1 / 24

China-EU Trade Dispute: Anti-dumping on Fasteners

China-EU Trade Dispute: Anti-dumping on Fasteners. Ferima Sidibe Rebecca Tinger Stephanie Trumpower. Agenda. Background: History & Context Main WTO Issues & Specific Provisions EU regulations A/D on Chinese fasteners A/D Investigation process Panel Decision Appellate Body Decision

emmy
Download Presentation

China-EU Trade Dispute: Anti-dumping on Fasteners

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. China-EU Trade Dispute:Anti-dumping on Fasteners Ferima Sidibe Rebecca Tinger Stephanie Trumpower

  2. Agenda • Background: History & Context • Main WTO Issues & Specific Provisions • EU regulations • A/D on Chinese fasteners • A/D Investigation process • Panel Decision • Appellate Body Decision • Implementation/Sanctions • Observations & Concerns

  3. China is the world’s biggest producer of screws, nuts, bolts, and washers, while the EU is its major importer.

  4. Background • China is EU’s 2nd largest trading partner • Since 1979, the EU has initiated over 160 anti-dumping measures against Chinese products • The EU imposed anti-dumping duties of 26.5 to 85% on fasteners from China for five years (January 2009) • Chinese Fastener Industry Association complained country’s fastener industry suffered great losses due to EU’s unfair treatment; led to WTO action • China also retaliated by imposing anti-dumping duties on certain fasteners from the EU (June 2010)

  5. Timeline of Case Jul 31, 2009: China requested consultation with the EU Oct 12, 2009: China requested establishment of a panel Oct 23, 2009: Panel established (3rd parties join) Dec 3, 2010: Panel report circulated Mar 25, 2011: EU notified of decision to appeal Mar 30, 2011: China notified of decision to appeal July 15, 2011: Appellate Body report circulated Aug 8, 2011: EU’s claims to implement report

  6. China’s Claim 1 EU anti-dumping regulations against non-market economies break international trading law and are discriminatory EU applies single anti-dumping duty to whole country rather than for individual firms Provision Inconsistencies: Article 9(5) of EU’s Basic AD Regulation inconsistent with Article XVI:4 of WTO Agreement, Articles I:1, VI:1, and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, and Articles 6.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 12.2.2 and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

  7. Claim 1: EU’s Response Limiting the exporters/producers due to their large number is not only exception Can also apply single margin of dumping depending on “economic realities of those firms.”

  8. Claim 2 • China: Anti-dumping duties on the “like product” fasteners were discriminatory to all types of fasteners, saying that “standard” and “special” fasteners shouldn’t be combined. • Norway (3rd party): Argued Article 2.6 “requires that any given category of the ‘like product’ must be ‘like’ each and every category of the product under consideration.” • Provision Inconsistencies: Nothing in the AD agreement requires an investigating authority to make a determination at a more micro level.

  9. China’s Claim 3 For years, the EU has been carrying out certain systematic wrongdoings in its anti-dumping investigations The EU’s definition of “domestic industry” is biased and thus investigations are not objective Provision Inconsistencies: Anti-dumping Agreement Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3. 5, 4.1, the GATT 1994, Protocol of Accession

  10. Claim 3: EU’s Response The investigating authority has virtually unregulated discretion to exclude whichever producers it wishes, so long as the remaining producers represent a “major proportion”

  11. DSB Panel Board • Brazil • Canada • Chile • Colombia • India • Japan • Norway • Chinese Taipei • Thailand • Turkey • United States

  12. Panel Report The Panel found that Article 9(5) of the Basic Regulation was inconsistent with Articles 6.10, 9.2 and 18.4 of the AD Agreement, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement

  13. Panel Report Cont’d The Panel also found that the EU investigating authorities acted inconsistently with: AD Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2 AD Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.5 AD Agreement Articles 6.4 and 6.2 AD Agreement Article 6.5.1 AD Agreement Article 6.5 and AD Agreement Article 6.5

  14. Main Issues Cont’d • This case, therefore, involves challenges to EC legislation, procedures, and the determination of duties are: • 1. Determination of non-market economy status (NME) unreasonable, not objective and discriminatory. • 2. Separate determination (individual treatment of a party) inconsistent • 3. Insufficient time allowed for response to NME treatment/individual treatment questionnaires • 4. Failure to demonstrate sufficient domestic support for AD initiation • 5. Failure to take into account all appropriate adjustments affecting the comparability of prices • 6. Injury determination – several issues • 7. Use of a sample of domestic producers • 8. Failure to exclude non-dumped imports • 9. Failure to consider evidence on other factors causing decline in domestic market share etc. • 10. Failure to disclose relevant information to interested parties.

  15. Panel Report Cont’d The Panel rejected China’s claims with respect to the: standing determination; definition of domestic industry; product under consideration; dumping determination;

  16. Panel Decision The Panel found that China’s claims concerning the definition of like product; were not within its terms of reference and declined to make findings on these claims. applied judicial economy with respect to some of China’s claims regarding the Basic Regulation and the Definitive Regulation.

  17. Panel Recommendation The Panel recommended that the DSB request the European Union to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. The Panel declined to make a suggestion on how the DSB recommendations and rulings may be implemented by the European Union.

  18. Appeals • March 2011, the European Union notified the DSB of its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body. • March 2011, China notified the DSB of its decision to cross appeal to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the panel report and certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel. • May 2011, the Chair of the Appellate Body notified the DSB that due to the time required for completion of the Appellate Body report, the Appellate Body would not be able to circulate its report within 60 days. The Appellate Body estimated that the report would be circulated to Members by mid-July 2011.

  19. Appellate Body Decision The World Trade Organization ruled in favor of China in its case alleging the European Union is illegally taxing steel fasteners of all sizes needed for everything from furniture to cars to bridges.

  20. Implementation The DSB agreed that, no later than March 2011, adopt the panel report, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to do so or the European Union or China notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU.

  21. Policy Implications Source: Google Images

  22. Observations & Concerns • China’s first trade dispute against EU in WTO • Victory for both Chinese industry and WTO rules • Mostly small & medium-sized firms • Promotes faith in system for industries of all sizes • Could open door to more claims where country’s government is seen to be guiding decision-making in certain export industries • US concern: importance of properly defining the domestic industry (producer/exporter) for purposes of industry analysis • China imposed anti-dumping duties on EU fasteners (June 2010)

  23. Sources "European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, US Executive Summary of US Oral Statement." 1 Apr. 2010. Web. Miao, Yu. "Beijing Hails Global Trade Win Over EU." Global Times. Web. Office of the United States Trade Representative. Proc. of Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China. 28 July 2011. Web Reppert-Bismarck, Juliane Von. "WTO Raps EU Anti-dumping in China Fasteners Case - International Business Times." International Business Times - IBTimes.com. 11 Aug. 2010. Web. "WTO | 2011 News Items - Dispute Settlement Body, Summary of the Meeting, 28 July 2011." World Trade Organization - Home Page. 28 July 2011. Web.

  24. Sources • “DSB establishes panel to examine EC anti-dumping measures on Chinese steel fasteners” 23 October 2009 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/dsb_23oct09_e.htm • “ An introduction to Anti-dumping law of EU and US as it applies to seafood” Hambry Consulting Course Handbook, 2010 • http://www.hambreyconsulting.co.uk/Documents/Course-handbook-eng.pdf • http://www.google.com/imgres?q=trade+china+and+EU&um=1&hl=en&sa=N&biw=1441&bih=710&tbm=isch&tbnid=Ha1RNtVAkXcJrM:&imgrefurl=http://ahdu88.blogspot.com/2010/09/eu-to-press-china-on-rights.html&docid=Wbg9bxd1qGTaxM&imgurl=http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_mDH7JKPsUkA/TJjVe_8tHhI/AAAAAAAAA0Q/zZ0wnNf6Nio/s400/EU__China_trade_ties.gif&w=360&h=270&ei=Ha-cTrW5K8Hk0QHR3pilCQ&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=909&vpy=160&dur=3355&hovh=194&hovw=259&tx=185&ty=108&sig=112766387269108438404&page=1&tbnh=159&tbnw=212&start=0&ndsp=15&ved=1t:429,r:3,s:0

More Related