1 / 50

After the Cold War

After the Cold War. The Post-Cold War World: 3 periods. First Period,1991-2000: Triumph of the West Triumph of global capitalism Russia’s transition crisis The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak The Western expansion to the post-communist East

andren
Download Presentation

After the Cold War

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. After the Cold War

  2. The Post-Cold War World: 3 periods

  3. First Period,1991-2000: Triumph of the West • Triumph of global capitalism • Russia’s transition crisis • The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak • The Western expansion to the post-communist East • Formation of the global neoliberal regime

  4. Second Period, 2001-2008: US Hegemony Tested • The Islamist challenge and the Bush response • Development of a multipolar system • Russia’s resurgence • Relative decline of US hegemony

  5. Third Period, 2008- • The global economic crisis • Creeping bankruptcy and political stalemate in the US • The crisis of European integration • The rise of China as a global power • Reset in Russia’s relations with the West

  6. Comparing 1917 and 1991: • The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution, the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a result of the civil war • The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast themselves as leaders of independent nation-states – • or of units of the Russian Federation • A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for themselves after communism • Transition to capitalism would enable most of them to maintain and even enhance their power and privilege

  7. Having dissolved the empire, the new elites have been engaged in competition and cooperation between themselves to: • secure their control, • reform their political-economic systems, • find new places in the regional and global orders THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPERIAL SPOILS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EURASIA • Some of them stick together (RF, CIS, GUUAM) • Others go their own separate ways, look for new partnerships • Meanwhile, many other states are exploring opportunities to expand their influence in Eurasia

  8. Contraction of Russian power

  9. NATO enlargement, 1949-2004

  10. Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end of the Cold War: 1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power • Territorial losses • Economic depression • The military crisis • Ideological neutralization • after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20th century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right 2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces with minimal regulation by the state 3. Political affiliation with the West 4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony

  11. Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in the Cold War sense: • Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal regime • RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist, cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies

  12. RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR • The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms: • The nuclear risks • Possibility of a totalitarian backlash • Potential for civil war • Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space • Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US (not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other states) – or: • Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US hegemony (a problem for the US)

  13. US objectives vis-à-vis Russia • Encourage Russia’s transition to capitalism • Prevent Russia from acting as a counterbalance to US • Control Russia’ behaviour to keep it congruent with US interests • Expand US influence into the post-Soviet space Perspectives outside the US: • Many countries would like Russia to play the role of a non-hostile, but relatively independent, actor in international politics • Most Russians have the same perspective

  14. The economy • GDP, PPP - $2.4 trln. (No.6 in the world) • World’s 15th biggest trading nation • GDP per capita - $17,000 • Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9% in 2009, 4,3% in 2010. 4.3% in 2011 • Public debt (2011) – 8.3% of GDP

  15. US National Intelligence Council forecast for the year 2025, unveiled in October 2008, described Russia as • one of four rising centers of international power: “In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic powernow under way — roughly from West to East — is without precedent in modern history . . . . No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout. . . . Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.” • “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”. Washington: National Intelligence Council, November 2008 - http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html , pp. vi, vii

  16. In the 2000s, Russian state capacity has been partially repaired in ways compatible with globalization – • and in line with Russia’s historical traditions • Putinism has consolidated Russian capitalism, protected it from internal challenges, and returned Russia to the rank of major international actors • That rebuilding was done by very crude methods • It involved increasing abandonment of liberal-democratic norms • And it resulted in consolidation of bureaucratic capitalism

  17. Russia continues to need major changes • Troubles in the global economy may plunge Russia back into a recession • The Russian economy needs major modernization to compete successfully • The new Russian state is in many ways dysfunctional and needs major reforms to meet Russia’s challenges • The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality

  18. The structure of Russia’s exports: 93% raw materials

  19. The challenges • Modernization of the economy – from hydrocarbons to hi-tech • Rebuilding infrastructure • Social investments: health, education, other social programs to improve quality of life

  20. Since Putin’s coming to power in 2000, Russia has been in a conservative phase • The new ruling class is determined to maintain its wealth and power • Authoritarian governance with a democratic façade • Rising influence of the Russian Orthodox Church • The public is largely depoliticized and wary of change

  21. Bureaucracy is bigger, more powerful, more corrupt, and less accountable • Among the bureaucrats, the Enforcers (KGB, Inc.) have gained unprecedented power • Rule of law, always an endangered species in Russia, suffered further setbacks

  22. Russia cannot cope with its challenges without reforming the state • No effective governance without accountability • No accountability without rule of law • No rule of law without electoral democracy

  23. The political earthquake of 2011-12 • Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin • Elections and protests • The mobilization of opposition forces • Defection of liberals from the Putin coalition • Putin’s counterattack • The new political uncertainty

  24. Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009: http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/

  25. Topol-M, Russia’s new mobile ICBM

  26. A Tu-160 strategic bomber

  27. A Yekaterinburg nuclear submarine with SLBMs

  28. Russian naval infantry in Victory Day parade

  29. A Russian warship in the Caribbean

  30. http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/5084/4/zProject%20finished%2026.01.pdfhttp://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/5084/4/zProject%20finished%2026.01.pdf

  31. The latest military reform plan • To cut the number of officers by more than half, to 150,000, by 2012. The number of generals and admirals will fall from 1,107 to 886 • To cut the number of military units in the ground forces from 1,890 to 172 within three years • The four-tier system inherited from the Soviet army -- where the line of command is from a military district, to army, to division to regiment -- will be replaced with a streamlined three-tier system in which brigades will play a central role • Under the plan, brigades – units bigger than regiments and smaller than divisions, will be largely self-contained, combat-ready forces which are highly mobile and can be deployed quickly in an emergency

  32. Russia’s foreign policy compass • West - US, EU, NATO • East – China, Japan • South - the Muslim world, India • North - the Arctic

  33. The main elements of Russian foreign policy thinking • Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence • Insistence on respect for national sovereignty, wariness of Western support of opposition forces inside Russia and everywhere • Push for re-integration of Eurasia • Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other international actors • The Eastward shift developing • Pragmatism • Primacy of trade and investment issues • Growing security concerns and a buildup of military power • Readiness for international cooperation to work out joint solutions to problems

  34. The Network Principle • The Russians are discovering that what works for Russia is networking • Not hegemony, not building imperial hierarchies - but networking • Based on pragmatic pursuit and matching of national interests • In the growing network of Russia’s ties with the world, the West is only one segment, even if the most important

  35. Russian elite interests The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class, product of the post-communist transformation • Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms • Dependent on the West, primarily the US • Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it • Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR • Assertive in the political sphere • Seeks economic opportunities worldwide • Intertwined with state bureaucracy

  36. The bureaucrats • The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites • Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get their property • Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West • Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis • Federal civilian bureaucracy • Interested in whatever protects and increases their power • Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests

  37. The national bourgeoisie • Well below the ranks of the oligarchy • Gets little from the West • Feels dominated by the oligarchs • Is nationalist and protectionist • The politicians • 1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United Russia” – becoming the ruling party under Putin • The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis

More Related