Globalisation and European Political Identities

1. Globalisation and European Political Identities Alistair Cole

2. Globalisation as a material reality? • Globalisation is, for the most part, used to signify a series of objective material shifts bound up with the increasing mobility of capital, the trans-nationalisation of production processes, shifting patterns of trade, technological changes…that all facilitate world-wide economic interaction. • The concept is used to refer to the spread of neo-liberal policy norms, the retreat from Keynesian welfare state and social democracy. • The prevailing interpretation sees globalization as either a structural fact or a set of policy preferences. • globalization makes powerful truth claims, requiring neo-liberal responses. • There is dispute about the extent of novelty of globalization and the extent to which it is actually occurring. International exchange has always occurred; the terms of international trade do not offer equal opportunities to all nations or continents.

3. Globalisation and Europeanization • The EU literature presents globalization in terms of being an external shock, a change from outside. Outside changes have strengthened the role of the EU as a stable governance system. There are a number of versions of this external argument: • The neo-functionalist one, espoused by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) whereby external economic change affected the preferences of business actors, who lobbied political authorities for the Single market and currency. • Other accounts focus on the impact on national states (Schmidt) and the loss of economic sovereignty brought about by the integration in processes of global governance • Others focus on the impact of global change on domestic constituencies (Moravscik, Milner). • Each of these sees rather mechanical effects. Europeanisation then emerges as a west European effort to develop policies to cope with the anarchy of the globe.

4. Globalisation as discourse Too much emphasis given to the empirical verifiability of globalisation, not enough to the saliency of globalization in contemporary policy processes. Globalisation is interesting in its ideational dimensions, how it structures political discourse. • WE can not simply treat globalization as a matter of exogenous change. The social construction of globalization determines whether it will be contested or embraced. • Globalisation as discourse can signify the irresistible triumph of neo-liberal solutions. It can also be used to delimit the range of available strategic opportunities. • There is an widely diffused belief in the spread of globalization as economic liberalization across the globe. In the hands of politicians, economic globalization has become distorted and vulgarized, in the sense of there is no alternative (Blair and new Labour) • globalisation has adopted a harder edge. For Leon Brittan, for example, globalization represented European level regulatory competence and neo-liberal policy options. This version sees globalization as an opportunity, rather than a threat. • But there is a large degree of dispute about what globalization requires; there is normative dissonance.

5. Adapting to globalisation: the UK • British Political discourse has framed globalisation as opportunity. Adapting to globalisation is inevitable and facilitates shifts from a manufacturing to a service and financial based economy • Adapting to globalisation; the advantage of setting a superior order to that of the European Union, recalling the imperative of global governance (UN, WTO, etc) • Globalisation a useful discursive tool to legitimise domestic change and to attract footloose capital (non-Doms) • Globalisation: primarily an economic framing of what the EU is for and its limitations.

6. Managed globalisation: the case of France • French political elites from left and right have argued in favour of a managed globalisation (mondialisation maitrisée). • One source close to the Villepin government defined mondialisation maitrisée as a demand for rules for international and European economic governance, tougher regulation of the environment, a defense of the cultural exception and support for linguistic diversity. • Gordon and Meunier (2001) identify the core features managed globalisation as: maintaining the state, building a stronger Europe, managing international trade and creating new rules for governing the international system.

7. Managing Globalisationas an argument for European integration • Managed globalisation relies above all upon a Europe that is strong enough to regulate international capitalism, and whose social model is an inspiration to others. • By its nature, globalisation produces external turbulence and uncertainty, hence justifies the argument for European consolidation. • As the largest single market in the world, the EU matters and ought to use its weight accordingly. Europe must act as a model for the rest of the world, in matters of social and environmental protection, labour regulations and democratic values. • Europe has a duty to protect its nations, to prevent social dumping, to demonstrate solidarity in WTO and other arena..

8. Trade policy • Managed globalisation also implies a tightly steered trade policy that defends European interests in international trade negotiations (Kresl and Gallais, 2002). France fought hard during the 1986-1993 Uruguay GATT round to keep services, intellectual property and culture off the international trade agenda (Webber, 1998, 1999). • Upon France’s insistence, the Treaty of Nice then enshrined the principle of the cultural exception in EU law. France has thus far been able to resist strong pressure from the Commission to introduce QMV to trade in services and intellectual property issues.

9. WTO • France was a strong supporter of creating the World Trade Organisation in 1995 as a tougher international trade organisation with binding arbitration mechanisms. France has consistently tried to broaden the scope of trade negotiations to include areas of workers rights, the environment, health and food safety. • Its stance on agriculture and the unconditional defense of farm subsidies brought French governments into conflict with EU trade Commissioners during the on-off Doha round launched in 2001 • European divisions were in part behind the failure of the most recent Geneva Talks in July 2008 to revive Doha.

10. Fortress Europe? • Quite apart from agriculture, France tends to align with the more protectionist wing of the EU, especially in relation to China. Thus, when in 2006 the end of the multi-fibre agreement meant free flowing Chinese textiles imports into Europe, France and Italy headed the resistance and pressurised the Commission into renegotiating a bilateral agreement with China. • The French position towards the Doha round (2001- ) produced many acerbic exchanges with EU trade Commissioner Mandelson, suspected of wanting to sell short European positions in agriculture against uncertain gains in opening goods and services on behalf of developing countries. • Economic globalisation at Doha, versus WSF

11. A Rules-based global governance • A rules-based approach to global governance? • In 1999, France argued that NATO military intervention in Kosovo required a UN mandate. • In 2003, foreign minister de Villepin spectacularly confronted Washington in the UN General Assembly, arguing a second UN resolution was essential in international law to allow the US-led coalition to invade Irak. • French governors have made a powerful claim for recognizing the role of international organisations as the appropriate institutions for managing global governance, whether in foreign policy, international trade, environmental standards, food safely or international justice. • Arguing for binding multilateral structures is an obvious challenge to the US, which has ratified neither the Kyoto convention on climate change, nor the International Crimes tribunal. But it resonates well with French public opinion, in Brussels and within the broader international community.

12. European Identity and globalisation • Problem of ‘methodological individualism’. • What is identity and how do we measure it? • What do we do when we ask questions about globalisation? Can we expect a coherent response/ • European Values survey and Eurobarometer

13. Europeanisation of identities? • Accession to the EU: does this produce a Europeanisation of identities? • French and Dutch referendums. What were these measuring? • Multiple identities • Permissive consensus • Conceptions of globalisation. How constructed? Global governance? Or delocalisations?

14. European political identity and globalisation • The EU itself acts as a legal order that embeds democratic institutions in its member-states – however much one might criticise the democratic deficit within the EU itself. • The new accession states of 2004 and 2007 countries had each to meet strict criteria – the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 – to be able to join in the European Union. • This provides a very good example of diffusion: of the imposition of norms of good practice and respect for human rights on members wanting to join the club. • EU a strongly normative agenda, as well as a market. • Values of human rights, good governance, anti-corruption, democracy, diversity… citizenship. • Framing as democracy – soutehrn Europe, CEE – or as markets and regulatory stability – UK, nordic states..

15. A Christian Club? • But deeper issues of identity: such as religion, cause conflict/division at the European level. • Turkey, Romania, Bulgarian all pose specific contemporary challenges • UK accession in 1973: brought in a protestant member.