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Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. Daniela Stockmann Department of Political Science Leiden University. Media Marketization in Authoritarian States. Deregulation Commercialization Partial Privatization. Guang Niu/Getty Images. The Puzzle. Media Marketization.

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Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

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  1. Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China Daniela Stockmann Department of Political Science Leiden University

  2. Media Marketization in Authoritarian States • Deregulation • Commercialization • Partial Privatization Guang Niu/Getty Images

  3. The Puzzle Media Marketization Why does media marketization contribute to political liberalization in some countries, but not in others? What is the role of the audience in explaining these outcomes? Political Liberalization & Regime Instability Regime Stability

  4. A. Theoretical Framework and Research Design

  5. A.1. Theoretical Framework State-Society Relations under Authoritarianism Authoritarian rulers stay in power by means of: • Repression (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965; Bellin, 2004) • Exchange of economic benefits in return for political support (Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Lust-Oskar, 2006) • Compliance not explained with regime support

  6. A.1. Theoretical Framework The Dictator’s Dilemma (Wintrobe, 1998) • The use of repression makes citizens hesitant to state their true opinions • The dictator suspects opposition • Distribution of rents as a solution

  7. A.1. Theoretical Framework Marketized Media as a Solution to the Dictator’s Dilemma • Marketized media provide information about citizen beliefs • Media marketization makes the state less reliant on coercive measures • Media become more credible • Marketized media are attractive propaganda instruments But:what happens, if market demands conflict with the official line?

  8. A.1. Theoretical Framework Regime Type and Media Marketization Condition for media marketization to work in favor of authoritarian leaders: • Institutions in charge of editorial control of news content • Single-party regimes tend to have this institutional capacity • Regime type mitigates the effects of media marketization

  9. A.2. Hypotheses Media as Instruments of Regime Stability In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

  10. A.3. Research Design Shenyang Beijing Wuxi Chongqing Foshan

  11. A.3. Research Design Research Design Interviews • Open-ended, semi-structured interviews with 46 media practitioners Content Analysis • Computer-Aided Content Analysis of news reporting in Chongqing and Beijing Public Opinion Surveys • Beijing Area Studies of Beijing Residents (BAS) • Survey of Legal Mobilization conducted in Chongqing, Shenyang, Foshan, and Wuxi (LLM) Experiments • Natural experiment of media management during the 2005 Anti-Japanese protests • Experimental vignettes (among citizens in Beijing) Cross-country Comparison • Collection of macro-level data on authoritarian states in Africa, East Central Europe, and the Middle East

  12. A.3. Research Design Evaluations of Labor Law and Sentiment towards the United States 1. Both issues are open, but related to regime stability • Most-difficult test of counter-hypotheses 2. Issues differ in terms of the relationship between the official line of the state and audience demands • Observation of the relationship between institutions and market forces

  13. A.2. Hypotheses Media as Instruments of Regime Stability In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

  14. B. Evidence from the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing

  15. B.1. Background Media Management During Crisis • Nationalism as a source of state legitimacy • Nationalism poses pressures and constraints on foreign policy towards Japan (and the US) • Media as a tool to “massage” negative sentiment • Except during Crisis

  16. B.2. Empirical Example Timeline Quasi-Experiment

  17. B.2. Empirical Example Newspaper Types in Beijing “Commercialized” “Semi-Official” “Official” Closed Space for News Reporting Open High Low Degree of Media Marketization

  18. B.2. Empirical Example Treatment B.2. Empirical Example

  19. B.2. Empirical Example Media Credibility • Official papers are perceived as propaganda organs and mouthpieces of state units. • Commercialized papers are perceived to publish “real news” from the perspective of “ordinary people.”

  20. B.2. Empirical Example Newspaper Types in Beijing “Commercialized” “Semi-Official” “Official” Closed Space for News Reporting Open High Low Degree of Media Marketization

  21. B.2. Empirical Example Data Analysis Data: Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617) Statistical Models: 1. Media Selection Model DV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable) 2. Media Effects Model DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100) • Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.

  22. B.2. Empirical Example Media Effects Controlling for national identity, exposure to alternative media sources, travel to Japan, education, generation, and gender.

  23. B.2. Empirical Example Media Effects

  24. Summary Despite marketization, newspaper content tends to be uniform. At the same time, marketization boosts the credibility of newspapers, thus promoting the ability of the state to influence public opinion.

  25. Appendix Quasi-Experiment

  26. Assumption of Quasi-Experiment

  27. Official Paper Use(Raw Data)

  28. B.2. Empirical Example Data Analysis Data: Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617) Statistical Models: 1. Media Selection Model DV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable) 2. Media Effects Model DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100) • Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.

  29. B.3. Selection Effects Selection Effects Control variables are not displayed in the table.

  30. B.3. Selection Effects Selection Effects

  31. Selection Effects (Controls)

  32. Media Effects (Controls)

  33. Effects of Exposure to More Commercialized Papers as Reading Additional Papers and Press Restrictions Change

  34. Effects of Reading up Ten Papers as Exposure to Commercialized Papers and Press Restrictions Change

  35. Credibility

  36. Media Labels and Branding Media branding refers to marketing strategies by media outlets to establish themselves as distinctive players in the media market. • Advertising “We make a Paper that is close to YOU!” “The Paper that Responsibly talks about everything!” • Corporate identities • Special columns and famous reporters • Design • Overstepping of boundaries for news reporting (playing table tennis by the edge)

  37. Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (I)

  38. Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (II)

  39. According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Wang Village Colemin owed Deng Pingjun and others, a group of 20 people, wages of more than 30000 Yuan. Approaching the spring festival the migrant workers wanted to visit home and asked several times for their wages, but the cole mine refused due to lack of money. The migrants had no alternative but to go to Beijing city court, demanding to be compensated for their work. To the benefit of the workers, the court took their case very seriously, speeded up the process, and waived the application fee. Under the hard work of the judges the case was resolved through mediation. The migrants received partial compensation on the same day and they had enough money to travel home for new year’s. According to statistics, since my country’s labor law was passed in 1995 the number of accepted cases in the whole nation was 425726. these dispute’s rightful, timely, and proper application had advantages for protecting the legitimate rights of the large working population. The court guided and shaped the complicated labor relations during the reform process, as well as solved the problems arising during reform and development of enterprises. 据(北京晚报/北京日报),王村煤矿欠郑平均等20人劳动报酬3万多元。眼看春节将至,民工们想回家过节,多次向煤矿索要所欠工资,煤矿以无钱为由拒绝给付,民工们万般无奈之下诉至北京市门头沟法院,要求王村煤矿给付所欠劳动报酬。 事关民工的切身利益,门头沟法院对此案非常重视,迅速立案,并根据原告的申请,缓收了案件受理费。在法官们的努力下,此案得以调解结案,民工们在结案当天便领到了部分劳动报酬,有了回家过年的路费。 据统计,自1995年我国劳动法实施以来,全国法院共受理各类劳动纠纷案件425726件。这些纠纷的合法、及时和妥善处理,有力地保护了广大员工的合法权益,各级法院依法引导和规范了改革过程中纷繁复杂的新型劳动关系,及时化解了企业改革和发展中出现的矛盾和问题。 Experimental Vignettes:Official Frame Original source: People’s Daily, 21 March, 2002. “为了员工的合法权益: 人民法院积极处理劳动纠纷案件纪实

  40. According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Liu Dingwei, Li Demin and Chen Qian belong to a group of 19 farmers in the city of Nancheng in Sizhou. Between July and December 2005 they worked at a construction site of TongXin Company in Chengdu. Throughout the process, the company outsourced to Mr. Zou. After arriving at the construction site, Mr. Zou asked Liu Dingwei and the other 18 to hurry up. Working hours and wages were decided by Mr. Zou. While working at the site Mr. Zou only gave these migrant workers a small sum to pay for living expenses. Each migrant’s wages was delayed to a different extent. In total wages in the amount of 26050 Yuan were not paid. Liu Dingwei and the others asked several times for their wages, but without any result although Mr. Zou said he would inquire about the reasons for the delay. In February the workers asked the provincial legal aid center for help. Together with two lawyers and staff they contacted TongXin Company and after positive coordination and communication eventually received a compensation of 13000 Yuan. 据(北京晚报/北京日报),刘定伟、李德敏、陈潜、李庆参等19人均系四川省南充市嘉陵区的农民。2005年7月22日至12月1日在成都某通信有限公司承建的某网络优化网工地务工,该工程承包方是成都某通信公司。在施工过程中,该通信公司将上述工程承包给自然人邹某,邹某接到工程后,遂请刘定伟等19人负责建设施工,工作时间及工资标准由邹某决定,工作过程中邹某只给这些农民工发过一些生活费,每个农民工均不同程度地被拖欠工资,经统计这19名农民工共被拖欠工资26050元。 刘定伟等人曾多次向何某、邹某追索未果,于2007年2月12日到省法律援助中心申请法律援助。工作站刘红、邓冰二位律师及工作人员杜伟数次前往通信公司,与其进行积极协调、沟通,最终于日前达成协议,由通信公司支付劳动报酬23000元。 Experimental Vignettes:Commercialized Frame Original source: Chengdu Evening News, 18 September 2007.” 免费为民工维权 律师不必白干了”

  41. Experimental Vignettes (Gibson and Gows, 2003) Survey Question (asked in all conditions): Source: LLM, 2005. 您有没有听说过 《劳动法》? 总的看来,您认为《劳动法》的贯彻执行对劳动者权利的保护是非常、比较、不太还是完全无效? “Have you heard about the labor law?” If yes, respondent was asked: “In general, is the implementation of the labor law very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective, or not at all effective in protecting workers’ rights?” Variable was coded one if respondent had heard about the labor law and thought it was somewhat or very effective, otherwise it was coded zero. 1 13 out of 138 participants had never heard about the labor law and were therefore not asked the second question. Among those 4 were sampled into the control group and 9 in treatment groups.

  42. Experimental Vignettes:Results

  43. Experimental Vignettes:Results

  44. Institutions

  45. Institutional Restrictions • Sponsoring Institutions • State Publication and Press Agency • Conglomeration • Absence of Media Law • Propaganda Department  Institutions establish boundaries for news reporting

  46. Attitudes toward the United States

  47. B.2. News Content News Reporting about the United States Positivity / Negativity Topics

  48. News Reporting about the United States * Control variables are not displayed in the table.

  49. News Reporting about the United States

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