Sharon Squassoni Senior Associate Toward a Nuclear Renaissance: Fact or Fiction?

1. Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation? Sharon Squassoni Senior Associate Toward a Nuclear Renaissance: Fact or Fiction? Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference April 6, 2009 Maps shown in this presentation were funded by Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

2. 15% global electricity demand 31 countries operating 439 reactors (371 GW) 12 countries where uranium enriched (50 million SWU capacity) 5 countries where spent fuel separated commercially 0 countries with geologic repositories for nuclear waste Nuclear Energy Today

3. 22 13 18.5 UNITED STATES 99 JAPAN46 9 18 5 0.5 4 1 2 2 1 I. Reactor Capacities for all Scenarios*(Gigawatts electric, GWe) OECD EUROPE 129.5 KEY: 2008 Current Capacity I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 –MIT New Capacity

4. II: Commercial Enrichment of Uranium, 2009

5. III: Commercial Reprocessing of Spent Fuel, 2009

6. 1950s: Too cheap to meter? 1960s-mid-70s: Easy to build Late 1970s-1980s: Risky after TMI & Chernobyl 1990s: Uneconomic and unnecessary, particularly for oil producers. Natural gas was the choice in US, Europe 2000s:Acceptable for all. Desirable for all? Paradise Lost…and Regained for Nuclear Power? Over Time, Nuclear Energy Perceived As…

7. Why Nuclear Energy Enthusiasm Now? • Nuclear energy rebranded as “clean, green, secure” • Since 2005, more than 25 states have announced new plans for nuclear power

8. New kinds of reactors? Gen IV, grid-appropriate Different choices for advanced vs. developing states New locations (Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa ) New capabilities Recycling techniques + closed fuel cycles for more states? More states with uranium enrichment? Yet, institutional frameworks are lagging to restrict spread of sensitive nuclear technologies and security and safety regimes not mandatory. Nuclear “renaissance”: More than numbers…

9. Economic models -- only as good as their assumptions (GDP growth, electricity demand, nuclear share) Gov’t plans -- how many reactors cancelled in the mid-1970s? Climate change analyses -- highly speculative, built on many assumptions MIT 2003 1500 GWe scenario (used economic modeling to guess at distribution, but 1500 GWe was assumption) Climate change scenarios IEA Alternative, Stabilisation, EPT BLUE scenarios all make assumptions about availability of technology, life extensions, infrastructure capacity to ramp up Forecasts: Fact or Fiction?

10. Scenario I: Realistic growth to 2030 (economic model EIA; +100 GW) Scenario II: Wildly optimistic (states’ plans) to 2030 (+474 GW) Scenario III: Fourfold increase (based on climate change, MIT’s “high scenario for 2050, +1300 GW) Nuclear Expansion Scenarios

11. 22 5 13 18.5 3 UNITED STATES 99 4 1 JAPAN46 9 18 0.5 1 5 1 5 0.5 4 4 1 9 0.5 3 1 1 4 1 1 3 5 8 10 1 4 4 6 3 5 2 2 10 2 1 1 IV. Reactor Capacities for all Scenarios*(Gigawatts electric, GWe) OECD EUROPE 129.5 KEY: 2008 Current Capacity I. 2030 – EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity IIIb. 2050 – MIT Expansion IIIb. 2050 –MIT New Capacity

12. Enrichment Implications of Reactor Capacity Growth

13. TENEX 22 9 URENCO 8.1 EURODIF10.8 1 JNFL USEC 8 1 1 CNNC 6 6 6 8 8 3 3 RESENDE0.12 0.5 1 1 1 V. Enrichment Capacities for all Scenarios(million SWU/year) KEY: Current Capacity I. 2030 - EIA Forecast II. 2030 – Proposed Expansion II. 2030 – Proposed New Capacity III.b. 2050 - MIT Expansion III.b. 2050 - MIT New Capacity

14. Spent Fuel Implications of Growth • 1 GWe = 20 tons spent fuel/year • Store or recycle? Tough to predict • National waste policies vs. international norms • Existing storage capacities (S. Korea?) • International repository? • Fuel cycle approaches (once-through, one recycle, fast reactors?) and new technologies • Cost Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

15. Major expansion could face limits… • Need to ramp up industry capacity • No more than 10 reactors/yr connected to grid for last 20 years • Bottlenecks for key components (forgings, etc.) • Skilled labor shortage • Not just engineers, but craft labor, qualified construction • Management experience • Olkiluoto and Flammanville • Need to replace aging reactors • According to World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2008 (Mycle Schneider & Antony Froggatt), 339reactors will reach retirement age by 2030. The IAEA’s low growth scenario posits • Closing 145 units • Building 178 new units • Extending lives of 193 units beyond 40 years. --

16. Physical, intellectual nuclear infrastructure Where are they in the process? Knowledgeable commitment (Milestone 1) Readiness to invite bids (Milestone 2) Ready to commission and operate (Milestone 3) Legal, financing, regulatory frameworks Safety, security cultures? Funding? Expansion will require aggressive financial support. Those states that can afford it, might pay. Limits for new nuclear states

17. VI. Proposed “New” Nuclear StatesProposals as of 2008

18. VII. Nuclear Plans and Failed State Index2008

19. Plans in the Middle East Country Plans Date Safeguards Safety Security Liability INFCIRC/153 AP (CNS) (CPPNM)

20. Risk assessment NRC requires designs to meet 1 in 10,000 reactor year frequency of core-damage accident. For 1/20,000 reactor-yr, 40-yr probability of major accident = 8% for 430 plants; 20% for 1100 plants (Matt Bunn, May 2008 briefing) Probability declines if new plants are 1/1,000,000 probability Importance of new safety features Should passive safety designs have active back-ups? When will we know how safe? Safety culture Can it be imported? How many years does it take to develop? What are potential implications of importing all expertise? Mitigating risks High-risk reactors can dominate risk, so phase them out (esp. Soviet-designed) Ensure that in rapid nuclear growth states (China, India) safety is paramount in construction, operation and regulation Do not let cost trump safety in construction Implications for SafetyNumbers, Kinds, Locations, Capabilities

21. Terrorism threat That terrorists could steal directly weapons-usable nuclear material from civilian facilities That terrorists could sabotage npps, fuel storage It matters where plants are, how spent fuel pools are designed, and how tight security is Mitigating the risk Shape fuel cycle to limit amount of directly weapons-usable nuclear material LEU, closed fuel cycle Limit geographic spread of sensitive fuel cycle facilities Enhance focus on security World Institute for Nuclear Security Better adherence to international standards (CPPNM) Implications for SecurityNumbers, Kinds, Locations, Capabilities

22. More LWRs = more expertise, materials in flow, more enrichment. Or CANDUs? If develop a new “second tier” of nuclear energy states, complicates diplomacy in nonproliferation regime New vendors (e.g., China, India, South Korea) might require fewer nonproliferation commitments for trade Prestige and latent capability may factor into decisions about nuclear energy Regional security reverberations? Still no consensus on tighter NSG criteria for enrichment & reprocessing Attractiveness of fuel supply assurances, fuel bank unclear UAE steps positive. Who will follow? Implications for ProliferationNumbers, Kinds, Locations, Capabilities

23. Need to manage risks now Government-government; vendor-vendor Not enough to provide “incentives” for states to forego enrichment, reprocessing Some positive steps (e.g., UAE announcement), but probably the only lasting solution will lie in multilateral facilities Conclusions

24. Recommendations • Nuclear energy where it makes most sense • Promote all energy options (incl. efficiency) and all approaches, including regional facilities, cross-border transmission, regional fuel cycle centers • Let international financial institutions continue with previous approach • Adopt IAEA Additional Protocol as standard of supply • Increase transparency and tighten restrictions on sensitive technologies • Phase out national enrichment plants, perhaps in a legally binding treaty (FMCT?)