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The North Korea-US agreement - prospects for peace. Tim Beal Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand NZIIA, Canterbury Tues 27 March 2007. Overview. Three for the price of one Agreement of 13 February 2007 Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 Agreed Framework of 1994

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The North Korea-US agreement - prospects for peace


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    1. The North Korea-US agreement - prospects for peace Tim Beal Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand NZIIA, Canterbury Tues 27 March 2007

    2. Overview • Three for the price of one • Agreement of 13 February 2007 • Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 • Agreed Framework of 1994 • >>return to Agreement, aftermath and prospects • But first a commercial, then set scene NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    3. NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    4. Consumer warning • Reviews have been generally positive • Charles Armstrong, Columbia University • Timely, important, and provocative. A useful corrective to the stereotypes and misinformation that pervade ‘conventional wisdom’ about North Korea • But not in NZ International Review NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    5. NZ International Review • Bryan Dorn (Jan-Feb 2007) • Masters student at VUW • Tim Beal attempts to focus on all issues of the North Korean crisis and ends up doing nothing very well • You have been warned… NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    6. Dorn’s criticism • Perhaps the fundamental weakness of Beal's book is its failure to recognise that it takes two parties to make a conflict. Excessive concentration on the United States overshadows the fact that Pyongyang is very far from being innocent in this exceptionally complicated dispute NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    7. Beal’s response • Dorn follows conventional wisdom • NK as ‘rogue state’ ..threat to stability • Beal – situates NK-US conflict within realist geopolitical framework NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    8. North Korea • NK small, weak state • Particular historical/geographic circumstances but with common aspirations • Independence • Security • Development/prosperity NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    9. United States • Global, imperial, superpower • NK policy small component of general foreign policy • NK not important in itself • Needs to be considered within wider policy framework • Set the scene>>focus on Six Party framework, and positions of Six NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    10. CHARACTERISTICS of Six Party Framework • 1 US salience • 2: Asymmetry • 3: Global interconnections – the network effect NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    11. US Salience • 1: US is salient • US is by far the most important country for each of the others • Not reciprocated • Except perhaps China • All of them want good relations with US • Not least DPRK NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    12. US position the default • They do things against their own interests – eg ROK sending troops to Iraq – to keep US happy • China plays a waiting game • They do not oppose US head-on in UN, but work to water down resolutions • Eg over invasion of Iraq, condemnation of NK missile and nuclear test • Focus in analysis should be on US, not DPRK • DPRK policy options limited, US much more complex NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    13. 2: Asymmetry • Six parties are very disparate • Population, wealth, military power, political system, culture, sovereignty, etc. etc. NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    14. Sovereignty and power I • US is the superpower • No serious threat from any other power • Question of projecting power • Iraq shows limits • Russia, China and Japan • Equal in military spending • But Japan not ‘normal country’ • Has US bases. large element of US military control NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    15. Sovereignty and power II • ROK • Much bigger and richer than DPRK, much larger military spending, advanced equipment…. • But US has ‘wartime control’, and bases • DPRK • Weakest and smallest • Limited project of power; defense paramount • No foreign bases, military exercises • IS DPRK-China mutual defence treaty operable? NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    16. Asymmetry: DPRK and US NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    17. DPRK • Negotiations with US key to future • Mistakes could be fatal • Only US can attack, or allow attack • Options limited • Determined and focussed NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    18. US • DPRK itself not important, no threat • It is implications of DPRK for global and regional strategies which is important • Wide range of problems and issues around the world (Iraq, Iran, Islamic nationalism… • Open society, traditionally confident in invulnerability and mission • Partisanship , inter-dept rivalry • Many options, no urgency NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    19. 3 Global interconnections and network • No country is an island • Even NK has relationships around the world • US, in particular, a global power • Korean policy must be seen in wider context • When the Americans talk of NK, they think or Iran….and China NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    20. For each of the Six Parties • Its relationship with one of the others has ramifications for its relationship with all • The actions of any one of the others impacts on its relationship with all • We can conceptualise a dual layer network • Between each of the Six with each other • Between each of the Six with their global relationships • Networks can be hard (political, military, economic) or soft (cultural, influence..) NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    21. Characteristics>>positions • 1 Salience of US • 2 Asymmetry • 3 Network • Now look at positions and policies of the Six NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    22. POSITIONS • Russia, China, ROK fairly similar • Oppose DPRK nuclear weapons • Facilitate Japanese remilitarisation and nuclearisation • Could provoke US to war • War would have horrendous consequences for Korean peninsula and region • China fear that hawks might use opportunity to attack NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    23. Russia, China, ROK • Want stability, peace • Different attitudes towards unification but all want economic cooperation and growth • All oppose collapse of DPRK NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    24. Japan • Abe Shinzo – career built on • NK abductions • ‘Constitutional reform’ (remilitarisation) • Currently a ‘spoiler’ – bringing abductee issue to SPT • Annoyed Koreas, China, now US NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    25. Japan • Abductee issue good for domestic consumption • Washington Post editorial 24/3/07 –Abe’s wilting popularity • Tension with DPRK>>remilitarisation • Aimed at China • Worried about Korean reunification NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    26. North Korea • What does North Korea want? • Asked Bob Gallucci – no answer • Answer would be embarrassing because it invalidates ‘rogue state’ cliché • Two recent quotes NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    27. Washington • Bates Gill • a China specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. • “They want a peace treaty. They want a normal relationship with the United States.” • Yardley, Jim. "Cleaning Up the 20th Century " New York Times, 18 March 2007. NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    28. Seoul • Establishing diplomatic relations with Washington is at the heart of Pyongyang’s wish list in current talks over its nuclear program. • For Pyongyang, gaining diplomatic recognition in Washington is seen as a way of addressing its economic collapse, according to a South Korean government official. “It makes sense,” said the official. “You get diplomatic recognition, sanctions are lifted and business will follow.” • Lee, Brian. "For Pyongyang talks are a way to make friends " JoongAng Ilbo, 13 March 2007. NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    29. North Korea’s aspirations • Security • Survival as independent country • Pending reunification • Normal diplomatic and commercial relationships • US, Japan • Short term humanitarian aid NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    30. United States • Much more difficult to pin down • NK issue small, part of wider strategic framework • Dissension, infighting (hawks/neocons v realists>>no coherent, consistent policy • Two underlying strands NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    31. Two strands of logic in US strategy • Overlapping, sometimes contradictory imperatives • Global and Regional NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    32. Global • DPRK must be punished and destroyed as an example to others • Peaceful coexistence would send wrong message • Not as pressing an issue as Middle East • NK is no threat, there is no real danger of things getting worse cf Iraq • Can be put on backburner • Agreement13 Feb • Rational for Missile Defense NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    33. Regional • Prime objective is containment of China • US-Japan alliance (now involving Taiwan) • Overtures to India, support for nuclear (missile?) programmes • Using India to Keep China at Bay, December 12, 2006, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3775 NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    34. Perception of Threat • DPRK threat and tension essential ingredient • Keep and consolidate Japan and ROK under US hegemony • Reunification would undercut military presence in Korea NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    35. Strategic incoherence • US critics often accuse Administration of ‘strategic incoherence’ • Clinton>>Perry • Bush doing the same • No solution – real reason: • Lack of clarity about strategic aims • Refusal to recognise conflicts between them NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    36. Conflict between global and regional • Global >>destroy DPRK • Regional >> preserve DPRK NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    37. AGREEMENTS • Agreement 13 February 2007 • Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement • >>Joint Statement 19 September 2005 • >>>successor to Agreed Framework NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    38. Origins of AF - nuclear issue • DPRK two main nuclear objectives • Electricity • Energy security …nuclear fuel cycle • Military Security (assumed but denied) • Same as every other nuclear-capable country • Parallels with India particularly topical and relevant NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    39. Need for electricity often overlooked • Key constraint on economic recovery • ROK (Japan…) large dependence on nuclear energy • UK reactivating nuclear energy programme NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    40. 1993/4 crisis>>Agreed Framework • Early 1990s – US suspected NK extracting plutonium which could be used for weapons • Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung • Agreement forced upon Clinton NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    41. Agreed Framework • I Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants. • Due 2003 – five years behind schedule, now cancelled • US-led Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    42. KEDO • Initiated and controlled by US, paid for mainly by ROK and Japan • Now formally disbanded • ROK having to pick up final bills • US to provide annual supplies of heavy fuel oil as compensation for energy forgone NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    43. Agreed Framework • II The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. • Little progress except late 2000; frozen by Bush • III Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclearfree Korean peninsula NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    44. nuclearfree Korean peninsula • US to give formal assurances against the threat of nuclear weapons • Bush Nuclear Posture Review threatened preemptive nuclear strike • DPRK implement N-S denuclearization agreement • Enriched uranium would breech that • IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regime. NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    45. Sunshine to clouds • Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ • Engagement with North was necessary to prevent war • Collapse of DPRK would disastrous for ROK • Defuse tensions, move to peaceful reunification • Pressure on Clinton >>Perry Report >>US – DPRK modus vivendi • NK missile moratorium NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    46. Pyongyang Summit 2000 • June – highly successful summit • October –Secretary Albright visits Pyongyang, comes back with invitation to Clinton • Clinton packs his bags but Gore loses election NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    47. Kim Dae-jung’s final years • Bush makes clear he is abandoning Clinton’s policies, Korea and elsewhere • ABC policy • March 2001 Kim Dae-jung goes to Washington, is rebuffed • North-South relations go up and down • Kim’s successor Roh Moo-hyun continues policy NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    48. January 2002 • Nuclear Posture Review • Violates NS- nuclear accord; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) • Axis of Evil speech • State of the Union speech links Iraq, Iran and DPRK NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    49. Collapse of Agreed Framework • US never fully implemented AF, effectively destroyed it late 2002 • Charged DPRK with having highly enriched uranium programme (HEU) NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07

    50. Kelly’s Pyongyang visit October 2002 • Kelly came back from Pyongyang claiming • He had accused NK of having HEU programme • They admitted this • Pyongyang soon denied both charges, but crisis had been set in motion • US suspended deliveries of oil, abrogating AF; Pyongyang reactivated reactors. US refused to negotiate NZIIA Canterbury 27/3/07