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Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua PowerPoint Presentation
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Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua

Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua

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Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua

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  1. East Asia Science & Security Network Nov 3, 2007; Beijing, China Technical Arms Control WorkAt IIS, Tsinghua Li Bin Tsinghua University

  2. 1. Missile Defense (1) US Missile Defense in East Europe (2) Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures

  3. (1) US Missile Defense in East Europe • Question: How capable the system is to intercept Russian missiles if it can intercept Iranian missiles; • Capability rather than intention; • Intercept range rather than killing probability

  4. Interceptors • BPI(Boost phase Interceptor): its range does not cover Iranian missiles flying to the US; • THAAD: its range does not cover Iranian missiles flying to the US; • GBI (Ground Based Interceptor): guided by radar; • KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor): guided by satellite & radar

  5. GBI in EU & AlaskaIntercept Russian Missiles

  6. KEI in EU & GBI in AlaskaIntercept Russian Missiles • KEI in EU intercepts Russian missile at 585s; • KEI in EU & GBI in Alaska form a layered defense; • GBI in EU contributes little

  7. Conclusions • GBIs in EU, which cover Iranian missile, do not add new threat to Russia; • KEIs in EU pose new threats to Russia by adding a layer of defense; • US commitment of GBIs only in EU can help avoid security dilemma

  8. 2. Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures • Russia & China declared that maneuvering warheads help penetrate missile defense; • The research is to understand whether and how it works; • China case; • Ongoing work

  9. Preliminary Results • Solid-fueled missile (DF-31) is not able to do this due to limited payload; • Liquid-fueled missile (DF-5) may or may not be able to do this; • Depends on the vulnerable time window

  10. Vulnerable Time Window

  11. Vulnerable Time Window &Depressed Trajectory • Depressed trajectory  shorter vulnerable time window  less fuel for maneuvering.

  12. Export Control • Impact of US export control on its trade with China; • Economic factors in export control: scale economy

  13. Historical Statistics of US-China TradeUS Perspective (M$)

  14. US Export to China (M$) Cox Report Tian’anmen Sq Taiwan Str EP3 RMB devalued

  15. How US Export Disturbed • Licensing contributes little; • Psychological burdens contributes a lot: • sanctions, • fear of accusation by ultranationalists

  16. 2. Economical Factors in Export Control Policy? • Economical factors drive the export control policies of all countries. • The US has had big markets in most areas, so it is not eager to expand its markets by lower export control standards. • Countries with small domestic markets and small fraction in international markets may be different.

  17. A US Case • US nuclear industry has zero domestic market and small international market; so it needs to create new market. • US-Indian nuclear deal

  18. Other work 1. Chinese nuclear strategy; Operation, Terminology, NFU 2. Energy (1) New security theory: military security not #1 concern (2) Peaceful access to energy