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PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE). Notes on Geoffrey Gorham, Philosophy of Science , Chapter 3. The Scientific Method. Deductivism vs. Inductivism David Hume against Miracles Hume on the Problem of Induction Nelson Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” Carl Hempel’s Hypothetico-Deductive Model
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PHILOSOPHY 107 (STOLZE) Notes on Geoffrey Gorham, Philosophy of Science, Chapter 3
The Scientific Method • Deductivism vs. Inductivism • David Hume against Miracles • Hume on the Problem of Induction • Nelson Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” • Carl Hempel’s Hypothetico-Deductive Model • Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms • Paul Feyerabend’s “Anything Goes” Approach • The Challenge of “Naturalism” to the Philosophy of Science
Two Forms of Reasoning • Deductive • Inductive
An Example of Deductive Reasoning 1. All chimpanzees are great apes. 2. All great apes are self-conscious. 3. All self-conscious beings deserve rights. 4. Therefore, all chimpanzees deserve rights.
An Example of Inductive Reasoning 1. Chimpanzees are physiologically similar to human beings. 2. Therefore, laboratory experiments on chimpanzees can provide reliable evidence for the causes of human diseases.
Mill’s Methods of Experimental Inquiry • The Method of Agreement • The Method of Difference • The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference
Hume on the Problem of Induction How can we justify a “Principle of the Uniformity of Nature” (PUN)? LET’S TRY: 1. In our past experience, X has always (or at least regularly) occurred. 2. [The future will continue to be like the past.] 3. Therefore, in the future X will probably continue to occur. BUT HOW THEN CAN WE JUSTIFY THE SECOND PREMISE? LET’S TRY: 1. In our past experience, the future was like the past. 2. [The future will continue to be like the past.] 3. Therefore, the future will probably continue to be like the past. BUT THIS IS CIRCULAR REASIONING…SO, CAN WE EVER LOGICALLY JUSTIFY OUR REASONING ABOUT THE FUTURE?
Nelson Goodman on the “New Riddle of Induction” Grue: “something is grue just in case it was observed in the past to be green or was not so observed and is blue” (p. 71).
Karl Popper on Verification vs. Falsification CONTRAST THE FOLLOWING TWO ARGUMENT FORMS: 1. T implies P. 2. P is true. 3. So, T is true. (Invalid) 1. T implies P. 2. P is not true. 3. So, T is false. (Valid)
Carl Hempel’s Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) Model of Confirmation • The H-D Model • The Paradox of the Ravens
Thomas Kuhn on Paradigms “A paradigm is a major theoretical achievement that establishes an ‘exemplar’ or framework for future research in a given field. Young scientists are inculcated in the assumptions and methods of the paradigm and commit themselves to its articulation and application. Much of everyday or ‘normal science’ is devoted to solving theoretical and empirical ‘puzzles’ that the paradigm presents.”
Paul Feyerabend on “Anything Goes” “Ideas which today form the very basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way” (p. 84).
The Challenge of “Naturalism” to the Philosophy of Science • Hans Reichenbach famously distinguished the “Context of Discovery” vs. the “Context of Justification” and emphasized the importance of the latter. • “Naturalized approaches to philosophy of science exactly reverse this hallowed distinction, putting the actual process of discovery prior to the logic of justification and urging a thoroughgoing historical and empirical study of this process. As Ronald Giere has encapsulated the naturalist manifesto: ‘the study of science must itself be science’” (p. 86).
