Scientific Methodology PH3580

1. Scientific Methodology PH3580 Luca Moretti Department of Philosophy Aberdeen University l.moretti@abdn.ac.uk http://lucamoretti.org

2. Lecture 8Lakatos� methodology II Requested readings: I. Lakatos,. �Why did Copernicus research programme supersede Ptolemy�s?� in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, pp. 168-189. P. Feyerabend, Against Method (Verso, 2003), Chs. 8-10. P. Feyerabend, �Consolations for the specialist� in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), Sect. 9.

3. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to prevent the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. Each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.





8. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. Each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

9. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. Each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

10. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. Each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

11. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. Each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

12. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Note that each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. And each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

13. 8.1 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Focusing on series of systems produces a clearer picture of the situation in which two scientific traditions compete with one another (e.g. the Ptolemaic versus the Copernican tradition). Consider two rival systems S and S*. Suppose S entails the observation statement O, and S* entails the observation statement not-O. An experiment is performed with the effect that O proves true. S is corroborated while S* is falsified. The advocates of S* will replace S* with S1* (in which some of the original auxiliary assumptions are modified to remove the falsification). Afterwards, new observation statements are derived from both S and the new rival S1*. Suppose now S is falsified, and is replaced with S1. This process will quickly lead to two rival series of systems: S, S1, S2,� and S*, S1*, S2*,� Note that each S-system shares the central principles of all other S-systems. And each S*-system shares the central principles of all other S*-systems. Lakatos calls the series of systems of this type scientific research programs.

14. 8.2 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Each scientific research program consists of a hard core of principles that remains unchanged in each system shift, and of a protective belt of auxiliary assumptions that has the function to prevent the falsification of the hard core. In each system shift some of the auxiliary assumptions will change. Furthermore, any research program is characterized by a heuristic, i.e. a set of problem solving techniques. More precisely, each research program is characterized by: (1) A negative heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should not do. (The rules of negative heuristic simply impose that the hard core of the research program should not be falsified). (2) A positive heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should do. (The rules of positive heuristic specify how the central principles constituting the hard core of the research program can be applied to reality to provide explanations and predictions. This typically comes in terms of a series of hints and suggestions concerning how to change and develop the protective belt that surround the hard core to accommodate possible falsifications).

15. 8.2 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Any scientific research program consists of a hard core of principles that remains unchanged in each system shift, and of a protective belt of auxiliary assumptions that has the function to prevent the falsification of the hard core. In each system shift, some of the auxiliary assumptions will change. Furthermore, any research program is characterized by a heuristic � i.e. a set of problem solving techniques. More precisely, each research program is characterized by: (1) A negative heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should not do. (The rules of negative heuristic simply impose that the hard core of the research program should not be falsified). (2) A positive heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should do. (The rules of positive heuristic specify how the principles constituting the hard core of the research program can be applied to reality to provide explanations and predictions. This typically comes in terms of a series of suggestions concerning how to change and develop the protective belt that surround the hard core to accommodate possible falsifications).

16. 8.2 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Any scientific research program consists of a hard core of principles that remains unchanged in each system shift, and of a protective belt of auxiliary assumptions that has the function to prevent the falsification of the hard core. In each system shift, only some of the auxiliary assumptions will change. Furthermore, any research program is characterized by a heuristic � i.e. a set of problem solving techniques. More precisely, each research program is characterized by: (1) A negative heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should not do. (The rules of negative heuristic simply impose that the hard core of the research program should not be falsified). (2) A positive heuristic, which specifies what the scientists should do. (The rules of positive heuristic specify how the principles constituting the hard core of the research program can be applied to reality to provide explanations and predictions. This typically comes in terms of a series of suggestions concerning how to change and develop the protective belt that surround the hard core to accommodate possible falsifications).







23. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (So every new system in the series of the research program must make new improbable predictions, and for at least some theories of the series some of the new predictions must be �verified�). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program PR supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another PR* if and only if: (a) PR predicts progressively all that PR* truly predicts and (b) PR makes some new verified prediction.





28. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (Hence, a research program is acceptable just in case each of its systems makes some new prediction, and at least some of its systems makes some verified and new prediction). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program PR supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another PR* if and only if: (a) PR predicts progressively all that PR* truly predicts and (b) PR makes some new verified prediction.

29. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (Hence, a research program is acceptable just in case each of its systems makes some new prediction, and at least some of its systems makes some verified and new prediction). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program PR supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another PR* if and only if: (a) PR predicts progressively all that PR* truly predicts and (b) PR makes some new verified prediction.

30. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (Hence, a research program is acceptable just in case each of its systems makes some new prediction, and at least some of its systems makes some verified and new prediction). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program, RP, supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another, RP*, if and only if: (a) PR predicts progressively all that PR* truly predicts and (b) PR makes some new verified prediction.

31. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (Hence, a research program is acceptable just in case each of its systems makes some new prediction, and at least some of its systems makes some verified and new prediction). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program, RP, supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another, RP*, if and only if: (a) RP predicts progressively all that RP* truly predicts and (b) PR makes some new verified prediction.

32. 8.3 Lakatos� methodology of research programs Lakatos proposes the following rules for the acceptance and the rejection of research programs. A research program can be accepted if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) it is theoretically progressive; (2) it is at least intermittently empirically progressive. (Hence, a research program is acceptable just in case each of its systems makes some new prediction, and at least some of its systems makes some verified and new prediction). If a research program does not satisfy both (1) and (2) is degenerating and should be rejected. A research program, RP, supersedes (i.e. is scientifically superior to) another, RP*, if and only if: (a) RP predicts progressively all that RP* truly predicts and (b) RP makes some additional true predictions.

33. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications a for long time, which is ad odds with Popper�s Falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program PR, will not abandon T even if each subsequent systems of PR that include T proves falsified. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if PR is no longer progressive (i.e. PR no longer produce new true predictions). But even if PR is progressive, each of PR�s systems will typically have some (or even many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to cope with this falsification. Suppose that none of the variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S due to O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

34. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program PR, will not abandon T even if each subsequent systems in PR proves falsified. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if PR is no longer progressive (i.e. PR no longer produce genuinely new true predictions). But even if PR is progressive, each of PR�s systems will typically have some (even many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

35. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if PR is no longer progressive (i.e. PR no longer produce genuinely new true predictions). But even if PR is progressive, each of PR�s systems will typically have some (even many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

36. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if PR is progressive, each of PR�s systems will typically have some (even many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

37. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

38. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Let S be a system of RP. S entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

39. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Suppose a system S of RP entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants S1, S2, S3, � is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

40. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Suppose a system S of RP entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. MP will eventually be rejected. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

41. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Suppose a system S of RP entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. RP will eventually be rejected. But this process may take a long time. Retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the falsification of S depending on O will be perceived as a decisive reason to reject MP.

42. 8.4 Lakatos� methodology is closer to real science than Popper�s falsificationism Lakatos� methodology clarifies why scientists can tolerate falsifications for a long time, which appears at odds with Popper�s falsificationism. The scientists who accept a given theory T, coinciding with the hard core of a given research program RP, will not abandon T even if just each subsequent system in RP is falsified by observations. They will abandon the whole research program PR � and thus T � only if RP is no longer progressive (i.e. RP no longer produces new true predictions). But even if RP is progressive, each of RP�s systems will typically have some (or many) observational falsifications. Lakatos� methodology also clarifies why scientific rationality is often very slow. Suppose a system S of RP entails O, which proves false. The advocates of RP will develop a series of variants S1, S2, S3, � of S to remove this falsification. Suppose that none of these variants is empirically adequate, for all new predictions of these systems are always false. RP will eventually be rejected. But this process may take a long time. Only retrospectively � perhaps after many years � the original falsification of S due to O will be perceived as a reason to reject RP.

43. 8.5 Lakatos� methodology and inductivism Note that it would be possible to make Lakatos� methodology even closer to actual science if Popper�s dogma that it is impossible to confirm any theory were dropped. We saw that a research program RP can be accepted if and only if: (1) RP is theoretically progressive; (2) RP is at least intermittently empirically progressive. Saying that RP is empirically progressive is saying � for Lakatos � that RP is intermittently corroborated by its new predictions (i.e. some of these predictions turns out to be true without increasing the probability of the system of RP that entails them). Inductivists could simply re-formulate the requirement of being intermittently empirically progressive by stating that RP should be intermittently confirmed by its new predictions (i.e. some of these predictions should turn out to be true to increase the probability of the system of RP that entails them). This would reflect the view shared by most scientists that the correct predictions of a theory do increase its probability.






49. 8.6 Feyerabend�s central criticism of Lakatos� methodology For Lakatos, science coincides with the production of research programs that are both (1) theoretically progressive and (2) at least intermittently empirically progressive. Suppose the research program RP has been degenerating for a long time � i.e. none of the subsequent systems of RP have produced, for a long time, genuinely new prediction that have been verified. (Suppose all new predictions have always turned out to be false). In this case � according to Lakatos � the scientists should reject RP. Feyerabend emphasizes that (2) does not clarify for how long a scientist should wait before rejecting RP. If (2) is left as it is, this condition can be criticized as vacuous. As no one can be accused of being irrational for obstinately sticking to a research program that has been degenerating for ages!). On the other hand, if (2) is made more precise - e.g. �the research program has to be empirically progressive after at least each 10 years� � this condition can be criticized as arbitrary (why just 10 years and not 20 or 100?). Feyerabend�s conclusion is that, since no research program can be eliminated, science an �anarchical� activity in which everything goes.

50. 8.6 Feyerabend�s central criticism of Lakatos� methodology For Lakatos, science coincides with the production of research programs that are both (1) theoretically progressive and (2) at least intermittently empirically progressive. Suppose the research program RP has been degenerating for a long time � i.e. none of the subsequent systems of RP have produced, for a long time, genuinely new prediction that have been verified. (Suppose all new predictions have always turned out to be false). In this case � according to Lakatos � the scientists should reject RP. Feyerabend emphasizes that (2) does not clarify for how long a scientist should wait before rejecting RP. If (2) is left as it is, this condition can be criticized as vacuous. As no one can be accused of being irrational for obstinately sticking to a research program that has been degenerating for ages!). On the other hand, if (2) is made more precise - e.g. �the research program has to be empirically progressive after at least each 10 years� � this condition can be criticized as arbitrary (why just 10 years and not 20 or 100?). Feyerabend�s conclusion is that, since no research program can be eliminated, science an �anarchical� activity in which everything goes.

51. 8.6 Feyerabend�s central criticism of Lakatos� methodology For Lakatos, science coincides with the production of research programs that are both (1) theoretically progressive and (2) at least intermittently empirically progressive. Suppose the research program RP has been degenerating for a long time � i.e. none of the subsequent systems of RP have produced, for a long time, new predictions that have been verified. (Imagine all new predictions have always turned out to be false). In this case � according to Lakatos � the scientists should reject RP. Feyerabend emphasizes that (2) does not clarify for how long a scientist should wait before rejecting RP. If (2) is left as it is, this condition can be criticized as vacuous. As no one can be accused of being irrational for obstinately sticking to a research program that has been degenerating for ages!). On the other hand, if (2) is made more precise - e.g. �the research program has to be empirically progressive after at least each 10 years� � this condition can be criticized as arbitrary (why just 10 years and not 20 or 100?). Feyerabend�s conclusion is that, since no research program can be eliminated, science an �anarchical� activity in which everything goes.





56. 8.6 Feyerabend�s central criticism of Lakatos� methodology For Lakatos, science coincides with the production of research programs that are both (1) theoretically progressive and (2) at least intermittently empirically progressive. Suppose the research program RP has been degenerating for a long time � i.e. none of the subsequent systems of RP have produced, for a long time, new predictions that have been verified. (Imagine all new predictions have always turned out to be false). In this case � according to Lakatos � the scientists should reject RP. Feyerabend emphasizes that (2) does not clarify for how long a scientist should wait before rejecting RP. If (2) is left as it is, this condition can be criticized as vacuous. As no one can be accused of being irrational for obstinately sticking to a research program that has been degenerating for ages!). On the other hand, if (2) is made more precise - e.g. �the research program has to be empirically progressive after at least each 10 years� � this condition can be criticized as arbitrary (why just 10 years and not 20 or 100?). Feyerabend�s conclusion is that, since no research program can be eliminated, science is an �anarchical� activity in which everything goes.

57. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included epicycles

58. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included)

59. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions around the same centre. This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included

60. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions around the same centre. This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included

61. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions around the same centre. This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included epicycles, equants, etc.)

62. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions around the same centre. This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. (The auxiliary assumptions concerned, for instance, the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and the structures of their orbits � e.g. whether they included epicycles

63. 8.7 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Ptolemaic research program was based on the central principle of (positive) heuristic according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions around the same centre. This principle is traceable to the Pythagorean-Platonic conviction that nature is governed by simple mathematical principles. The hard-core of the Ptolemaic research program said that: (HC) The Earth is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. The protective belt was made of auxiliary assumptions, continuously changed in time, about the specific locations of the planets and the stars in time, their specific speeds, and - above all - the structures of their orbits - e.g. whether they included epicycles, equants, etc.

64. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system capable to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or incompatible with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems after Eudoxus� produced any genuinely new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program were degenerating!

65. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system supposed to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or to some extent incoherent with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems after Eudoxus� produced any genuinely new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program were degenerating!



68. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system supposed to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or to some extent incoherent with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. So the planets� orbits did not share the same centre or the planets� motion was not uniform. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems after Eudoxus� produced any genuinely new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program were degenerating!

69. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system supposed to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or to some extent incoherent with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. So the planets� orbits did not share the same centre or the planets� motion was not uniform. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems produced any new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program were degenerating!

70. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system supposed to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or to some extent incoherent with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. So the planets� orbits did not share the same centre or the planets� motion was not uniform. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems produced any new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program were degenerating!

71. 8.8 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, each theoretical system supposed to explain the motions of the planets produced within the Ptolemaic tradition was observationally inadequate or to some extent incoherent with the heuristic principle (E). For instance: Eudoxus� system of concentric spheres could not account for the observation that planets change their brightness in time. And the subsequent systems introduced by Apollonius, Hipparchus and Ptolemy made use of epicycles, equants and eccentrics. So the planets� orbits did not share the same centre or the planets� motion was not uniform. In this, they were all at odds with (E). More importantly � according to Lakatos � none of the systems produced any new and verified prediction. (These systems were able to remove the falsifications of their predecessors, but nothing more than this). In Copernicus� age, the Ptolemaic research program was degenerating!

72. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel, rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. Furthermore, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive, as it made, at the outset, completely new predictions. For example: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s in its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

73. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. Furthermore, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, genuinely new predictions. For example: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!




77. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. Furthermore, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, genuinely new predictions. For example: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

78. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. Furthermore, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, genuinely new predictions. For example: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

79. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. More importantly, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, new predictions. For example: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

80. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. More importantly, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, new predictions. In particular: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

81. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. More importantly, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, new predictions. In particular: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need to see new and verified predictions!

82. 8.9 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program shared with the Ptolemaic the positive heuristic principle according to which: (E) All astronomical phenomena should be explained by a combination of a few uniform circular motions about the same centre. Yet the hard-core of the Copernican research program was this: (HC*) The Sun is fixed in the centre and all celestial bodies move around it. According to Lakatos, at least the original system of the Copernican research program � the one proposed by Copernicus himself � was less incoherent with (E) than the parallel and rival system in the Ptolemaic research program. For example, Copernicus used no equants, thus all motions were really uniform. More importantly, the Copernican research program was theoretically progressive. As it produced, at the outset, new predictions. In particular: about the phases of planets and the existence of stellar parallax. But this does not suffice to justify Lakatos� claim that the Copernican research program superseded Ptolemy�s at its early stages. For this conclusion, we would need new and verified predictions!

83. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, and it did produce one completely new prediction, verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. Yet Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos has suggested that also some predictions of Copernicus� system, about already known facts, could be seen as genuinely new predictions. Consider, for instance, the fact that some planets, but not the sun, have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican system even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. The prediction of this fact can be seen as a an unexpected result of Copernicus� system. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

84. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos has suggested that also some predictions of Copernicus� system, about already known facts, could be seen as genuinely new predictions. Consider, for instance, the fact that some planets, but not the sun, have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican system even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. The prediction of this fact can be seen as a an unexpected result of Copernicus� system. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

85. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos has suggested that also some predictions of Copernicus� system, about already known facts, could be seen as genuinely new predictions. Consider, for instance, the fact that some planets, but not the sun, have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican system even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. The prediction of this fact can be seen as a an unexpected result of Copernicus� system. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

86. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider, for instance, the fact that some planets, but not the sun, have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican system even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. The prediction of this fact can be seen as a an unexpected result of Copernicus� system. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

87. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican system even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. The prediction of this fact can be seen as a an unexpected result of Copernicus� system. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

88. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican program even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. Copernicus� goal was just producing a theory of the heavens in harmony with certain Pythagorean-Platonic principles. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

89. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican program even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. Copernicus� goal was just producing a theory of the heavens in harmony with certain Pythagorean-Platonic principles. Hence, the prediction of this fact can be seen as an unexpected result of Copernicus� research program. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

90. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican program even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. Copernicus� goal was just producing a theory of the heavens in harmony with certain Pythagorean-Platonic principles. Hence, the prediction of this fact can be seen as an unexpected result of Copernicus� research program. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a genuinely new prediction of the Copernican system.

91. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican program even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. Copernicus� goal was just producing a theory of the heavens in harmony with certain Pythagorean-Platonic principles. Hence, the prediction of this fact can be seen as an unexpected result of Copernicus� research program. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a new prediction of the Copernican system.

92. 8.10 Why Copernicus� research program superseded Ptolemy�s according to Lakatos According to Lakatos, the Copernican research program could predicted (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic research program truly predicted, and it did produce quite early one new prediction verified by Galileo: that Venus has phases. (The stellar parallax was observed only in the XIX Century!) Yet remember that Feyerabend has argued that Galileo�s observations could not be considered to be reliable at that time. Lakatos also suggests that certain predictions of Copernicus� program about already known facts could be seen as new predictions. Consider for instance the fact that some planets have retrogressions. This fact was predicted by the Copernican program even though its existence was assumed neither in its hard-core nor in its Pythagorean-Platonic heuristic. Copernicus� goal was just producing a theory of the heavens in harmony with certain Pythagorean-Platonic principles. Hence, the prediction of this fact can be seen as an unexpected result of Copernicus� research program. Hence � according to Lakatos � this prediction can count as a new prediction of the Copernican system. Probably, many will not be persuaded by this argument that the Copernican research program was really empirically progressive in the XVII century �

93. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program early in the XVII century. For though the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce genuinely new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any genuinely new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind the facts without anticipating any! For this reasons, scientists were rationally justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research project as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether they were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research project.

94. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For though the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce genuinely new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any genuinely new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind the facts without anticipating any! For this reasons, scientists were rationally justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research project as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether they were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research project.

95. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For, although the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any genuinely new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind the facts without anticipating any! For this reasons, scientists were rationally justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research project as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether they were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research project.

96. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For, although the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind known facts � they did not anticipate any new fact! For this reasons, scientists were rationally justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research project as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether they were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research project.

97. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For, although the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind known facts � they did not anticipate any new fact! For this reasons, scientists were in some sense justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research program as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether they were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research project.

98. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For. although the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind known facts � they did not anticipate any new fact! For this reasons, scientists were in some sense justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research program as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether scientists were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research program. Finally, since no one was able to answer Aristotle�s objections against the earth� motion, the Copernican research program could legitimately be perceived to be a non-starter in the XVII century!

99. 8.11 The Copernican revolution: an open problem It is unclear whether we should accept the conclusion that Copernicus� research program superseded � in Lakatos� sense � Ptolemy�s research program in the XVII century. For. although the Copernican system was able to predict (roughly) all what the Ptolemaic system truly predicted, it is unsure that it did produce new and true predictions at that early stage. Despite this, Lakatos� thesis that Ptolemy�s research program was degenerating appears correct and illuminating � that research program was unable to produce any new and true prediction for centuries. The Ptolemaist scientists always lagged behind known facts � they did not anticipate any new fact! For this reasons, scientists were in some sense justified in starting working at Copernicus� new research program as soon as Copernicus introduced it. However � given Feyerabend�s criticism � it is unclear whether scientists were rationally justified in rejecting the old Ptolemaic research program. Finally, since no one was able to answer Aristotle�s objections against the earth� motion, the Copernican research program could legitimately be perceived to be a non-starter in the XVII century.

100. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science will be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) that are enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules or theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge much more reliable than, for instance, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.



103. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science can be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) that are enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules or theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge much more reliable than, for instance, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.

104. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science can be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules or theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge much more reliable than, for instance, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.

105. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science can be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules or theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge much more reliable than, for instance, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.

106. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science can be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules for theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge much more reliable than, for instance, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.

107. 8.12 Conclusion: a sense in which science is more rational than non-science We can presumably extend the conclusions reached about the Copernican revolution to (empirical) science in general. The investigation about the nature of the scientific method should focus on, not single theories, but sequences of theories in time, where each sequence individuates a specific research program (or a scientific tradition, or a paradigm). Only in this way the philosophical picture of science can be sufficiently realistic. We saw that it is possible to formulate quite precise rules for the acceptance and rejection of single theories (i.e. theories and auxiliary assumptions) enclosed in research programs. In this sense, science does possess a rational method to achieve knowledge. This method makes science essentially different from other disciplines that aim to achieve knowledge � it is very dubious that similar rules for theory acceptance and rejection characterize, for instance, any astrological research program (if there is anything like it)! In this sense, science is a source of knowledge more reliable than, for example, commonsense, religion, astrology or myth.

108. 8.13 Conclusion: scientific rationality without objectivity Despite this important result, it hard to think of any set of satisfactory methodological rules that apply to a research program as a whole. Whereas we have rules to decide whether a research program is epistemically preferable to another in a given time, it is hard to think of any reasonable rule to eliminate degenerating research programs. The view that science approximates better and better the true description of reality appears thus questionable. The problem is that scientific descriptions alternative to the one accepted in any given time cannot really be eliminated on the grounds of rational considerations � once put aside, these descriptions can always resuscitate, perhaps after centuries. Science gives us knowledge which proves rational to a very high degree - perhaps the highest possible degree we can aim at � and yet this seems insufficient to guarantee the objectivity of scientific knowledge.

109. 8.13 Conclusion: scientific rationality without objectivity Despite this important result, it is hard to think of any set of satisfactory methodological rules that apply to a research program as a whole. Whereas we have rules to decide whether a research program is epistemically preferable to another in a given time, it is hard to think of any reasonable rule to eliminate degenerating research programs. The view that science approximates better and better the true description of reality appears thus questionable. The problem is that scientific descriptions alternative to the one accepted in any given time cannot really be eliminated on the grounds of rational considerations � once put aside, these descriptions can always resuscitate, perhaps after centuries. Science gives us knowledge which proves rational to a very high degree - perhaps the highest possible degree we can aim at � and yet this seems insufficient to guarantee the objectivity of scientific knowledge.




113. 8.13 Conclusion: scientific rationality without objectivity Despite this important result, it is hard to think of any set of satisfactory methodological rules that apply to a research program as a whole. Whereas we have rules to decide whether a research program is epistemically preferable to another in a given time, it is hard to think of any reasonable rule to eliminate degenerating research programs. The view that science approximates better and better the true description of reality appears thus questionable. The problem is that scientific descriptions alternative to the one accepted in any given time cannot really be eliminated on the grounds of rational considerations � once put aside, these descriptions can always resuscitate, perhaps after centuries. Science gives us knowledge which proves rational to a high degree - perhaps the highest possible degree we can aim at � and yet this seems insufficient to guarantee the objectivity of scientific knowledge.

114. End Lecture 8

Scientific Methodology PH3580

Scientific Methodology PH3580

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