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THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
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THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY

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  1. THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY JUNE 4-5, 1942

  2. EARLY 1942 EVENTS • THE DOOLITTLE RAID: • WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 • WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS • WHO? • U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS • U.S. NAVY • Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O • 16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN) • WHY? • RETALIATION FOR PEARL HARBOR ATTACK • TO BOOST U.S. MILITARY & PUBLIC MORALE • PROBLEM? • HOW TO GET AIR GROUP CLOSE ENOUGH TO JAPAN W/OUT DETECTION • HOW TO GET CREWS / PLANES TO SAFETY • RESULTS? • TOKYO BOMBED W/LITTLE DAMAGE • CASUALTIES: • U.S. – 3 KIA, 8 POW (4 DIE IN CAPTIVITY – 3 EXECUTED, 1 OF DISEASE), 15 B-25 BOMBERS • JAPAN – 50 DEAD, 400 WOUNDED • STRATEGIC RESULTS: • JAPAN WITHDRAWS CARRIER GROUP FROM INDIAN OCEAN TO DEFEND JAPAN • JAPAN DECIDES TO ATTACK MIDWAY ISLAND

  3. LT. COL. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE, USAAF

  4. THE REAL DOOLITTLE

  5. U.S. ARMY B-25 BOMBER

  6. DOOLITTLE’S B-25LAUNCHES FROMU.S.S. HORNET,APRIL 18, 1942

  7. DOOLITTLE’S B-25s OVER TOKYO HARBOR, APRIL, 1942

  8. DOOLITTLE RAIDER IN JAPANESE CAPTIVITY, APRIL, 1942

  9. THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA • WHEN? MAY 4-8, 1942 • WHERE? CORAL SEA, S.PACIFIC (near Australia) • WHO? • IJN COMBINED FLEET (carriers & battleships) • USN – 2 CARRIER TASK FORCES (define) • AUSTRALIA – DESTROYER FORCES • WHY? • JAPAN ATTEMPTING TO… • STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN S. PACIFIC • OCCUPY PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) • EXTEND CONTROL IN SOLOMON ISLANDS • SO WHAT? DIRECT THREAT TO AUSTRALIA • RESULTS? • FIRST BATTLE TO EMPLOY LARGE-SCALE CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS • HEAVY FIGHTING / LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES • CASUALTIES: • JAPAN – 1 CARRIER SUNK, 1 DAMAGED, 966 KIA • U.S. – 1 CARRIER SCUTTLED, 1 HEAVILY DAMAGED, 656 KIA • STRATEGIC EFFECT? • JAPAN CANNOT OCCUPY PORT MORESBY • 2 JAPANESE CARRIERS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT MIDWAY • U.S. & ALLIES NOW HAVE TIME TO PREPARE NEW GUINEA INVASION

  10. MIDWAY ISLAND, CENTRAL PACIFIC

  11. AERIAL RECONAISSANCEPHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND,1942

  12. FLEET ADMIRALCHESTER NIMITZ,COMMANDER,U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

  13. REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPRUANCE,COMMANDING OFFICER,TASK FORCE 16,BATTLE OF MIDWAY

  14. VICE ADMIRALWILLIAM HALSEY,U.S. NAVY,ORIGINAL C/O,TASK FORCE 16

  15. REAR ADMIRAL FRANK JACK FLETCHER,COMMANDING OFFICER,TASK FORCE 17,BATTLE OF MIDWAY

  16. LCDR JOSEPH ROCHEFORT,U.S. NAVY,NAVAL INTELLIGENCE &CRYPTOLOGY DIVISION

  17. ADMIRAL ISORUKU YAMAMOTO,COMMANDING OFFICER,IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY

  18. ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMO COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE BATTLE FLEET, BATTLE OF MIDWAY

  19. MIDWAY: PREPARING FOR BATTLE • JAPANESE GOALS: • ELIMINATE U.S. STRATEGIC POWER IN PACIFIC • ALLOW JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN / TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT CONQUESTS • WOULD ENSURE NO REPEAT OF DOOLITTLE RAID • HOW? / WHAT WAS THE STRATEGY? • LURE U.S.NAVY CARRIERS INTO TRAP & ELIMINATE THEM • A THREAT TO HAWAII WOULD FORCE U.S. TO RESPOND W/ CARRIER FORCES • ATTACK & OCCUPY MIDWAY ISLAND

  20. MIDWAY: ORDER OF BATTLE • JAPANESE FORCES*: • 4 CARRIERS • 2 BATTLESHIPS • 15 SUPPORT SHIPS • 248 AIRCRAFT • U.S. FORCES: • 3 CARRIERS • 25 SUPPORT SHIPS • 233 CARRIER-BASED PLANES • 127 LAND-BASED (Midway Island) PLANES • *THESE FIGURES ONLY INCLUDE FORCES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN COMBAT AT MIDWAY

  21. COMPARING FORCES • JAPAN: ADVANTAGES • LARGER NAVAL FORCE • MOST IMPORTANTLY – MORE CARRIERS • MORE EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWS • MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS • CONFIDENCE • MOMENTUM • JAPAN: DISADVANTAGES • FEW, IF ANY • NAVAL CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY WAS INFERIOR TO U.S. • BATTLE PLAN IS COMPLICATED: • JAPANESE FORCES CANNOT SUPPORT EACH OTHER • WHY? THEY ARE DISPERSED OVER LARGE AREA • OVERCONFIDENCE – UNDERESTIMATION OF U.S. CAPABILITIES (at that time)

  22. COMPARING FORCES(cont’d.) • U.S.: ADVANTAGES • CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOLOGY • U.S.: DISADVANTAGES • LESS EXPERIENCED CREWS • FEWER SHIPS, esp. CARRIERS • INFERIOR TORPEDO PLANES • INFERIOR FIGHTER PLANES • U.S. CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE CARRIERS • WHAT ROLE DO U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CODEBREAKERS PLAY IN THE BATTLE? • IJN NAVAL CODE (IJN-25) WAS BROKEN BY THE U.S. • CODES PROVED MIDWAY WAS JAPAN’s PRIMARY TARGET

  23. U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE 16CARRIERS, BATTLE OF MIDWAYU.S.S. HORNET (above)U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (right)

  24. U.S.S. YORKTOWN, TASK FORCE 17

  25. U.S. NAVY SBD “DAUNTLESS” DIVE BOMBER

  26. U.S.NAVY TBD “DEVASTATOR” TORPEDO PLANE

  27. U.S.NAVY TBD“DEVASTATOR” TORPEDO PLANE

  28. U.S. NAVY GRUMMAN F-4-F “WILDCAT” FIGHTER

  29. U.S. NAVY BREWSTER F2A-3 “BUFFALO” FIGHTER