The Yin / Yang Approach to Measures of Merit: Where does science end and art begin?

1. The Yin / Yang Approach to Measures of Merit: Where does science end and art begin? Adam Siegel Senior Analyst Northrop Grumman Analysis Center August 2003

2. Introduction and Outline • Caveat: • Briefing represents author’s personal opinions, not necessarily Northrop Grumman (or USG) • Concept briefing, not ‘definitive’ analysis • Goal: Spark discussion rather than impart results • Long-discussed Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) only part of the equation – especially for “effects-based operations” (EBO) • Complicted mix from MOPs to MoPEs • Each level of analysis requires different mix of tools, techniques, academic & intellectual skills and approaches • Questions: • Reinforcing or conflicting approaches? • What should be dominant?

3. Universe is run by a single principle, the Tao, or Great Ultimate Principle is divided into two opposite principles Universal explanatory principle: All phenomena can be understood using yin-yang yin and yang represent all the opposite principles one finds in the universe Yin / Yang

4. Layer within layer:Thinking about Measures of Merit • DP: Dimensional parameters • MOP: Measure of Performance • MOE: Measure of Effectiveness • MOFE: Measure of Force Effectiveness • Measures of Operational Effectiveness • MOPE: Measure of Policy Effectiveness DP MOP MOE MOFE MOOE MOPE Question: How does this relate to EBO??

5. Some “case studies”re “MOM” analysis • Patriot performance in Desert Storm • Operation Allied Force • 9/11

6. Patriots and Desert Storm • Background • Iraqi SCUD ballistic missile threat • Patriot • developed for fixed-wing air defense • Software modifications to deal with TBMs • Deployed to Saudi Arabia and Israel • Operational experience • Initial claims of high-success rate in intercepts • Undercut by later and more detailed analysis • In the end, seemingly ineffective (potentially counterproductive) tactically • Critically important operationally and strategically • Forces believed they were protected – aided force morale • Israel and Saudi populations perceived active defense • Critical to keeping Israel from retaliating against Iraq – which might have shattered coalition • Thus – tactical failure, operational /strategic / policy success

7. Operation Allied Force • Background • Air campaign re Serbian activity in Kosovo • Generally perceived before conflict that several days of exemplary bombing would suffice … 78 days later • Strike operations against: • Fielded Serbian forces and facilities directly supporting them • “Strategic” target sets • No allied ground forces (Importance of UCK / KLA?) • Operational experience • Claims of successes in attacking fielded forces • Undercut by later and more detailed analysis • In the end, unclear tactical effects (at best) • “Strategic” target sets • Operators perceived stringent ROE restrictions • Unclear links to adversary decision making • Why did Milosevic surrender? • Multiple theories from pressure of air campaign on Serbian public and/or cronies; demonstrated NATO willingness to stay the course; emerging threat of a ground offensive; Russian pressure • Thus – operational success (enemy surrender) with uncertain understanding as to why

8. 9/11 • Background • Al Qaeda suicide terrorist attacks using airliners as WMD • Uncertain Al Qaeda intent … potentially • Tactically: kill many? ‘shock’ the world? • Operationally: damage U.S.? gain recruits for Al Qaeda? • Strategic: drive U.S. from Middle East? galvanize revolutionary Islam? weaken U.S.-Saudi relations? weaken Saudi gov / regime? • Operational experience • Tactical success: Aircraft caused massive destruction, potentially largest news event in history to date • Operational success: Massive economic • Strategic – mixed: Initial boost to al Qaeda, potentially undercut by U.S./world move into Afghanistan and improved anti-terrorist operations, U.S. forces departing Saudi Arabia, worsened U.S.-Arab relations • Thus, for al Qaeda – clear tactical ‘victory’, likely operational ‘success’, with uncertain link to long-term strategic objectives

9. CASE ‘LESSONS” • Tactical, operational, and policy success not necessarily clearly linked • “Predictive” ability uncertain • Extremely difficult to link technical, quantitatively measurable activity to decision-making processes • In these cases, what “DP” links to “MOPE” existed? • Quantitative and qualitative measures • Both relevant for understanding situations • But at different points of the MOM spectrum • Which provided path toward best support of (strategic) decision-making?

10. Layer within layer:Returning to Measures of Merit • DP: Dimensional parameters • MOP: Measure of Performance • MOE: Measure of Effectiveness • MOFE: Measure of Force Effectiveness • Measures of Operational Effectiveness • MOPE: Measure of Policy Effectiveness more quantitative DP MOP MOE MOFE more qualitative MOOE MOPE EBO requires full spectrum analysis combining ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ skills – or science and art. Contention: easier to teach artists science, than scientists art …