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Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels. Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Institut für Sozialwissenschaften Politik und Verwaltung. Work (VERY MUCH) in progress Not for citation/ quotation please.

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playing with the grown ups regional influence in brussels

Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels

Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer

Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung

  • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress
  • Not for citation/quotationplease
playing with the grown ups regional influence in brussels1

Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels

Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer

Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung

  • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress
  • Not for citation/quotationplease
playing with the grown ups regional influence in brussels2

Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels

Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer

Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung

  • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress
  • Not for citation/quotationplease
structure
Structure
  • Puzzle & Research question
  • Explanatory framework & hypotheses
  • Data, operationalisation & methodology
  • Findings & discussion
structure1
Structure
  • Puzzle & Research question
  • Explanatory framework & hypotheses
  • Data, operationalisation & methodology
  • Findings & discussion
structure2
Structure
  • Puzzle & Research question
  • Explanatory framework & hypotheses
  • Data, operationalisation & methodology
  • Findings & discussion
structure3
Structure
  • Puzzle & Research question
  • Explanatory framework & hypotheses
  • Data, operationalisation & methodology
  • Findings & discussion
structure4
Structure
  • Puzzle & Research question
  • Explanatory framework & hypotheses
  • Data, operationalisation & methodology
  • Findings & discussion
puzzle rq 1 2
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 21
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 22
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 23
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 24
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 25
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 26
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 27
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 28
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 29
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 1 210
Puzzle & RQ (1/2)

Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU:

  • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS)
  • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s)
  • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009)
  • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013)
  • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013)

Gap = what actual influence over outcomes

  • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass)
  • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence)
  • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)
puzzle rq 2 2
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 21
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 22
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 23
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 24
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 25
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 26
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

puzzle rq 2 27
Puzzle & RQ (2/2)

Research questions:

  • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive)
  • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical)

Relevance (why should we care)?

  • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010)
  • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay)
  • Democracy & size

= a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

explanatory framework 1 1
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 11
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 12
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 13
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 14
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 15
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 16
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 17
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 18
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 19
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranationalembeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 110
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 111
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 112
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

explanatory framework 1 113
Explanatoryframework (1/1)

H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size

H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels

H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies

H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested)

H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness

H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels

H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there

Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

data operationalisation 1 5
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 1 51
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 1 52
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 1 53
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 1 54
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 1 55
Data & operationalisation (1/5)

Three options to evaluate influence:

  • Process tracing:
    • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses
    • BUT: few cases (case study approach)
  • Preference attainment
    • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome
    • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck?
  • Attributed influence:
    • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations
    • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)
data operationalisation 2 5
Data & operationalisation (2/5)
  • Survey administrative élites (phone & native)
    • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility
    • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES
      • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004)
      • East, West, South (but no North)
    • In different regions (6 to 19 per country)
    • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries
      • 1 to 12 individuals per region
      • 50 to 76 individuals per country
      • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)
data operationalisation 2 51
Data & operationalisation (2/5)
  • Survey administrative élites (phone & native)
    • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility
    • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES
      • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004)
      • East, West, South (but no North)
    • In different regions (6 to 19 per country)
    • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries
      • 1 to 12 individuals per region
      • 50 to 76 individuals per country
      • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)
data operationalisation 2 52
Data & operationalisation (2/5)
  • Survey administrative élites (phone & native)
    • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility
    • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES
      • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004)
      • East, West, South (but no North)
    • In different regions (6 to 19 per country)
    • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries
      • 1 to 12 individuals per region
      • 50 to 76 individuals per country
      • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)
data operationalisation 2 53
Data & operationalisation (2/5)
  • Survey administrative élites (phone & native)
    • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility
    • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES
      • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004)
      • East, West, South (but no North)
    • In different regions (6 to 19 per country)
    • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries
      • 1 to 12 individuals per region
      • 50 to 76 individuals per country
      • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)
data operationalisation 2 54
Data & operationalisation (2/5)
  • Survey administrative élites (phone & native)
    • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility
    • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES
      • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004)
      • East, West, South (but no North)
    • In different regions (6 to 19 per country)
    • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries
      • 1 to 12 individuals per region
      • 50 to 76 individuals per country
      • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)
data operationalisation 3 5
Data & operationalisation (3/5)

Dependent variable

(phone)

methodology 1 2
Methodology (1/2)

Theoretical expectations:

  • Non-independence of observations, according to region and country

=> Hierarchical modelling

Multi-level structure:

  • ICC regional level ≈ .35 (LR test)
  • ICC country level ≈ .23 (LR test)

=> Three-level model, maximum likelihood estimation (random intercept model)

methodology 2 2
Methodology (2/2)

A note on missing values:

  • Lost 17 obsmissingness on DV
  • Further 34 obs missing due to IVs
  • Decision to impute
  • Imputation by chained equation through ICE
    • Don’t assume multivariate normal distribution
    • Has lower sample size requirements
  • Does not affect results: onlyslight variations
    • (CoRhelpfulness)
findings 2 36
Findings (2/3)

If no direct effect, a conditional one?

findings 3 3
Findings (3/3)

Visual representation of marginal effects, withkerneldensityestimates of conditioning variable and 90% ci.

Based on full models

findings 3 31
Findings (3/3)

population

Central gvt help

Visual representation of marginal effects, withkerneldensityestimates of conditioning variable and 90% ci.

Based on full models

CoR help

COM help

Nat Embed

EU Embed

findings 3 32
Findings (3/3)

population

Central gvt help

Visual representation of marginal effects, withkerneldensityestimates of conditioning variable and 90% ci.

Based on full models

CoR help

COM help

Nat Embed

EU Embed

discussion 1 3
Discussion (1/3)
  • Methodologically
    • Between country & between region variation remains important:
      • Partly due to few region and no country-level covariates
      • Relevance of regional and national patterns for RQ.
      • Future research: try to better model between region and country variance.
discussion 1 31
Discussion (1/3)
  • Methodologically
    • Between country & between region variation remains important:
      • Partly due to few region and no country-level covariates
      • Relevance of regional and national patterns for RQ.
      • Future research: try to better model between region and country variance.
discussion 1 32
Discussion (1/3)
  • Methodologically
    • Between country & between region variation remains important:
      • Partly due to few region and no country-level covariates
      • Relevance of regional and national patterns for RQ.
      • Future research: try to better model between region and countryvariance.
discussion 2 3
Discussion (2/3)
  • Relevant factors:
    • Population and EU embeddedness:
      • The bigger & more populous, the more influent (size & representation), magnified by decentralisation
      • The more supranationally embedded, the more influent, magnified by decentralisation
    • The Commission is most helpful to the least influent, although effect reversed by decentralisation
    • Decentralisation, does not have a direct effect, but a conditional one; magnifying or reversing the effect of other factors
discussion 2 31
Discussion (2/3)
  • Relevant factors:
    • Population and EU embeddedness:
      • The bigger & more populous, the more influent (size & representation), magnified by decentralisation
      • The more supranationally embedded, the more influent, magnified by decentralisation
    • The Commission is most helpful to the least influent, although effect reversed by decentralisation
    • Decentralisation, does not have a direct effect, but a conditional one; magnifying or reversing the effect of other factors
discussion 2 32
Discussion (2/3)
  • Relevant factors:
    • Population and EU embeddedness:
      • The bigger & more populous, the more influent (size & representation), magnified by decentralisation
      • The more supranationally embedded, the more influent, magnified by decentralisation
    • The Commission is most helpful to the least influent, although effect reversed by decentralisation
    • Decentralisation, does not have a direct effect, but a conditional one; magnifying or reversing the effect of other factors
discussion 2 33
Discussion (2/3)
  • Relevant factors:
    • Population and EU embeddedness:
      • The bigger & more populous, the more influent (size & representation), magnified by decentralisation
      • The more supranationally embedded, the more influent, magnified by decentralisation
    • The Commission is most helpful to the least influent, although effect reversed by decentralisation
    • Decentralisation, does not have a direct effect, but a conditional one; magnifying or reversing the effect of other factors
discussion 3 3
Discussion (3/3)

Scope for generalisation:

  • Though 5 countries and 60 regions (different accession waves & geography):
    • Extend findings to similar countries
    • Reluctance to extend to other “country types”.
      • E.g. nordic, baltic, Anglo-Saxon countries, especially considering that between country variance is persistent
  • Summary: Regions are less influential than assumed:
    • Population size & EU embeddedness are crucial
    • The Commission is most helpful of the least influential
    • Decentralisation has an indirect, conditioning effect
discussion 3 31
Discussion (3/3)

Scope for generalisation:

  • Though 5 countries and 60 regions (different accession waves & geography):
    • Extend findings to similar countries
    • Reluctance to extend to other “country types”.
      • E.g. nordic, baltic, Anglo-Saxon countries, especially considering that between country variance is persistent
  • Summary: Regions are less influential than assumed:
    • Population size & EU embeddedness are crucial
    • The Commission is most helpful of the least influential
    • Decentralisation has an indirect, conditioning effect
discussion 3 32
Discussion (3/3)

Scope for generalisation:

  • Though 5 countries and 60 regions (different accession waves & geography):
    • Extend findings to similar countries
    • Reluctance to extend to other “country types”.
      • E.g. nordic, baltic, Anglo-Saxon countries, especially considering that between country variance is persistent
  • Summary: Regions are less influential than assumed:
    • Population size & EU embeddedness are crucial
    • The Commission is most helpful of the least influential
    • Decentralisation has an indirect, conditioning effect
discussion 3 33
Discussion (3/3)

Scope for generalisation:

  • Though 5 countries and 60 regions (different accession waves & geography):
    • Extend findings to similar countries
    • Reluctance to extend to other “country types”.
      • E.g. nordic, baltic, Anglo-Saxon countries, especially considering that between country variance is persistent
  • Summary: Regions are less influential than assumed:
    • Population size & EU embeddedness are crucial
    • The Commission is most helpful of the least influential
    • Decentralisation has an indirect, conditioning effect
thank you

Thankyou!

QUESTIONS