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Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Division of Nuclear Installation Safety. IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS WORLDWIDE Mamdouh El-Shanawany Head of Safety Assessment Section. Hierarchy of the Safety Standards . Safety Fundamentals. Safety Fundamentals. Requirements.

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department of nuclear safety and security division of nuclear installation safety

Department of Nuclear Safety and SecurityDivision of Nuclear Installation Safety

IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME FOR NPPS WORLDWIDE

Mamdouh El-Shanawany

Head of Safety Assessment Section

slide2

Hierarchy of the Safety Standards

Safety Fundamentals

Safety Fundamentals

Requirements

Requirements

Safety Guides

Safety Guides

Under its mandate the IAEA has developed a logical framework of objectives and principles of nuclear reactor safety.

Safety Fundamentals

  • Set out general principles for protecting people and the environment

Safety Requirements

  • Establish requirements: what has to be done (‘shall’) to apply these principles in meeting objectives

Safety Guides

  • Set out recommended ways (‘should’) of meeting the requirements
examples of safety standards
Examples of Safety Standards
  • Fundamental Safety Principles

SF-1

  • The IAEA Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities Requirements

GS-R-Part4

  • The Safety of Nuclear Power Plant: Design

NS-R-1

slide4

Specific Safety Requirements

General Safety Requirements

Part 1 Governmental and

Regulatory Framework

1. Site Evaluation for

Nuclear Installations

Part 2 Leadership and Management

for Safety

2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

2.1 Design and Construction

2.2 Commissioning and Operation

B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants

Part 3 Radiation Protection and

Safety of Radiation Sources

Part 4 Safety Assessment

3. Safety of Research Reactors

Part 5 Predisposal Management

of Radioactive Waste

4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel

Cycle Facilities

5. Safety of Radioactive Waste

Disposal Facilities

Part 6 Decommissioning and

Termination of Activities

6. Safe Transport of

Radioactive Material

Part 7 Emergency Preparedness

and Response

iaea safety standards
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
  • IAEA has statutory obligation to develop international standards of safety

Article III.A.6 of Statutes:

    • To establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property
    • To provide for the application of these standards
iaea safety standards6
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Safety Standards represent international consensus on the best practices to achieve a high level of safety

iaea safety standards7
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Utilization by Member States

  • Formally adopted (i.e. China, Netherlands)
  • Direct use of standards to establish regulation (i.e. Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea, Russian Federation)
  • Used as reference for review of national standards (by all States also by Industry).
iaea safety review services
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Peer reviews performed upon request of Member States.
  • Assess compliance with Safety Standards and provide recommendations for improvements.
  • Results publically available (unless formally requested by Member State).
iaea safety review services9
IAEASAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Guidelines based on best international practices and feedback from long experience
  • Phased approach
    • Self assessment
    • Preparatory mission
    • Main mission
    • Follow-up mission
  • Modular approach to meet needs of Member States
iaea safety review services10
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
  • International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team (IPSART)
  • Review of Accident management Program (RAMP)
  • Safety Assessment and Design Safety Review Service (SADRS)
  • Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
  • International seismic safety centre Services (ISSC)
  • Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
  • Peer Review of Operational safety Performance Experience (PROSPER)
  • Safety aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO)
  • Safety Culture Assessment Review Team (SCART)
  • Integrated safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR)
  • Safety assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities during operation (SEDO)
iaea safety review services11
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
  • “Customers” of safety review services:
      • 50% Regulators
      • 50%Industry
osart objectives of the osart programme
OSARTobjectives of the OSART programme
  • to provide the host country (regulatory authority, plant/utility management and governmental authorities) with an objective assessment of the status of the operational safety with respect to international standards of operational safety and performance;
  • to provide the host plant with recommendations and suggestions for improvement in areas where performance falls short of IAEA Safety Standards and international best practices;
objectives of the osart programme
Objectives of the OSART programme
  • to provide key staff at the host plant with an opportunity to discuss their practices with experts who have experience of other practices in the same field;
  • to provide all Member States with information regarding good practices identified in the course of the review;
  • to provide experts and observers from Member States and the IAEA staff with opportunities to broaden their experience and knowledge of their own field.
standard osart review scope 9 areas
Standard OSART review scope: 9 areas
  • Management, organization and administration (MOA)
  • Training and qualification (TQ)
  • Operations (OP)
  • Maintenance (MA)
  • Technical support (TS)
  • Operational experience feedback (OE)
  • Radiation protection (RP)
  • Chemistry (CH)
  • Emergency planning and preparedness (EPP)
  • (+ Commissioning [COM] for pre-operational OSART)
customized osart review scope
Customized OSART review scope

Customized review scope = core areas + selected optional areas

New optional areas in development:

  • Long Term Operation
  • Transition from Operations to Decommissioning
  • Probabilistic Safety Assessment Applications
  • Accident Management
osart missions 2006 2007
OSART missions 2006, 2007

2006

  • Lithuania, Ignalina
  • Slovakia, Mochovce
  • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 3
  • France, St. Laurent

2007

  • Finland, Loviisa
  • Korea, Yongwang
  • Belgium, Tihange
  • Germany, Neckarwestheim
  • Ukraine, Khmelnitsky
  • France, Chinon
osart missions 2008 2009
OSART missions 2008, 2009

2008

  • Sweden, Forsmark
  • Russia, Balakovo
  • USA, Arkansas
  • France, Cruas
  • Ukraine, Rovno 3,4

2009

  • Japan, Mihama
  • Sweden, Oskarshamn
  • France, Fessenheim
  • Spain, Vandellos 2
  • Ukraine, S. Ukraine 1,2*
  • China, Ling Ao 3,4**

* Limited scope

** Pre-operational

osart programme 2006 200 9

5

9

3

3

1

0

0

OSART PROGRAMME 2006-2009

21 OSART missions:

Western Europe 9

Central Europe 3

Eastern Europe 5

Asia 3

North America 1

South America 0

Africa 0

osart missions for russian npps
OSART Missions for Russian NPPs

A number of OSART missions were requested by Russian NPPs during the period 1989–1993, which are listed below:

PlantReactor typeYear

Gorky (Pre-operational) district heating NP 1989

Novovoronezh 3/4 VVER 440/179 1991

Kola 1/2 VVER 440/ 230 1991

Smolensk 3 RBMK 1000 1993

All of these missions were combined review of design and operational safety, not the current standard OSART programme.

osart missions for russian npps20
OSART missions for Russian NPPs

More recently, the Russian NPPs management requested full OSART and follow up for two more plants:

PlantReactor typeOSARTOSART FU

Volgodonsk VVER-1000 2005 2007

Balakovo VVER-1000 2008 2010

osart missions for russian npps21
OSART missions for Russian NPPs

The following points were noted from overall assessment of the results of OSART missions to Volgodonsk and Balakovo NPPs:

  • Evidence of significant efforts were spent by the plants to prepare for the OSART;
  • Relatively low number of areas for improvement;
  • Most areas for improvements are suggestions, only a few recommendations;
  • Relatively high number of good practices;
  • During the OSART Follow-up missions the team observed that:
  • A high ratio of issues fully resolved, the rest progressing satisfactorily towards completion, with no issues having insufficient progress;
  • The plants responded with corrective actions not only to recommendations and suggestions but also to encouragements, which is the lowest category of advice;
  • The corrective actions were applied not only at the plant hosting the OSART but across the fleet of Rosenergoatom.
osart missions for russian npps22
OSART missions for Russian NPPs

Future plans for OSART missions in Russia are being considered. There is an agreement with the utility Rosenergoatom to organize an OSART mission to a Russian NPP site every three years:

PlantReactor typeYear

SmolenskRBMK 2011

Kola VVER 440/213 2014

By completing these reviews the OSART programme will then have cover all major reactor designs operated in Russia.

nuclear installation safety generic reactor safety reviews grsr
Nuclear Installation Safety Generic Reactor Safety Reviews (GRSR)

The IAEA is assisting Member States in their new reactor design assessments by carrying out reviews of reactor design safety cases with focus on completeness and comprehensiveness of the safety case using selected and applicable IAEA Safety Fundamentals and Requirements.

.

generic reactor safety review objectives
Generic Reactor Safety ReviewObjectives
  • The aims of the review are to:
  • Determine whether the reactor design safety case follows the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles,
  • Determine whether the selected safety requirements defined in GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 are being addressed in the design safety case and identify any that have been omitted,
  • For those requirements that are addressed, form a view on whether they are being addressed in a way that is consistent with the spirit of the IAEA requirements,
  • For the safety requirements that are not being addressed or are partially addressed, form a view on their relative significance and highlight their importance to safety.
  • Identify if the supplied documentation includes proper references/evidence as technical supporting information.
generic reactor safety review area and scope
Generic Reactor Safety ReviewArea and Scope

The review focuses on:

A. Completeness

  • Does the documentation provide a complete overview of the safety case or are there gaps?
  • if so are these made explicit and is there any indication of what is being done to fill them (NB this applies to both the safety of the design and the safety case itself)?
  • Is evidence provided that substantiates the safety claims and arguments being made?

B. Comprehensiveness

  • Are all modes of operation covered, e.g. outages, refuelling, maintenance, start-up, shutdown?
  • Are all features of the facility included e.g. fuel stores, spent fuel storage, auxiliary systems, steam turbines?
  • Are lifetime issues covered e.g. ageing management; provision for maintenance, repair, replacement with respect to radiological risks/doses; decommissioning; radioactive waste minimisation in maintenance, repair and replacement?

Assisting Member States to implement the IAEA safety standards

slide27

Generic Reactor Safety ReviewSafety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements

Safety Standards used in IAEA generic evaluation of safety of new reactor designs :

Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1

Safety Standards against which the reviews are conducted

Safety Assessment Requirements, GS-R-4

Design Safety Requirements NS-R-1

Supporting guidance documents

Design Safety Guidelines

Safety Assessment Guidelines

slide28

IAEA Safety Requirements andGeneric Reactor Safety Review

LICENSING

FUTURE STATE

MS REQUIREMENTS

AND CRITERIA

LICENSING

IAEA

SAFETY STANDARDS

REQUIREMENTS

REVIEW

REVIEW

MS REQUIREMENTS

AND CRITERIA

HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS

GLOBAL NUCLEAR

SAFETY REGIME

REVIEW

FUTURE MDEP CONTRIBUTION

MS REQUIREMENTS

AND CRITERIA

REVIEW

MS REQUIREMENTS

AND CRITERIA

LICENSING

LICENSING

generic reactor safety review report contents
Generic Reactor Safety Review Report Contents

The Executive Summary :

General Reporting:

  • Description of the review’s scope, objectives, implementation, and safety requirements selected for the review

Review Results:

  • General comments on the quality and completeness of the documents screened
  • A review of selected design features with observations and recommendations highlighting specific findings on technical topics (e.g. safety functions, reactor core and associated features, reactor coolant system, containment, I&C, human factors defence in depth, use of PSA and DSA, etc.)

Review Sheets for each Safety Requirement :

  • Detailed screening comments on each requirement and sub-paragraph of GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 reviewed
slide30

Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009 Activities

ACR 1000 - AECL

AP1000 - Westinghouse

EPR - AREVA

ESBWR – GE Hitachi

ATMEA 1 – AREVA – MHI

APR1400 – KHNP

slide31

Generic Reactor Safety Review 2006-2009 Activities

2006-2007 - Concept Development and Planning

2007-2009GRSR Reviews Conducted :

  • UK HSEScreening of Four New Reactor Safety Cases submitted for the consideration of the UK Health and Safety Executive/ NII against DS348: ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR

(initiatedSeptember 2007 – completed March 2008)

  • ATMEA1 Screening of Conceptual Design Safety File and its innovative features against DS348 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1

(initiated10 December 2007 – completed June 2008)

  • AP1000 Screening of AP1000 Safety and Environmental Report and its innovative features against DS348 and NS-R-1

(initiated13 February 2008 – completed January 2009)

  • APR1400 Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and Environmental Report against GS-R- Part 4 and NS-R-1

(initiated15 October 2008 – completed August 2009)

Projects in the planning stages:

  • APR1000 Screening of the Korean APR1000 has been requested and initial discussions with KEPCO are ongoing.
slide32
IAEA

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY CENTRE

(INSC)

slide33

BACKGROUND

  • There are 436 nuclear power reactors in operation worldwide, and over 50 reactors are under construction.
  • Large number of countries without any previous nuclear experience considers implementation of nuclear power programmes in the next decade.
  • Safety assessment capacity is the primary means for decision-making in support of design, licensing and operation activities.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide34

Safety Assessment provides the foundation for:

          • SUCCESSFUL DESIGN,
          • LICENSING, AND
          • OPERATION
  • The development of an efficient and competent safety infrastructure in all Member States with nuclear power programmes or planning deployment of nuclear power system for the first time is a must!
  • A significant element of the safety infrastructure is the safety assessment capability:
  • there is no safety without safety assessment!

Safety cannot be assured without robust safety assessment

slide35

Hence: comes the need to increase global safety assessment capacity for new nuclear power plant,

  • and the need to assist Member States in the applications of integrated safety assessment approach in order to reach informed safety decisions based on IAEA safety standards.
  • The IAEA is establishing the International Nuclear Safety Centre (INSC).

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide36

OBJECTIVES of INSAC 1/2

  • Implementing integrated and harmonized methods and approach to safety assessment of nuclear installations and to assist in its applications.
  • The INSC framework and platforms will be used to:
  • 1. Support safety standard preparation through providing for technical bases;
  • 2. Provide comprehensive IAEA advisory and review services;

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide37

OBJECTIVES of INSAC 2/2

  • 3. Support Member States in safety capacity building, maintenance and knowledge management;
  • 4. Provide networking systems and facilitate effective knowledge and information sharing and collaboration.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide38

Advanced Education and Training

Reviews and Advisory Services

IAEA

SAFETY STANDARDS

HARMONIZING SAFETY ASSESSMENTS

Advanced Safety Assessment

and

Engineering Tools

International Network

COMPETENCY AND CAPACITY BUILDING

slide39

EXPECTED RESULTS

  • The INSAC will harmonise safety assessment competency and capacity building efforts.
  • It will provide leadership and management of safety assessment methodologies based on an integrated structured approach.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide40

Examples: PERFORMANCE MEASURES

  • The number of developed Technical Documents and Guides related to the interpretation of safety assessment requirements. Development and application of Generic Reactor Safety Review methodology,
  • Development and application of methods/guidance documents for;- Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making process,- Safety Performance Indicators and applications, - “Safety Goals” and its applications.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

slide41

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

  • Implementation of integrated safety review services of safety assessment approach developed. Number of advisory service conducted per year
  • Development of safety assessment knowledge requirement & implementation of capacity building. Number of training courses and workshops prepared and conducted per year
  • Development and use of e-platform such as CASAT. To foster collaboration and network platform promoting harmonization of nuclear safety assessment concepts and approaches worldwide in operation. Web-bases system setup for collaboration and networking, data base for training and methods validation.

Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment

concluding remarks
Concluding Remarks
  • The IAEA is willing and ready to support safety enhancements through the establishment and application of Safety Standards, Safety Review and Advisory Services and International Instruments.
  • The IAEA is successfully performing safety assessments of new reactor designs using the current Safety Standards.
  • Current Safety Standards are a first basis for harmonization.
  • All IAEA publications are available at:

http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/publications.asp