Potential of the Army Reserve to provide the “Shortfall”

1. Potential of the Army Reserve to provide the “Shortfall”

2. Army Reserve – Historical Legacy • Militia formed post WWII essentially for continental defence of Australia • Post-WWII a small regular Army was formed and committed to relatively small scale deployments • Conscription occurred in the 1960s but the then Citizen Military Forces could not be used for legislative reasons • Redesignated as the Army Reserve from 1974 and formed a base for mobilisation • CMF/Army Reserve reviewed and restructured ad nauseam – every restructure led to a loss of capability as soldiers voted with their feet and left • “One Army concept” led to Reserve units being structured like ARA units and abolition of specialist Reserve units

3. Catalyst for Change • What organisation would raise, train and sustain a part time force for over 50 years and not use it? • What changed? • Large scale deployment of regular forces to Timor led to an increased focus on readiness by Regular units and the necessity to use Reservists to plug the gaps • With a number of exceptions, use of Reservists was poorly handled – many relinquished rank or volunteered to serve but not called upon • Defence 2000 White Paper – required land forces with sufficient fire power, protection and mobility for a clear advantage in likely operations in DOA or our immediate region

4. Catalyst for Change (Continued) • Legislative changes providing for “call out” of Reservists and protection of their civilian employment • Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) initiative - to provide depth and sustainability to Army • HNA requires Army to sustain a brigade on operations for extended periods and concurrently a battalion group for deployment elsewhere • Recognition of significant shortfalls in ARA units that must be filled by qualified Reservists to achieve the capability requirements of HNA

5. 13 BDE 8 BDE 5 BDE 2 DIV 9 BDE LSF 4 BDE 51 FNQR NORFORCE 11 BDE 11 BDE Pilbara 1 DIV 7 BDE

6. Army Reserve Today • Currently comprises @ 16,000 active personnel • This strength is unacceptably low which undermines ability of the Reserve to meet the “shortfall” • Parade on an average of 40 days per annum • Median length of service 4 years • Some 9,000 Supplementary Reserve personnel – previously the Inactive Reserve

7. What Capability has the Army Reserve Delivered? Since Jan 2000: > 1000 in East Timor including 3HSB, A Coy 5/7 RAR, individual soldiers > 1000 to Bougainville, Balkans, Afghanistan, Solomons etc 1300 Reservists over 14 x 3 month deployments to Rifle Company Butterworth Capability Generation: 3 x Regional Force Surveillance Units 7 x Reserve Response Forces In last three years: Over 500 a year transfer to ARA (~18% of ARA target) and 400 to 700 each year are on full time service Support to domestic emergencies (bushfires, Tsunami) 230 Reservists for 3 months Xmas rotations to deter illegal immigrants (Op Relex – now called Op Resolute) > 300 Reservists on Op Acolyte (Commonwealth Games)

8. Role of the Army Reserve ‘To provide specified individual and collective capability to support, sustain and reinforce Army’s operational forces.’

9. Reserve Components of the HNA • High Readiness Reserve • Active Reserve • Standby Reserve

10. High Readiness Reserve (HRR) • Regular Army units will seek High Readiness Reservists in accordance with their unit establishments via Army’s Capability Management System • High Readiness Reservists will: - enter a 2 year contract - be managed and administered regionally by their parent Army Reserve unit - be substantively posted to their supported Regular Army unit - provide 32-50 days on mandated training per year including one continuous exercise between 14 and 40 days with their Regular Army unit (or formation for Force Protection Company Group members) and the remainder with their parent Army Reserve unit - be available for voluntary deployment when called for - possess all Regular Army competencies for their employed position (until the HNA training model review is complete - whereby exceptions may be made)

11. Active Reserve (AR) • Active Reservists will enable the High Readiness Reserve through support and reinforcement • The Active Reserve will provide the Reserve Response Force*, previously known as the High Readiness Reserve * Reserve Response Force consists of around 120 Soldiers on 7 days readiness notice to undertake domestic security operations • Active Reservists will still have the opportunity to be selected for operations, although this opportunity is decreased with the raising of the High Readiness Reserve

12. Standby Reserve (SR) • All ARA who joined after mid 2003 are required to transfer to the Standby Reserve for five years after completing full-time service • This provides potentially significant latent capability • The ‘who’ and ‘how’ the Standby Reserve is to be managed is still under review

13. Future ARes Force Structure Available for operations short of call out 1600 HNA/ 1200 FPCG HIGH READINESS RESERVES ACTIVE RESERVES DEPLOYABLE THRESHOLD 12000-14000 Call out in whole or in part for mobilisation and expansion STANDBY RESERVES 9000-12000 6 RESERVE BRIGADES WITH 6-7 UNITS EACH

14. Future ARes Brigade Structure REGIONAL BDE HQ MDM REGT CSS ENGR REGT SIG SQN INF BN INF BN LT CAV REGT RRF AR HRR FPCG INDIVIDUALS IAW BDE MATRIX COLLECTIVE CAPABILITIES IAW DIV MATRIX

15. Implementation Phase One (Mid 2006 – End 2008): • Develop the approximately 1100 individual and collective reinforcements • Collective capability includes raising Force Protection Company Groups to protect HQ’s, Logistic nodes and critical infrastructure. Consist of Inf, Engr, Recon, and Combat Service Support assets, approximately 180 HRR • Identify additional capabilities required to be developed within the Army Reserve • Review command and control at regional and command level

16. Implementation Phase Two (Start 2009 - End 2012): • Develop remaining 1700 individual and collective reinforcements

17. Training • The HNA Training Model currently under development will: • maintain the common competency model for ARA and ARes • reduce the training requirement for Active Reservists by reducing the number of competencies required • identify and develop gap training to enable Reservists to transition from Active Reserve to High Readiness Reserve • From 1 July 2006, new Reserve Recruit Training Course implemented. Now 29 days instead of 45 days with Reserve units to teach First Aid and Navigation modules

18. Remuneration • HRR will receive: • $10,000 Tax Free completion bonus for two years HRR service • $2,500 health benefit per annum • AR and HRR will receive: • New pay rates that are competency based • A Reserve service allowance of up to $10 per day • $600 health benefit per annum for AR

19. Risks • Whether size and structure of the remuneration package is sufficient to attract Active Reservists and ex-ARA from the SR to the HRR • Whether Active Reservists will have the time to obtain ARA trade and rank qualifications • The impact of training burden on Reserve units. Now required to provide some recruit training, around 75% of individual employment training, training of the RRF and some training of the HRR. Is it feasible to ask Reserve units to also undertake the gap training of Active Reservists so that they can have the same ARA competencies to transfer to the HRR? • Whether retention and recruitment can improve to grow the Active Reserve to provide the foundation base for the HRR (> 2,800 Reservists) and maintain the Reserve Response Forces (>840 Reservists) • How to produce Reserve NCOs and Officers for the HRR that have ARA equivalent qualifications • Whether sufficient equipment can be accessed by Active Reservists and HRR to maintain the necessary skill sets • Army and Government being prepared to use the HRR on operations • Whether fixed mind sets on the utility of the Reserve, can change

20. “Ideal Chance for Reservists” “…ARES, specifically 2 Div, your time has come. With components of the ARA stretched across the globe, others preparing to deploy and now a stability and support operation in East Timor, your time to step up to the plate is here. In the not too distant future, peace in Dili and surrounds will be restored. Many question the value that the ARes provides Defence. Well here is your opportunity to prove your $950 million p.a. worth. Here is 2 Div’s chance to bring combat power to the fore. In six months, if Army is still in East Timor, then you are well placed to assume full command of Op Astute and allow the ARA to focus on warfighting ops. Of the 10,000+ ARes pers, dispersed across 14+ infantry battalions and associated combat, CS, CSS units and numerous formation HQ’s, surely 2 Div can be entrusted with the forming, training deployment and sustainment of an appropriate force to assume full operational responsibility of Op Asture. If not, then it is evident that there is no place for the ARes in its present form in the current future complex warfighting environment.” [Source: Army Newspaper, Circa 2006]

21. Strengths • Provides a realistic and achievable role for the Reserve • Provides an operational focus and fosters a culture of readiness in Reserve units • Reserve tasks will be directly linked to generating capability for the HRR • Core of the Army Reserve will remain the Active Reserve which will raise, partially train and sustain HRR soldiers and continue to deliver depth to Army • Supported by Senior Reservists • Maintains Reserve unit structures and formations and hence the footprint of Army in large parts of Australia

22. Conclusion “… Army Reserve forces can now be concentrated on providing full capability as part of operational forces, and to provide the subsequent reinforcement and rotation of deployed forces. Expansion and mobilisation will remain an Army task, but the priority in the future will clearly be on meeting more immediate military needs” [Quote: Lieutenant General Peter Leahy]

23. Questions?