Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Air Force CONOPS &

Capabilities Based Planning

Lt Col Nathan Titus

Resource Analyses Directorate

Air Force Studies & Analyses Agency

19 Mar 04

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• Capabilities Based Planning Background
• Challenges to Implementation
• Recent Efforts in Air Force Capabilities-Based Planning
• Observations/Recommendations

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• Focus on “possibilities” vs.. “specific validated threats”
• Central question must be “What do I need to do to achieve desired effects?” vs.. “How many of each system do I need?”
• Goal is to plan for robust, flexible forces, capable of meeting a wide variety of threats, rather than an “optimal” force for a narrow set of threats

“[P]lanning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.”

Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation, MR-1513-OSD

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• Fundamentals:
• Defining terms: Effects and Capabilities
• Understanding the role of scenarios
• Analytic Issues:
• Proficiency vs. Sufficiency
• What do we mean by “Risk”?
• What does it cost?
• Determining priorities
• Organizational Challenges

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• Defining effects and capabilities
• Effects are associated with a desired Outcome or Result
• Capabilities are Non-solution Specific – Describe What must be done to achieve Effects
• Fix the level to create common perspective
• Avoid overlaps, redundancy
• Identify relationships
• Role of scenario
• Scenarios needed to provide context for capability assessment
• Suite of scenarios/vignettes must span the range of potential conflicts in all dimensions (political, geography, intensity, etc)
• In resource constrained environment, best solution is robust across all scenarios – not an optimal solution to a point scenario which may never occur

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Effect

Effect

Capability

Capability

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Fundamentals:Defining Effects and Capabilities

Master Capability List

Effects Construct

Capability 1

Capability 2

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

Sub-Sub-

Capability

• Functional decomposition of capabilities
• Collectively Exhaustive and Mutually Exclusive
• Provides a “menu” from which all CONOPS can choose required capabilities

• Builds on Master Capability List
• Links capabilities to effects
• Explicitly identifies crosslinks and interdependencies between capabilities
• Highlights “enabler” capabilities

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C8

C5

C1

C6

C3

C7

C2

C4

• Risk is derived from two independent assessments
• Our capability to deal with events or to provide effects (y axis)
• The severity of impact of the event if we fail to provide the capability (x axis)

• Risk concept not strictly ORM
• No attempt to determine the probability of adverse event (no validated data exists, this is left to senior leadership judgement)
• Measures capability to achieve required effects

Capability

Severity of Impact

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• Answering questions like “How much capability do we have?” or “How much capability do we need?” leads to two different looks at capability
• Proficiency – “how well”
• e.g., radar detection range
• Sufficiency – “how many”
• Force Structure
• Proficiency
• Key scenario elements are adversary and location
• Amenable to subjective or objective analysis techniques
• Sufficiency
• Key scenario elements are time related – how fast to arrive and how long to sustain
• Best addressed with an objective, quantitative analysis technique

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Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) ... will guide our planning and programming, requirements reform, and acquisition.

...make warfighting effects, and the capabilities we need to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do.

... shift from a program review to a review of how our programs contribute to warfighting capabilities and effects.

…Air Staff designed a new review to replace the ‘Quarterly Acquisition Review Program’--we call this new approach a Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA).

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Determine

Environment

Assess

Cue(s)

Determine Sensor Availability

Task Sensor

Collect

Data

Detect Target

Track until Stopped

Geolocate Target

ID Target

Update

Target

List

Assign weapon to target

Update Mission Plans

Issue Execution Order

Support Weapon Flyout

DDD Target

Deconflict target

Task

BDI / BHI

Collect

BDI / BHI

Assess

BDI / BHI

Remove from Target List

Using the MCL Example Activity Diagram (Time Sensitive Targeting)

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• Elicitation - in units of the measure
• Is more of this good or bad?
• When can’t you do it with less?
• What is good enough?
• When does more not matter?

More doesn’t matter

Good Enough

• Example – More is better
• Measure: Detection range
• Units of measure: NMI
• Can’t do with less than 250 NMI
• Good enough is 500 NMI
• Over 1000 NMI doesn’t matter

Can’t do it

with less

Global Strike

CONOPS

Homeland Security

CONOPS

Global

Mobility

CONOPS

Nuclear Response

CONOPS

Space

& C4ISR

CONOPS

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Global Vigilance

Global Reach

Global Power

Joint Vision

USAF Vision

Air & Space Expeditionary Forces

Global

Persistent

Attack

CONOPS

Agile Combat Support

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Phase 2B – Analysis (Leveraging Existing Efforts & New Focused Work)

Phase 3 – Apply Professional Military Judgment

Phase 1 - Foundations

Define Master Capability Library

Define Scenarios

Pair-wise Comparisons

Warm Database Mining

Architecture-Based Thread Analyses

Define CONOPS Activity Models

Define Metrics

CRRA Briefing Trail

CONOPS-Specific Analyses

Product: Focus Areas List

Product: Prioritized Courses of Action

Product: Candidate Courses of Action

Product: Capability Performance Framework

Assess Proficiency

Phase 2C – Analysis (Characterization and Optimization of Solutions)

Product:

Planning and Programming Guidance to MAJCOMS

(APPG)

Assess Sufficiency

Assess Impact

Characterization of Resource Constraints

Characterization of Warfighting Effects

Phase 2A – Analysis (Subjective Assessment)

Optimization of Alternatives

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Joint Functional Concepts

Battlespace Awareness

Joint Cmd & Ctrl

Force Application

Protection

Focused Logistics

AF CONOPS Capabilities

1.0 Surveillance &

Reconaissance

3.0 Command &

Control

5.0 Force Application

7.0 Protect

6.0 Force Projection

2.0 Intelligence

4.0 Communications

8.0 Prepare &

Sustain

9.0 Create the Force

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• Measuring individual capabilities is not difficult; comparing the value/worth of different capabilities is the hard part
• Scenarios are still important! Maybe even more important than in threat-based planning
• Difficult to measure DOTLPF solutions vs. M solutions – need techniques to help do this
• Definitions are important – build consensus early!
• Rigorous application of a framework is necessary but not sufficient for success

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• The USAF is moving forward to establish Capabilities Based Planning as the foundation for how we conduct business in the future
• A constant communication between HQ/AF and MAJCOMs essential to understand contributions to warfighter, investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls and capability priorities
• Our task: make warfighting effects, and the capabilities needed to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do

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• Linking capabilities to cost demands a discussion of solutions – Should you even talk about costs?
• Decision makers need the input, but leads to other questions:
• What cost to use? NPV, LCC, Acquisition, O&M?
• How are currently owned systems valued?
• Will this approach stifle innovation?
• Bottom line is that we need to analyze solutions and costs, but do the capability analysis up front to ensure we are solving the most important problems

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C8

C5

C1

C2

0

0

0

0

0

C6

C7

C3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

C4

• Determining “Importance” of capability shortfalls
• How extensive is the shortfall?
• What is the impact if not fixed?
• How much of the Air Force is affected?
• No well-defined set of tools/models exists – need objective & subjective tools as well as military judgment

• Sensitivity Analysis
• Multiattribute Utility Analysis

Prioritized Shortfalls

Combine with Risk Assessment Scores

Determine Weights

Shortfall priority = f(shortfall importance, risk, cost)

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• Build Master Capability Library for all CONOPS
• Each CONOPS describes desired effects and capabilities required to achieve these effects
• Capabilities drawn from MCL to facilitate later integration
• Interdependencies and linkages between capabilities are explicitly defined in each CONOPS
• From CONOPS descriptions (above), effects construct built to aid subjective determination of “effects drivers”:
• Effects linked to capabilities, sub-capabilities
• Weights associated with the contribution of a capability or sub-capability determined by SME or from quick-turn analysis tools
• Weights are developed in the context of an overarching scenario
• Risk Assessment Charts – Depicts capability assessment vs.. severity of impact for capability in the context of an overarching scenario
• Integration is straightforward extension when common capability definitions and overarching scenarios are used – Required additional assumption is that all CONOPS Effects are of equal value

1.0 Data Collection

2.0 Intelligence

3.0 Command &

Control

4.0 Communications

1.1 Surveillance

(Un-Cued Continuous

Collection)

2.1 Process and

Exploit Intel

3.1 Planning

4.1 Exchange

Information

1.2 Reconnaissance

(Cued Search,

Focused Coll.)

2.2 Provide Intel

Assessments

3.2 Execution

Management

4.2 Provide for Data

Storage and Retrieval

1.3 Collect Weather

Related Information

3.3 Provide Positioning,

Navigation, Timing

Information

4.3 Provide Network

Damage Assessment

& Reconstitution

5.0 Force Application

6.0 Full Spectrum

Threat Response

7.0 Combat Support

8.0 Mobility

5.1 Countermeasures

6.1 Protect the Force

7.1 Establish

Operating Locations

8.1 Airlift

5.2 Neutralize Air

Threats/Targets

6.2 Provide Support

for Civil Authorities

7.2 Generate

the Mission

8.2 Air Refueling

5.3 Neutralize Space

Threats/Targets

6.3 Defensive

Information Operations

7.3 Support

Mission and Forces

8.3 Space Lift

5.4 Neutralize Surface

Threats/Targets

7.4 Posture

Responsive Forces

5.5 Neutralize

Sub-Surface

Threats/Targets

7.5 Sustain

Mission and Forces

5.6 Offensive

Information Operations

7.6 Public Affairs

5.7 Combat Search

and Rescue

1.0 Data Collection

2.0 Intelligence

3.0 Command &

Control

4.0 Communications

1.1 Surveillance

(Un-Cued Continuous

Collection)

2.1 Process and

Exploit Intel

3.1 Planning

4.1 Exchange

Information

1.2 Reconnaissance

(Cued Search,

Focused Coll.)

2.2 Provide Intel

Assessments

3.2 Execution

Management

4.2 Provide for Data

Storage and Retrieval

1.3 Collect Weather

Related Information

3.3 Provide Positioning,

Navigation, Timing

Information

4.3 Provide Network

Damage Assessment

& Reconstitution

5.0 Force Application

6.0 Full Spectrum

Threat Response

7.0 Combat Support

8.0 Mobility

5.1 Countermeasures

6.1 Protect the Force

7.1 Establish

Operating Locations

8.1 Airlift

5.2 Neutralize Air

Threats/Targets

6.2 Provide Support

for Civil Authorities

7.2 Generate

the Mission

8.2 Air Refueling

5.3 Neutralize Space

Threats/Targets

6.3 Defensive

Information Operations

7.3 Support

Mission and Forces

8.3 Space Lift

5.4 Neutralize Surface

Threats/Targets

7.4 Posture

Responsive Forces

5.5 Neutralize

Sub-Surface

Threats/Targets

7.5 Sustain

Mission and Forces

5.6 Offensive

Information Operations

7.6 Public Affairs

5.7 Combat Search

and Rescue

Global Mobility Effects Construct

Rapid Projection

of Joint Power

0.4

0.6

7.0 Combat

Support

8.0 Mobility

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.3

1.0 Data

Collection

3.0 Command &

Control

4.0 Comm

6.0 FSTR

8.1 Air Lift

8.2 Air Refueling

8.3 Space Lift

0.4

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

1.0

0.4

0.1

0.4

0.2

0.2

0.6

1.3 Collect

Weather Info

3.1 Planning

3.3 Nav, Pos, &

Timing

7.1 Establish

Operating Location

7.2 Generate the

Mission

4.1 Exchange

Information

4.2 Data

Storage

4.3 Network

Damage Assess

5.1 Defensive

Countermeasures

3.2 Execution

Management

7.3 Support the

Mission

6.1 Protect the

Force

7.4 Posture the

Force

Crosscutting Analysis:Using the Effects Construct

• Determination of contribution weights for each node can be done by separate pairwise comparisons or by M&S
• Contributions to each node sum to one to keep scale consistent

Effect A

Effect B

Effect C

Effect D

0.1

0.4

0.8

0.2

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.4

0.4

Capability 6

Capability 1

Capability 2

Capability 3

Capability 4

Capability 5

0.4

0.2

0.3

0.6

0.6

0.5

1.0

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.4

0.2

Sub-Capability

1.1

Sub-Capability

2.1

Sub-Capability

2.2

Sub-Capability

3.1

Sub-Capability

4.1

Sub-Capability

4.2

Sub-Capability

6.1