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Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role

BWC IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS. Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role. Richard Lennane Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch).

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Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role

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  1. BWC IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS Strengths and weaknesses of theexisting mechanisms:the BWC and its evolving role Richard Lennane Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs(Geneva Branch) Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  2. BWC strengths and weaknesses • Strengths: • Clear, comprehensive ban: no exceptions, few loopholes • Strong international norm, never publicly challenged • Futureproof (so far...) • Weaknesses: • No organisation or implementing body • No systematic monitoring of implementation or compliance • No systematic assessment of needs or provision of assistance • Uneven national implementation • No mechanism for investigating alleged violations • Conceived to deal with state-based BW programs: covers bioterrorism only indirectly Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  3. Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention Biological Weapons Convention Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ? International Atomic Energy Agency Weapons of Mass Destruction Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  4. Biothreats: the 21st Century view • Government biological weapons programs • Non-state actors: bioterrorism • Naturally-occurring, emerging and re-emerging disease • Rapidly growing biotech capabilities, shrinking costs, and widely expanding interest, participation, availability and access • Unintended consequences, experiments gone wrong • Accidents, leaks, mistakes – or deliberate misuse or sabotage (bio-terror vs. bio-error) • Awareness and management of risks lagging far behind Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  5. Natural disease outbreak WHO BWC Unintended consequences Vandalism, sabotage Deliberate use of BW Accidents Negligence The Spectrum of Biological Risk “We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006 Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  6. Strengthening the BWC: the new way • Focus on improving and coordinating national implementation of BWC • Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise • Range of different actors and organisations involved • Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity • Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  7. OIE WHO FAO New BWC approach: a network model BWC INTERPOL SCR 1540 Work Program ISU State State Professional associations Industry Scientific organisations Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  8. Security vs. Development? Art I / III Art X Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  9. Security vs. Development? Art X Art I / III Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  10. Security vs. Development? Art I / III Art X Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  11. A new vision of the BWC Art. I / III Art. X Mutual reinforcement: cooperation reduces risks; reducing risks encourages cooperation. Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  12. The new vision: examples • Kofi Annan (2006): “Building public health capacities can strengthen safeguards against bioterrorism. And being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall. Similarly, the availability of training and technology is crucial to improving laboratory safety and security, and making labs safe and secure encourages cooperation and creates opportunities for development.” • USA (2009): “In order to implement our Article X commitments, it is critical that we work together to achieve, sustain and improve international capacity to detect, report and respond to outbreaks of disease, whether deliberate, accidental or natural ... Greater cooperation and technical assistance are key to achieving and sustaining the capabilities we need to prevent biological weapons use and to combat infectious diseases.” Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

  13. Strengthening the regime BWC National implementation Non-state partners International/collective Legislation/regulations Professional bodies Organization? Biosafety/biosecurity Science & academia Monitoring/assessment? Enforcement capacity Industry? Investigations? Export controls Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010

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