Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels

1. Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress • Not for citation/quotationplease

2. Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress • Not for citation/quotationplease

3. Playing with the grown-ups: regional influence in Brussels Michaël Tatham & Michael W. Bauer Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinInstitut für SozialwissenschaftenPolitik und Verwaltung • Work(VERY MUCH) in progress • Not for citation/quotationplease

4. Structure • Puzzle & Research question • Explanatory framework & hypotheses • Data, operationalisation & methodology • Findings & discussion

5. Structure • Puzzle & Research question • Explanatory framework & hypotheses • Data, operationalisation & methodology • Findings & discussion

6. Structure • Puzzle & Research question • Explanatory framework & hypotheses • Data, operationalisation & methodology • Findings & discussion

7. Structure • Puzzle & Research question • Explanatory framework & hypotheses • Data, operationalisation & methodology • Findings & discussion

8. Structure • Puzzle & Research question • Explanatory framework & hypotheses • Data, operationalisation & methodology • Findings & discussion

9. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

10. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

11. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

12. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

13. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

14. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

15. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

16. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

17. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

18. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

19. Puzzle & RQ (1/2) Cumulative knowledge on regions in the EU: • Determinants of mobilisation (e.g. Marks et al 1996, CPS) • Channels of interest representation (Hooghe, 90s) • Objectives (from Marks et al, 2002 to Mbaye, 2009) • Networking patterns (Salk et al 2001 to Donas and Donas & Beyers, 2012, 2013) • Interaction styles (Tatham, 2010, 2012, 2013) Gap = what actual influence over outcomes • Potential & characteristics (new opportunities & bypass) • Case studies: process tracing (individual regional influence) • General assessment: optimistic VS damning (LI, Jeffery, 2000 & 2007)

20. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

21. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

22. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

23. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

24. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

25. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

26. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

27. Puzzle & RQ (2/2) Research questions: • How successful are regions in influencing decisions in Brussels? (descriptive) • How can we account for variation in success? (analytical) Relevance (why should we care)? • Increasing decentralisation in established democracies world wide (more & more w/ more & more powers, Hooghe et al, 2010) • Growing regional presence in Brussels (here to stay) • Democracy & size = a very special category of stakeholders in the Brussels polity

28. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

29. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

30. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

31. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

32. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

33. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

34. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

35. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

36. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

37. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranationalembeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

38. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

39. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

40. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

41. Explanatoryframework (1/1) H1. Lobbying success in Brussels is a function of a region’s capacity and size H1a. The greater the region’s capacity for good government, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1b. The greater the region’s decentralisation level, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H1c. The more populous the region, the more successfully will it influence decisions in Brussels H2. Lobbying success in Brussels is determined by a region’s policy allies H2a. The more central government is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H2b. The more the Commission is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels (contested) H2c. The more the CoR is perceived as a helpful partner to influence EU legislation, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3. Lobbying success in Brussels is affected by national and supranational embeddedness H3a. The greater national embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3b. The greater EU embeddedness, the greater the success at influencing decisions in Brussels H3c. Regions benefiting from a Brussels office will more successfully influence decisions there Between theory building and theory testing; mainly deductive but also partly inductive.

42. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

43. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

44. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

45. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

46. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

47. Data & operationalisation (1/5) Three options to evaluate influence: • Process tracing: • high internal validity & testing rival hypotheses + generate new hypotheses • BUT: few cases (case study approach) • Preference attainment • Compare expressed preference and policy outcome • PB: success rather than influence? Power VS luck? • Attributed influence: • Self-evaluation or expert evaluations • Large-n possible, but perception of influence rather than actual influence (over, under-reporting)

48. Data & operationalisation (2/5) • Survey administrative élites (phone & native) • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004) • East, West, South (but no North) • In different regions (6 to 19 per country) • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries • 1 to 12 individuals per region • 50 to 76 individuals per country • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)

49. Data & operationalisation (2/5) • Survey administrative élites (phone & native) • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004) • East, West, South (but no North) • In different regions (6 to 19 per country) • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries • 1 to 12 individuals per region • 50 to 76 individuals per country • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)

50. Data & operationalisation (2/5) • Survey administrative élites (phone & native) • Senior civil servants with policy responsibility • Different countries: DE, PL, HU, FR, ES • Different accession waves (2 founding, one mid two post-2004) • East, West, South (but no North) • In different regions (6 to 19 per country) • >300 individuals in 60 regions in 5 countries • 1 to 12 individuals per region • 50 to 76 individuals per country • Average of 5.5 (per region) and 66 (per country)