Commentary & Extensions: Sugiyama’s “Orchestra of Treaties”

Commentary & Extensions: Sugiyama’s “Orchestra of Treaties” Conference “Post-2012 Climate Policy Options: European Perspectives”, 04-05 Sept. 2003, HWWA, Hamburg Detlef Sprinz PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research & University of Potsdam http://www.sprinz.org

Overview • Sugiyama’s Perspective • Extensions • Conclusions

Sugiyama’s Perspective • “Kyoto Plus” is not Feasible • Main argument: Adversarial negotiations • Main Proposal • Leaders shall lead • Specialized treaties for committed countries only

Sugiyama’s Perspective • Commentary • Q: Why Are There No Unconditional Frontrunners? • Three options • Resign yourself to infeasibility of substantial improvement over business-as-usual • Optimize Kyoto setup • Small negotiation setting with delegated decision-making authority (not like the EU in The Hague) • Binding agreements with strong sanctioning system • Real penalties that do not violate endogeneity challenges • Overall: Coordinated transition to low carbon future • “Overcome” Kyoto • Orchestra of treaties -> Sugiyama and others

Extensions • Two Options • Top-Down • Agree among core countries on ambitious version of Art. 2 UNFCCC in general policy equilibrium • Negotiations on distribution of burdens (and rights) between countries and over time – both mitigation and adaptation, using, e.g. cost minimum with side-payments • Strong sanctioning mechanisms with pre-delegated assets at risk of no-nonsense judicial procedure

Extensions • Bottom-Up • Compose a map of political and economically feasible contributions to emission reduction and adaptation efforts across time, countries, and political sub-units • Use iterative procedure of repositioning in view of full information regime (incl. uncertainties) • No external sanctioning needed, all sanctioning is within political jurisdictions (e.g., EU, Germany, Japan, India)

Extensions • Additional Options: What We Should Know More About • Frontier of Country Commitments (see “bottom up”) • Likely outcome of negotiations given actual positions • Modeling political decisions (use actual positions) • Replicate past agreements • Predict foreseeable future (e.g., Art. 2 UNFCCC) • Simulate alternatives to Kyoto Protocol (e.g., some of the “orchestra” members)

Extensions • Build a Long-Term Insurance Fund • Stabilize policy in Annex II countries • Expenses for mitigation and adaptation projects • Provide compensation for unavoided actual damages

Conclusions • Kyoto Protocol May Have Been the Only Show in The Hague, But the Venue Has Changed • Wide Array of Options for Further Development of Global Climate Regime • Decentralized Options Are a Clear Candidate, But May Lead to Amorphous Picture

Additional Information • Webpage: http://www.sprinz.org • Luterbacher, Urs, and Detlef F. Sprinz, eds. 2001.International Relations and Global Climate Change. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. • Sprinz, Detlef. 2001. Climate Change After Marrakech: The Role of Europe in the Global Arena. German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 2(6). • Jaeger, Carlo C., Detlef F. Sprinz, and Klaus Hasselmann. 2003. Wer soll das bezahlen? [Who Shall Pay For It?]. Die Zeit 8/2003.

Commentary & Extensions: Sugiyama’s “Orchestra of Treaties”