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SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants – Finnish national research programme 2003-2006

SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants – Finnish national research programme 2003-2006. Overview of the programme prepared by Eija Karita Puska, Director of SAFIR http://www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/safir. Background – Nuclear energy R&D.

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SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants – Finnish national research programme 2003-2006

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  1. SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants – Finnish national research programme 2003-2006 Overview of the programme prepared by Eija Karita Puska, Director of SAFIR http://www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/safir

  2. Background – Nuclear energy R&D • In Finland nuclear energy R&D consist of research in three major areas: • nuclear power plant safety (reactor safety), 39 % • waste management, 50 % • fusion, 10 % • In nuclear power plant safety nearly 40 % of research is done in public research programmes • In waste management only 2 % of research is in the public research programmes

  3. Background - Nuclear Energy R&Din Finland (1999)Total volume 27 million € Research Areas Funding Sources Fusion Research 10 % Others 6 % Others 1 % VTT 10 % EU 6 % FFUSION2 KTM 9 % Reactor Safety 39 % TEKES 11 % XVO 4 % 3 % ALWR 15 % Power companies 53 % STUK 5 % FINNUS Waste Management 50 % 4 % JYT2001

  4. Financing FINNUS 1999 – 2002 and SAFIR 2003 1600 1400 1200 1000 kEuro 800 600 400 200 0 KTM VTT STUK Utilities NKS Other 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Background – Research programmes • The public NPP safety research in Finland is organised into reseach programmes and funded by several partners: • KTM = Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry • VTT = Technical Research Centre of Finland • STUK = Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority • Utilities = Fortum Oyj and Teollisuuden Voima Oy • NKS = Nordic co-operation in nuclear safety

  5. Background - FINNUS 1999 - 2002 • FINNUS Finnish national research programme on nuclear power plants safety1999 – 2002 • Research areas: NPP ageing, accidents and risk, with 11 separate research projects • Total volume 14,4 million € and 130 person years • An extensive summary of the results is presented in the Final report and Executive summary • FINNUS produced nearly 600 publications • FINNUS took care of education of new generation by producing 26 academic degrees • See http://www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/finnus and the printed publications for detailed information

  6. Background - FINNUS 1999 - 2002 • FINNUS contributed to the safe and economic use of nuclear power in Finland as a strong link in the chain of national research programmes by: • developing tools and practices for safety authorities and utilities • providing a basis for safety-related decisions • educating new nuclear energy experts • promoting technology and information transfer • Research continues in SAFIR 2003 – 2006

  7. SAFIR is The mid-field of research and education Safetyof nuclear power plants –Finnishnationalresearch programme SAFIR Regulatoryinspectionsandreviews Safetycase andlicensingevidence Regulatory research Utility research 2003-2006 National research programme

  8. SAFIR = mid-field Safety of nuclear power plants –Finnish national research programme Mid-field research activities Researchactivitiessupportingregulatoryinspectionsdo notbelong toSAFIR. Researchactivitiessupportinglicensingdo notbelong toSAFIR. Regulatory body (STUK) Utilities (TVO, Fortum) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI)

  9. General SAFIR objectives • Basic preparedness • expertise • methods • Education • new experts • experienced experts • Networks • domestic • international

  10. 4. New types ofnuclear power plants 1. New fuel designsand enhanced use 5. Uncertainties associatedwith process safety functions 2. Ensurance of integrity ofan ageing reactor circuit 6. Automation modernizations 3. Ensurance of containmentintegrity and leak-tightness 7. Control room modernizations 11. Risk analysisof external effects 8. Operational developmentwith modern technology 9. Plant lifetime management 12. Risk-informed safetyand operational management 10. Development of organisationalculture and safety management Planning of SAFIR - Future safety challenges integrity design & analysis function initiating events physical barriers plant functions risks operation safety management

  11. Planning of SAFIR - Grouping of challenges 1 1. New fuel designsand enhanced use 2 2. Ensurance of integrity ofan ageing reactor circuit 4. New types ofnuclear power plants 9. Plant lifetime management 4 3 6. Automation modernizations 7. Control room modernizations 3. Ensurance of containmentintegrity and leak-tightness 8. Operational developmentwith modern technology 5. Uncertainties associatedwith process safety functions 5 11. Risk analysisof external effects 6 10. Development of organisationalculture and safety management 12. Risk-informed safetyand operational management

  12. SAFIR 2003 – The Research • 4 million € and 31 person years • 19 research projects • VTT as the major research organisation (some 90 % of research), others • Lappeenranta University of Technology • Fortum Nuclear Services • RAMSE Consulting • plus some other partners as subcontractors

  13. SAFIR 2003 – The Funding

  14. SAFIR 2003 – The Expenses

  15. SAFIR 2003 – Six Research Areas • 1. Reactor fuel and core • 2. Reactor circuit and structural safety • 3. Containment and process safety functions • 4. Automation, control room and information technology • 5. Organisations and safety management • 6. Risk-informed safety management • Each area has a reference group that superwises the research • Additional Ad hoc groups in large areas

  16. SAFIR 2003

  17. SAFIR 2003

  18. SPENT FUEL STORAGE STORAGE FINAL REPOSITORY SEVERE ACCIDENTS TRANSPORTATION IRRADIATION: MATERIAL DAMAGES REFUELING & ACTIVATION SHUTDOWNS ACCIDENTS TRANSIENTS OPERATIONAL STABILITY SAFETY LIMITS COOLANT FLOW HIGH CLADDING WATER BURNUP CORROSION INTEGRITY CHEMISTRY 1. Reactor fuel and core CRITICALITY SAFETY FUEL ICFM CORE FUEL THERMAL MECHANICS ICFM = IN-CORE FUEL MANAGEMENT

  19. SAFIR projects in 2003 1. Reactor fuel and core • Enhanced methods for reactor analysis (EMERALD), 525 k€ / 48 person months / VTT Processes • High-burnup upgrades in fuel behaviour modelling (KORU), 210 k€ / 20,5 person months / VTT Processes

  20. Reactor pressure vessel with joints and internals Loadings Material properties Faults Criteria Re-embrittlement Data Methods Integrity Reactor circuit pipelines Loadings Material properties Geometry LBB Environment Cumulative effects Operating experiences Other reactor circuit components Materials Failure types Loadings Faults Criteria Water chemistry effects Base material Oxide film Flow conditions Impurities 2. Reactor circuit and structural safety Reactor circuit integrity Plant lifetime management Requirements – design – manufacturing Inspection – characterisation – predictions Risk-informed safety management Operational development with modern technology

  21. SAFIR projects in 2003 2. Reactor circuit and structural integrity • Integrity and life time of reactor circuits (INTELI), 1057 k€ / 77,9 person months / VTT Industrial Systems • Ageing of the Function of the Containment Building (AGCONT), 13 k€ / 1,1 person months / VTT Building and Transport • Participation in the OECD NEA Task Group Concrete Ageing (CONAGE), 9,48 k€ / 0,6 person months / VTT Building and Transport • Concrete Technological Studies Related to the Construction, Inspection and Reparation of the Nuclear Power Plant Structures (CONTECH), 100,6 k€ / 8 person months / VTT Building and Transport

  22. Process safety functions Passivesystems Balancedsafety Integrated assessment ofcontainment and process safety functions Severe accidents coolability shutdown conditions long-term aspects plant-specific questions chemistry fission products 3. Containment and process safety functions Containment Potentialreleases,environmentaleffects External threats Effects of ageing oncontainment function Integrity Leak-tightness

  23. SAFIR projects in 2003 3. Containment and process safety functions • Wall Response to Soft Impact (WARSI), 137,7 k€ /13 person months / VTT Industrial Systems • The Integral Code for Design Basis Accident Analyses (TIFANY), 206,8 k€ / 17 person months / Fortum Nuclear Services • Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Nuclear Reactors (THEA), 187 k€ / 12 person months / VTT Processes • Severe Accidents and Nuclear Containment integrity (SANCY), 315,6 k€ / 17 person months / VTT Processes • Fission product gas and aerosol particle control (FIKSU), 98,2 k€ /10,5 person months / VTT Processes • Emergency preparedness supporting studies (OTUS), 50 k€ /4,5 person months / VTT Processes • Archiving experiment data (KOETAR), 60 k€ / 6 person months / Lappeenranta University of Technology • Condensation pool experiments (POOLEX), 152,5 k€ / 15 person months / Lappeenranta University of Technology

  24. Automation Control room Changes in control room work Requirements engineering Verification and validation process Human system interaction (interface design) Qualification process IT Design evaluation Reference model for the work processes Configuration and requirements management Lifetime management Knowledge and information management 4. Automation, control room and information technology

  25. SAFIR projects in 2003 4. Automation, control room and information technology • Interaction approach to development of control rooms (IDEC), 140 k€ /12 person months / VTT Industrial Systems • Application Possibilities of Systematic Requirements Management in the Improvement of Nuclear Safety in Finland (APSREM), 50 k€ / 3,8 person months / RAMSE Consulting

  26. bringing newtechnologyinto operation changingproceduresand habits managementanddecision making maintainingknowledgeand expertise preventingroutineeffects work loadandwearout 5. Organisations and safety management Theoreticaldevelopment Practicalproblems Pressurefor change developmentoftechnology understandingculturalaspects implementationofchanges improvedproductivity& efficiency changesinage structure

  27. SAFIR projects in 2003 5.Organisations and safety management • Organisational culture and management of change (CULMA), 205,7 k€ / 17 person moths / VTT Industrial Systems

  28. Dynamic reliability and risk models Structural reliability and failure models Risk-informed maintenance strategies Multidisciplinary, risk-informed practices involving different technical areas Cost-benefit evaluations in design, operation and monitoring Multidisciplinary risk analysis related to plant lifetime 6. Risk-informed safety management Development of risk analysis Level 1 PSA:plant design Level 1 PSA:plant operation Level 2 PSA: severeaccident management Fire safetyand risk analysis Risk analysisof external effects

  29. SAFIR projects in 2003 6. Risk-informed safety management • Potential of Fire Spread (POTFIS), 158 k€ / 12 person months / VTT Building and Transport • Principles and Practices of Risk-Informed Safety MAnagement (PPRISMA). 258,55 k€ / 24,4 person months / VTT Industrial Systems

  30. SAFIR – The Education • SAFIR is an important forum for education of nuclear experts in Finland • Education takes place via research work in the SAFIR projects • Education is a continuous process • New experts into the nuclear field - largely via tutoring by the old experts • New challenging tasks for the old experts – old experts have to acquire new skills

  31. SAFIR 2003 – The Network • SAFIR is a forum for information exchange and link between researchers and organisations: • some 130 persons involved in the research work in the projects of SAFIR • 80 persons from safety authority STUK, utilities Fortum and TVO, VTT, universities and other organisations involved in the quidance of research via the steering group and six reference groups (meeting 3-4 times annually)

  32. Steeringgroup ad hoc-ryhmät ad hoc-ryhmät ad hoc-ryhmät ad hoc-ryhmät ad hocgroups 6 Reference Groups 1. Reactorfuel & core 2. Reactor circuitand structural safety 6. Risk-informedsafety management 3. Containmentand processsafety functions 5. Organisationsand safetymanagement 4. Automation,control room& IT

  33. VTT’s role in SAFIR • VTT Processes has been selected as the coordination unit for the period 2002-2004 • VTT is the main/responsible partner in 15 out of the 19 research projects in 2003 • VTT has a key role in the funding of SAFIR for 2003 with some 1 million € • VTT’s research units decide independently on their funding in SAFIR and the direction of the funding within SAFIR

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