventing from malicious traceability should be provided for privacy protection of RFID, especially for the passport application. • However, key management and scalability are identified to be very challenging problems to be explored.

12. Observations for N-RFID security(2/2) • Some standardization items identified : • Security framework for RFID: • NGN Security architecture for network aspects of identification (including RFID) services and applications; • Various authentication protocol including password access protocol to lock or kill an RFID tag for privacy control; • Privacy management framework and protocol based on a user profile; • Adult confirmation technology; • Protocol for countering malicious traceability; • Secure data exchange protocol for application.

13. Conclusions

14. Conclusions(1/3) • The security will become a mandatory function, not an optional function. That is, the security should be integrated into every level of NGN: access network level, transport stratum, and service stratum. • Seamless service for NGN can only be possible with the aid of security. • The recommendation and technology on the security of networked RFID should be developed to make the N-RFID service feasible in the near future. • We, CJK, are now leading the standardization activities for NGN, especially in SG13 and SG17 in ITU-T. Indeed, 22 out of 35 recommendations are being developed by editors from CJK for SG17.

15. Conclusions(2/3) • Therefore, collaboration between CJK is very important to accelerate the standardization work in ITU-T. • ITU-T has coordinated structure for security; the security framework has been assigned to SG13, and security mechanism and protocol to SG17. • Considering the spirit of coordination on the security in ITU-T, how do we collaborate each other efficiently under CJK IT Standards group? • To make new study items to cover a security-related issues under the CJK group in the near future.

16. Conclusions(3/3) • The scope of security-related study items is as follows, but is not limited to the below areas. • NGN security, RFID security • ISMS, Secure application protocol, Home network • The objective of the security-related activities will be as follows; • To extract the study items for NGN and RFID security; • To coordinate the standardization activities between CJK for NGN and N-RFID security in ITU-T. This presentation was supported by the MIC, Korea, under the ITRC support program supervised by the IITA. (IITA-2005-(C1090-0502-0020))

17. Thank you very much!!