Outline • Safety file • Descriptive part • Hazard inventory • Demonstrative part • Operational part • Feedbacks • Other recommendations from safety review HiRadMathearing session: safety file HiRadMatHearing session CERN, July 27, 2011 S. Evrard – EN/MEF EDMS No: 1155047
Demonstrative part • Main risks assessed: • Radiation • Beam • Vacuum • Fire • Environment • Decommissioning
Risk Management Example • Design stage: • Fluka simulations CV and Ramses design • Dedicated handling means (lifting jig and eyes) • Prefabricated structure (easily removable) • Activated material management plan • Maintenance plan (reduced time in TNC) • Organizational measures • Frequent radiation survey of TNC tunnel • Dedicated RP training • ALARA, JOLI & DIMR preparation with all stakeholders • On-site close RP monitoring • Technical measures • Access , ventilation and RP sectorization • Ventilation system • Ramses monitoring system • Remote controlled PR532 crane • Personal measures • IPE, dosimeters, … Stray radiation (external exposure) Airborne contamination decrease AbsoluteFilter exchange Equipment remotehandling
Operation part • This part of the HiRadMat Safety File is an inventory of all operational documents needed in order to optimize the exploitation of the project HiRadMat especially in terms of safety. • These operational documents are of three kinds: • Information note • Operational instructions and procedures • Control and test reports
Feedback part This part of the HiRadMat Safety File is an inventory of all feedbacks, mishap reports as well as experience gained reports which are very important to take into account in order to optimize the exploitation of the HiRadMat facility especially in terms of safety.
Other recommendations from safety review • Risk assessment cables = the main hazard • Prevention measures in place (fire detection, extinguishing means, air tightening campaign) • Fire in the HiRadmat facility – operation mode • Operation mode means that the situation is under control: all the doors are closed in the facility and nobody is present underground, i.e. no human life in stake. • Fire in the HiRadmat facility – shutdown mode • Shutdown mode means that the situation is not under control: all the doors could be or are open in the facility and people are present underground, i.e. human lives are at stake. • Fire in the SPS • A fire in the SPS could than affect the HiRadMat facility. Therefore it is proposed to equip the door PPG 6905 (separating TCC6 and TJ7) with lock springs in order to ensure that the door is closed at all times and thus prevents smoke to enter into the HiRadMat facility area. • Cold smoke extraction Risk and incidents withfire
Other recommendations from safety review Two escape ways are considered depending on where the event causing the evacuation is triggered. The recommended way is passing through TJ7, then TA7, PA7 and return to the surface via the BA7 access point via the staircases. If someone is blocked in TNC and cannot escape using this recommended way, an alternative way is in place via the B.846 shaft. Escape ways to bedefined
Other recommendations from safety review 2 visits on-site with FB FB safety assessment Modifications in progress (deadline = september) B.846 shaftsafetyassessment as escape way Top escape pit -The yellow balk under the plafond can be used as anker point, if it can bear a load of 35 kN. (if this is not the case, 2 points should be constructed as the point halfway the pit. -Red telephone with direct contact to fire brigade (in function) -Door to exit, which can’t be locked by keys Halfway ladder escape pit -Anker points (2 points, one of 35 kN above the shaft and one of 10 kN above the ladder) - Possibility to remove fence - Possibility to close the hole to stairs End of HIRADMAT experiment - AUG (clear visible next to the escape door) - Red telephone (clear visible next to the escape door) Bottom escape pit -Red telephone at the bottom of the pit (separated from HIRADMAT experiment), with direct contact to fire brigade - Entrance door, which can be opened in emergency without key. - (to discuss) Sign that explains that before the use of this shaft the FB must be informed and contact with FB is mandatory once the top has been reached. If desired FB can secure ascension.
Other recommendations from safety review SPS sector 6&7 Seal on PPG710 B.846 shaft patrolled only if seal broken or patrol box dropped Searchprocedure
Other recommendations from safety review • The various incidents and faulty situations that can occur in operating the HiRadMat facility have been identified and are listed here below: • Vacuum window failure • Beam loss incident • Ventilation failure • PR532 crane failure • Contamination spread around the test bed Abnormal conditions and accident scenarios
Other recommendations from safety review • Access to BA7/TA7, TJ7, TCC6 tunnels • 17 steps or actions identified involving user, CCC operator, RP technician before access is granted • Access toBA7/material shaft • idem • Access toBA7/TNC tunnels • Idem + work notification and DIMR • Checklist for End of Access in HiRadMat Defineaccess conditions
Outcome • Thanks to the fruitful collaboration of many of you, a complete set of safety documents is ready for approval • It is not only safety documentation but some hardware modifications were implemented and communication among safety stakeholders is improved (CCC operators, Fire Brigade,…) • Ways of improvement: • Information is somehow fragmented one single user document needed • Demonstrative part to be more specific • Safety file will evolve in the course of the facility operation Safety file