Tools of statecraft
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Tools of Statecraft. Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions. I. Military Intervention. Predicting intervention Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention Alliance Portfolios predict side choice. What is an alliance portfolio?.

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Tools of Statecraft

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Tools of statecraft

Tools of Statecraft

Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions


I military intervention

I. Military Intervention

  • Predicting intervention

    • Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict

      • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

      • Alliance Portfolios predict side choice


What is an alliance portfolio

What is an alliance portfolio?

  • All of the allies of a state

  • Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation

    • Better predictor than dyadic alliance!


I military intervention1

I. Military Intervention

  • Predicting intervention

    • Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict

      • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

      • Alliance portfolios predict side choice

      • More likely when existing parity between combatants


Balances of power disparity and parity

Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity

Disparity

Parity


I military intervention2

I. Military Intervention

  • Predicting intervention

    • Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict

      • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

      • Alliance portfolios predict side choice

      • More likely when existing parity between combatants

      • Great powers intervene much more frequently!


2 predicting war initiation

2. Predicting War Initiation

  • What factors increase the probability of war?


A contiguity and proximity

a. Contiguity and Proximity

Contiguity: Sharing common border

MID = Use, threat, or display of force short of war


Proximity loss of strength gradient

Wealthy/Advanced State

Poor State

Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient

Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance

Shift in gradient due to technology or development


B different regime types

b. Different Regime Types

State level finding that magnifies dyadic effects:

Democracies more stable than autocracies, which in turn are more stable than intermediate regimes


C issue type territory

c. Issue Type: Territory


D power parity a balance of power produces war not peace

d. Power Parity: A “Balance of Power” Produces War, Not Peace!

Disparity = Low Risk

Parity = High Risk


War initiators since 1980

War initiators since 1980

  • United States (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq)

  • Iraq (1981 and 1990 attacks on Iran and Kuwait)

  • Israel (1982 and 2006 invasions of Lebanon)

  • Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands)

  • Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on definition)

  • China (1987 attack on Vietnam)

  • Ecuador (1995 war with Peru)

  • Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)

  • Georgia (2008 war with Russia)

  • Pakistan (1999 Kargil War with India)

  • Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC)

    (Note: War is defined as minimum 1000 battle-deaths/year)


B when does intervention work

B. When does intervention work?

  • Who wins interstate wars?

    • Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars.

    • Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors)

    • Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)


Parity leads to long wars makes stalemate more likely

Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely


2 intervention in civil wars

2. Intervention in Civil Wars


2 intervention in civil wars1

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

  • Does intervention lead to compromise?


2 intervention in civil wars2

Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997

Intervention for government

No intervention

2. Intervention in Civil Wars


2 intervention in civil wars3

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

  • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

  • Does intervention prolong wars?


2 intervention in civil wars4

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

  • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

  • Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

  • Is intervention getting more common?


Intervention over time

Intervention Over Time


2 intervention in civil wars5

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

  • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

  • Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

  • Is intervention getting more common? Yes

  • The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice

    • Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak

    • Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people


Ii sanctions and pressure

II. Sanctions and Pressure

  • Predicting Sanctions

    • US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US

      • Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant

      • Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions


Ii sanctions and pressure1

II. Sanctions and Pressure

  • Predicting Sanctions

    • US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US

      • Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant

      • Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

    • General: Asymmetric dependence

      • If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you

      • If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you

      • Problem: Measuring dependence is hard


Example us south africa

Example: US-South Africa

  • 1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade

  • Issue: Apartheid

    • US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions

    • US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones)

    • Question: Why not sanction?


Example us south africa1

Example: US-South Africa

  • Answer: Minerals

  • USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals


Example us south africa2

Example: US-South Africa

  • US needed imports of critical minerals:


F 100 engine use of imported metals f 15 and f 16 aircraft key to air defense in 1980s

F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals(F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s)

Cobalt

910 lbs

73%

(Norway, Finland)

Tantalum

3 lbs

80%

(China)

Titanium

5,366 lbs

77%

(Australia, South Africa)

Columbium

171 lbs

100%

(Brazil)

Aluminum

720 lbs

100%

(Australia)

Chromium

1,656 lbs

80%

(South Africa)

Nickel

5,024 lbs

63%

(Canada)

(Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine)


Example us south africa3

Example: US-South Africa

  • Best case: end trade = price increases

  • Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware


Example us south africa did south africa s minerals make it secure

Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure?

  • No: Fear of resource conflict  nuclear proliferation

    • 1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium

    • 1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence)

    • 1975-1976: US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid

    • “laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation  proliferation

    • 1977-1979: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test)

    • 1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed

    • 1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule


B do sanctions work

B. Do sanctions work?

  • The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed

  • Keys to success

    • Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP

    • Sanction must not harm sender (very much)

    • Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender

  • Success usually takes less than 5 years


Iii foreign aid

III. Foreign Aid

  • Predicting foreign aid

    • In general (who gets the most aid?)

      • Free market countries (especially during Cold War)

      • Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization)

      • Poverty and Debt

    • Specific relationships

      • US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003)

      • Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade

      • Western Europe: Former colonies


B us gives low of gdp for development

B. US Gives Low % of GDP for development…


But still manages to be the largest donor

…but still manages to be the largest donor


1 recent international affairs spending aid and diplomacy surprising stability

1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability


2 long term decline in foreign aid

2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid


3 top three recipients of us aid fy 2001 fy 2009 and 2010 request

3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request)

Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?


C does foreign aid work

C. Does foreign aid work?

  • Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative

    • More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid

    • Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia

  • Aid and growth

    • “Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect

    • “Bad policies:” Aid has no effect

    • Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why?


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