Individual Transferable Quotas Evan Martin
ITQ strategy 3 Major Parts: 1) Total allowable catch (TAC) is determined through research and abundance data. 2) Individual catch quotas are derived from the TAC and purchased by fishermen 3) Flexibility of these quotas to be bought, sold, and leased among fishermen Goals: - Harvest fish at a level of MSY, and mitigate over-exploitation
Benefits • Costello C, Gaines SD, Lynham J. 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science (Washington, D.C.) 321(5896): 1678-1681
Benefits • The use of ITQs as a management strategy has been showed to slow or even halt the collapse of fisheries where they have been implemented. • Provides stewardship incentives by allowing fisherman to have a fixed share of the resource. • Limits harvest of exploited fisheries.
criticisms • Many of the criticisms surrounding ITQs involve the economic and market based aspects of the system. • Some argue that the privatization of a common resource will lead to monopolization and control by major companies. • Others argue that market demands will still fuel corruption within the system
Conclusions Due to the dismal state of the worlds fisheries, the ecological benefits of ITQs cannot be ignored. ITQs have proven to be an effective way to start healing ailing fish stocks around the world Through limiting harvest, and providing incentives for fishermen to make sound stewardship decisions, an ITQ strategy can reduce the collapse of fisheries The full potential of an ITQ system will only be reached through proper enforcement, and strict adherence to the management plan
References • Costello C, Gaines SD, Lynham J. 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science (Washington, D.C.) 321(5896): 1678-1681 • Parslow, John. (2010). Individual transferable quotas and the “tragedy of the commons” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 67:1889-1896 • Copes, Parzival. (1986). “A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management” Land Economics, 62:3. 278-291