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East and West since 1990. Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, and key member states such as France, eager to secure from Germany an irreversible commitment to further integration Strasbourg summit (December 1989) -deepening of European Integration and German Unification

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East and West since 1990


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    1. East and West since 1990 Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, and key member states such as France, eager to secure from Germany an irreversible commitment to further integration Strasbourg summit (December 1989) -deepening of European Integration and German Unification -1990 EMU-a course towards a stronger, more democratic Community, a common foreign and security policy, and intensified cooperation on justice and home affairs –all made more urgent by the unfolding transformation of East-West relations in Europe 1991-Maastricht Treaty -Common Foreign and Security policy- Germany played a central and constructive role in debates and discussions over the development of a common European foreign and security policy that took account of developments in the East.

    2. THE YUGOSLAV DEBACLE Conflict casts the nervous eye on the Soviet Union and the Baltic republics. EC member states stressed the desirability of a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the preservation of national unity The community offered to serve as a broker between the central government in Belgrade and breakaway republics, sending a delegation of three foreign ministers repeatedly to mediate the conflict. - A crack appeared in the EC’s common front during the first week of July 1991: The German government signaled that the Community would have to consider accepting the independence of Slovenia and Croatia if the stripe continue to worsen and mediation efforts proved ineffectual.

    3. German officials stressed that acceptance did not equate with full diplomatic recognition of independence, and justified their position as consistent with the principle of self-determination for national and ethnic group. This represented a clear break with the EC’ declared position: French foreign minister warned that any softening of the EC’s position could harden the unsteady situation among Eastern European’s ethnic minorities. - EC member state with separatist problems of their own, like Britain, Spain and France were stubborn about maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

    4. Issues of the Yugoslavian debacle • On 8 July- an accord between the Yugoslavia central government and the Yugoslav republics, with the EC assisting in the process. • Slovenia and Croatia- implementation of their declarations of independence for 3 months. Yugoslav federation would be reorganized in negotiations mediated by the EC. • Croatia- a vicious cycle of violence and exposed along the way the limits of effective EC intervention • European efforts to mediate the conflict failed in early August and Brussels turned to the CSCE for support. • French send the armed buffer force by the WEU to separate the insurgent in Croatia • Bonn threatened the Serbia with economic sanctions if it continued to block progress on a settlement. • 8 August Yugoslavia agree to accept additional international observes from both the EC and other CSCE member countries, who were to monitor any accord reached between Croatia and Serbia.

    5. Recognizing Slovenia and Croatia • After Maastricht summit, Bonn announced that it would be formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia be year’s end, even if this meant breaking ranks with the majority of its partners: the UN, and the US. • This was interpreted as violating the spirit of the agreement. • German -domestic political factors: - diplomatic isolation of Serbia would stem the flood of Yugoslavian refugees into Germany, which had trilled in 1991 over the previous year.

    6. POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT • Failing of the Soviet Union in 1991 spurred developments in EC foreign policy-making circles. • German concerns on the security of the former Soviet nuclear deterrent, the observance of existing treaties such as the Helsinki Accords and arms control agreements, the servicing of the Soviet foreign debt, and measures to ease the process of economic and political liberalization • Germany reaffirmed the stability of the “political parallelogram”: NATO, THE CSCE, The EC and the WEU • Creation of joint embassies for EC member states in each country of CIS.

    7. The process of enlargement • Enlargement in 1970-1980-application from member states of the European Free Trade Association: Sweden, Finland an Austria-joined in January 1995 • In July 1997 –the negotiations of accession 6 countries: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus. Second group of applicants: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Malta.

    8. POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT • Stabilization of the new European political order • A leading role of the EU, a phasing-out by the US, and a losing of weight by Russia. • Dream of the Grand Europe: - to expand its territory with a stable political structure; - to form around ita “ring of friends”, - to build up its own security and defense capability.

    9. Motivation for enlargement • The motivation more political than economic, namely to bring into the EU theintermediate zone neutralized by the ending of the cold war. • the prospect of taking in another half a dozen countries to push the EU’s frontier further to the CIS’ or even Russia’s western border. • When the EU of such a scale emerges, will there be any doubt of its leading role in Europe’s political order?

    10. Reasons for enlargement • “New frontier”. In a speech in 2002, Mr. Romano Prodi, President of theEuropean Commission, said: “I want to see a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union and its closest Europeanneighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea.” By this “ring of friends”, the EU is to acquire, as well, avast political buffer zone and economic space embracing the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.

    11. WHY the enlargement was needed • Rebound of the European nationalism blocked the path of supranational politicalIntegration • The settlement of the German problem and the US-USSR nuclear equilibrium in Europerelieved the Western European countries of the pressure for its own defense • Jean Monnet’s ingeniouscreation—the Common Market—fit well with needs of the postwar European economic development.