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‘Trust’ and New Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)Technological Change

‘Trust’ and New Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)Technological Change. Richard Hindmarsh Tee Rogers-Hayden Griffith University, Australia Univ. of East Anglia, UK. TOPICS. Crisis in public trust re S&T 2. Australia’s GM regulatory legitimisers

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‘Trust’ and New Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)Technological Change

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  1. ‘Trust’ andNew Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)Technological Change Richard HindmarshTee Rogers-HaydenGriffith University, AustraliaUniv. of East Anglia, UK

  2. TOPICS • Crisis in public trust re S&T 2. Australia’s GM regulatory legitimisers 3. NZ & the RCGM as a regulatory legitimiser 4. Ideas for new forms of governance

  3. TOPIC 1: Crisis in public trust re S&T • A deep crisis in public trust of science now apparent • 1980s – positioned as lack of public understanding of science • more recently, its the catalyst for institutional redesign towards participatory governance • to strengthen reflexivity and legitimacy of governing • The drivers: • The Public: increasing questioning of govt’s ability to handle risk, now GM building on food safety scares of the 1980s, & the BSE crisis • Science & Biotech industries: concerned about opposition to GM • The State: concerned about the challenge to innovation & govt. • The Critics: opportunity to reduce authority of science & open up new possibilities for public engagement, improved governance, and trust

  4. 1 Catalyst for distrust: actions • 1997 Monsanto's unsegregated soya • contamination of non-GM: Spain, Mexico & Canada, etc • patenting and ownership of ‘nature’ • non-labelling of GM foods • GM regulation’s reliance on pro-GM expert committee’s • overall: intermeshed state, business & scientific interests

  5. 2 Catalyst for distrust: re institutional response • Institutional response to distrust seen as biased, inadequate & out of touch: • portrayal of regulation as thorough despite narrowness • continued reliance on the rhetoric of ‘sound science’ and ‘increase science literacy’ • increasing public acceptance routines, eg, exhibitions, forums, websites, surveys, inquiries • overall, existing institutions are seen as unable to address effectively the new policy challenges raised: • bioethics, value conflicts, responsibility to future generations and non-human nature, monopoly power, need for precaution as GM can only be partially controlled, high consequence risks, democratic governance, etc.

  6. 3. Catalyst for distrust: manoeuvres exposed • continued exposure of manipulative manoeuvres • increasing resort to PR, propaganda, rhetoric in pro-GM discourses to booster claims • which themselves are increasingly criticised, eg ‘RR’ crops • tactics of marginalisation and delegitimisation of critics and public • critics = anti-science, neo-luddites, extremists • public = ignorant and alarmist • even as uncertainty and risk of science increasingly apparent • science articles rely on increasing favourable public understanding: • ‘In Science we Trust’ • ‘How to Restore Public Trust in Science’ • seen as inadequate in not addressing the depth of the debate and out of touch with the public

  7. What’s a regulatory legitimiser? • a significant device, mechanism, strategy or intervention of governance • to control regulation & absorb dissent, & thus control ‘problem populations’ • to legitimise & enable GM experimentation; then commercialisation • What’s governance? = a regime of governability: state ministeries, agencies and interests; R&D networks; agencies of civil society Biotech: 1. Scientists (1970s), 2. State agencies (late 70s), 3. Industrial interests (1980s)

  8. Topic 2: Australia’s 4 key GMregulatory legitimisers • 1975 peer-review in-house regulation • 1979 Australian Academy of Science report 3. 1990 GM Inquiry 4. Gene Technology Act 2000

  9. 1. peer-review in-house regulation • Controversy arises post 1973 • Asilomar (1975) – [National Institutes of Health] • broader hazards marginalised • benefits > risks • ‘responsible scientific review’ • compulsory regulation & moratoriumunnecessary • voluntarily self‑regulation the way • NIH developed minimalist or low risk international guidelines • ASCORD: supervision by supportive scientists • no role for public • No opportunities for scientific and public dissentwithin regulation

  10. Shaping regulation: Asilomar to ASCORD social, ethical, broader ecological risks & biohazards dissenting scientists public

  11. 2. Australian Academy of Science Report • public concerns persist but ‘contained’ overseas • scientists: ‘epidemic pathogen hypothesis’ • bureaucrats in Australia • University of Melbourne Assembly inquiry (1977) • halt research! [background: GM issue redefined from safety to economic opportunity & int’ competitiveness] • Australian Academy of Science report • rDNA low risk • Commercial opportunity

  12. 3. GM Inquiry • regulatory committee moved into pro-GM Science department (1980) • intense battle inside bureaucracy • 1988 ‘mutant meat’ scandal forced Inquiry • terms of reference biased • conducted by parliamentary Standing Committee for Industry, Science & Technology • 1992 inquiry report favourable to bio-business; public input token • real outcome: establish mandatory uniform legislation to facilitate bio-business

  13. 4. Gene Technology Act 2000 • Gene Technology Bill introduced to Oz parliament • Senate inquiry re. the Bill makes 3 key recommendations • community & ethics input in proposed OGTR (deemed detrimental to science-based decision-making) • GTR should be statutory authority of 3 people, independent of bioindustry (economically unviable) (1 pro-industry) • provision for review of regulator (no provision) • Lawson’s risk assessment of the 1st release • broader environment ignored (only gene flow & weediness) • no mention of PP (section 4aa of the Act) or ESD • Bayer Cropscience and Monsanto GM canola approved 2003/4 • critics call for major review, trust a major issue

  14. “The canola applications have focussed attention on the Act. If the nationally consistent scheme enabling the use of gene technology is to regain some credibility a review of the Act should be commenced before the statutory date of June 2005.”

  15. TOPIC 3:NZ & the RCGM as a regulatory legitimiser

  16. NZ: Background • Latecomer to the GM debate, ERMA 1988 • no releases yet, GM in processed foods • set to change with moratorium lifted 29 Oct. 2003 • much resistance before and since • like anti-nuke campaign, GE-free zones (districts, people’s homes, properties), & resistance groups • ‘hot’ issue in 1999 national elections • Green Party pressured for Royal Commission • Signified loss of trust by environmentalists • New Labour/Alliance government instigated one on 8 May 2000

  17. GM proponents GE the solution needed to ‘develop’ a sustainable response more progress all innovation positive decision-making is a science domain GE over-regulated Environmentalists more industrialisation for industrial problems unsustainable approach sustainable GE-free organic nation PP needed Diverging viewpoints…

  18. The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification • 11,000 submissions: c10,000 against or tending to be against GM • RCGM reported on the 29 July 2001 • ‘proceed with GM but with caution’ • the report read as one more of sustaining progress than of progressing sustainability

  19. NZ’s RCGM as a ‘regulatory legitimiser’… Marginalised dissent: • quasi-legal processadvantaged well resourced GM interests (e.g. Life Sciences Network: Avcare key industry group) • submission template • stand alone questions advantaged a modernist parts approach • answers collated into a summary report • environmental & Maori voices disadvantaged • subjective public surveyby Commissioners advantaged GM supporters • Outcome: protest & distrust heightened

  20. Conclusions... • case studies illustrate highly political discourses legitimating modernist governance rather than building trust • deep distrust has resulted regarding the new challenges of GM • institutional re-design needed to regain trust • what might they be?

  21. TOPIC 4:1. Ideas for new forms of governance Millstone & van Zwanenberg (2000) • acknowledge uncertainties & limitations of science • acknowledge risks & benefits for different publics • inclusive decision-making • establish scientific & democratic legitimacy Conditions: • open information (limit commercial confidentiality) • separate regulatory and development agencies • separate scientific and political risk management • pluralistic scientific views & conditional advice in regulation

  22. 2. Ideas for new forms of governance PLUS • pluralistic knowledge approaches • civic participatory governance approaches that engender communication and trust • new political mechanisms/spaces integrating citizen and expert participation & dialogue • broad social, cultural, ethical & economic technological assessment pre-technology adoption, & for regulation once adopted • post technological monitoring & adjustment to knowledge possessed at any one time

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