Does One Size Fit All? US Attempts to Transpose the Anbar Awakening from Iraq to Afghanistan

1. Does One Size Fit All?US Attempts to Transpose the Anbar Awakening from Iraq to Afghanistan Ryan Calder and Nicholas Hoover Wilson rcalder@berkeley.edu and nwilson@berkeley.edu UC Berkeley Department of Sociology March 10, 2010

2. The Puzzle Why is the “Anbar Awakening” strategy of tribal engagement being transposed from Iraq to Afghanistan?

3. Hypothesis: US Chains of Empire US Policy Field Iraqi Imperial Field Afghan Imperial Field Circulating officials Indigenous Iraqi Field Indigenous Afghan Field

4. Model (I): Structure of Imperial Administration • US officials are doubly embedded • “Downward” into colonial societies • “Upward” into metropolitan field of US politics • Constitute the US “chain of empire” (Go 2000) • Embedding is both enabling and constraining • Constraining because officials must respond to two kinds of struggle at the same time • Enabling because they mediate between struggles • They have technical expertise vis-à-vis metropolitan field • They have relative military and economic superiority over colonized society

5. How do imperial officials construct the “problem”? Two key questions that imperial officials have faced • The “big” question: Why did violence in Iraq decline? • The “smaller” question: Why did the Anbar Awakening happen?

6. Violence peaked in 2006-2008 Documented civilian deaths from violence in Iraq 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total (2003–2010): 95,593–104,291 Source: Iraq Body Count

7. How do imperial officials construct the “problem”? Our thesis is that the way agents in the “chain of empire” answered these two questions... 1. depended on the way they imagined Iraqis and Afghans 2. profoundly affected whether they believed the Awakening strategy should be applied in Afghanistan

8. Substance of Imperial Administration Similar Different Particularistic Metropole (USA) Metropole (USA) Metropole (USA) x x x x Colony (Iraq) Colony (Afghanistan) Colony (Iraq) Colony (Afghanistan) Colony (Iraq) Colony(Afghanistan) x

9. Anbar province, Iraq

10. Ethnoreligious groups and major tribes

11. What was the Anbar Awakening? • March 2003: US invades Iraq • 2004: Iraqi resistance grows • 2005: Attitudes toward cooperation with US shift among some tribal leaders, but US military is reluctant to engage • May 2005: Hamza Forces of Albu Mahal tribe ask for US help; Marines carry out own operation instead • August 2005: Some Dulaym groups fight Al Qaeda • November 2005: US cooperation with Albu Mahal

12. What was the Anbar Awakening? (cont’d.) • August 2006: ‘Abd al-Sattār Abū Rīshah forms alliance of Anbar tribal chiefs to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq • Alliance known as Anbar Awakening (صحوة الانبار) or Anbar Salvation Council (مجلس انقاذ الانبار) • Abū Rīshah first encourages members of his tribe to join the police; later forms separate “Emergency Response Units” of Interior Ministry • Many members had formerly been fighting against US and government of Iraq (GoI)

13. What was the Anbar Awakening? (cont’d.) • October 2006: US involvement with Awakening begins in earnest • US forces provide protection for meetings • Pays 100% of Awakening members’ salaries • Provides arms, training, logistical support • 2007-2008: Movement succeeds, spreads, and splinters • 2009-2010: Halting integration into Iraqi government positions; move into politics

14. What was the Anbar Awakening? (cont’d.) ‘Abd al-Sattār Abū Rīshah (1972-2007) Logo of the Iraq Awakening Congress

15. So… why did Anbar’s tribal sheikhs “awaken”? Theories of the Anbar Awakening Sheikhs love democracy and freedom Sheikhs grew tired of war Al Qaeda threatened sheikhs’ business interests (e.g. smuggling) Power play by some sheikhs against others Al Qaeda makes cultural faux-pas (e.g. over marriage) US said it was leaving

16. And why did violence in Iraq decline in 2007-2008? Theories of “pacification” of Iraq The “surge” Cease-fire with Muqtadá Al-Ṣadr and strategic de-escalation by Iranian government Success of Anbar Awakening and tribal-engagement model Ethnic cleansing of Baghdad (Izady 2009)

17. Equifinality Observed Outcome Unobserved Causal Processes

18. Model (II): Logic of Imperial Administration • Imperial administration represents relatively extreme state autonomy • Information about society is very hard to obtain • Reliance on indigenous informants, negotiation with local elites • Interpretation of local social structure and actors’ behavior is equifinal

19. A “tribal-engagement” strategy for Afghanistan? In early 2008, US leaders were suspicious… But by late 2008, they were embracing the idea “Certainly many on the ground think that perhaps in certain areas local reconciliation initiatives hold some potential.” - US Gen. David Petraeus (Sep ’08) “What we should not do is take actions [in Afghanistan] that will reintroduce militas of the former power brokers.” - US Gen. Dan McNeill (Jan ’08) “At the end of the day the only solution in Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders in terms of trying to create a backlash … against the Taliban.” - US Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Oct ’08)

20. Portrayals of social structure shape colonial strategies of domination …and act as a lens that defines the set of military strategies US officials consider possible Primordialist imaginings of Iraqi and Afghan social structure circulate inside the Beltway…

21. Portrayals of social structure shape colonial strategies of domination (cont’d.) Report: “A Tribal Strategy for Afghanistan” (Nov ’08) Framing these regional power struggles—and any new ground-up strategy—are a complex and baffling array of tribal actors. Pashtuns are represented by dozens of major tribal groups (though two "super tribes," the Durrani and Ghilzai, have historically been among the most influential) with hundreds of subtribes. The most sought-after partnership discussed in any potential U.S.-NATO-Afghan tribal cooperation would involve the arbakai… A September 2004 report (PDF) by the International Legal Foundation describes their traditional duties: "In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they take orders from a commander. They are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who flout these rules are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization." More recently, these self-regulating militias have been especially adept at keeping the Taliban at bay in areas where tribal structures are strongest. Pashtun tribes adhere to an ancient code of honor and revenge known as Pashtunwali; the Taliban have struggled to promote their vision of sharia law in Pashtunwali regions... But experts say it would be premature to assume Pashtun militias would be open to cooperating with international forces: Pashtun disdain for outsiders is not discriminatory.

22. Model (III): Explaining Outcomes • Why does one view of colonial society and its congruent form of governance become predominant? • Weir and Skocpol, 1985: because proponents of different views have variable levels of access to metropolitan decision-makers • Metropolitan authorities’ support tips the scales of conflict in particular colonies