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Key amplification in unstructured networks

Key amplification in unstructured networks. Shishir Nagaraja University of Cambridge. Problem statement. LiveJournal Source: Trejkaz Xaoza, Touchgraph. Alice. Bob. Problem statement. Alice and Bob are part of a common network – for instance, a social network.

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Key amplification in unstructured networks

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  1. Key amplification in unstructured networks Shishir Nagaraja University of Cambridge

  2. Problem statement LiveJournal Source: Trejkaz Xaoza, Touchgraph Alice Bob University of Cambridge

  3. Problem statement • Alice and Bob are part of a common network – for instance, a social network. • Alice shares a weak human guessable secret with Bob. • Both want to amplify their shared-key before using it. • Bob would like to ensure that Alice is not a “dodgy” node and vice-versa. University of Cambridge

  4. Threat model • Global passive adversary • Adversary arrives after network bootstraps. University of Cambridge

  5. Context… • Neither party possesses global topology information • Each node shares a strong link key with its neighbours. • There is no centralized reputation infrastructure available. University of Cambridge

  6. Background work • Prior work on password authenticated key exchange, in several waves. • EKE, SRP, OKE, AMP, S3P, GLNS … • Provably secure schemes [GL03], [GL01], [CPP04] … • Random walks on graph topologies have a rich history, security schemes based on them, less so • SybilGuard, [BF93] … University of Cambridge

  7. Intersection1David Sybil Region Intersection2Ali Scheme • Alice and Bob each carry out a random walk of k steps. University of Cambridge

  8. Desirable properties • Protocol efficiency - #collisions/walk-length • Lower the risk of manipulation from corrupt nodes • Lower the risk from localized graph sampling • Avoid key amplification with dodgy nodes University of Cambridge

  9. Key steps Alice and Bob wish to generate a link key: • Find common acquaintances. • Acquire entropy contribution from acquaintances. • Generate a common link key from the entropy contributions obtained. University of Cambridge

  10. Directed network topologies • Baseline topology – LiveJournal network of friendship ties • Scale-freeness – presence of hubs • Clustering and Weak-ties • Community structure University of Cambridge

  11. LiveJournal |V|=3.2 million |E|=55 million Source: Trejkaz Xaoza, Touchgraph Pavel Zakharov, Thermodynamic approach for community discovering within the complex networks: LiveJournal study. e-print on arxiv.org: physics/0602063. University of Cambridge

  12. Network models - 1 • Scale-free Random (SFR) model. • Based on massive call graphs from AT&T [Aiello & Chung 2000] • Choose a gamma of 3.45 after LJ network. • 3.2 million nodes and 55 million nodes • Exactly the same degree distribution as the LJ network, but random (uniformly) in all other ways. University of Cambridge

  13. Network models – 2 • Klienberg-Watts-Strogatz model of social networks p = 1 - local ties q = 0 - weak ties |V| = 3.2 million |E| ~ 55 million [Klienberg 2001] University of Cambridge

  14. Protocol 1 – Single random walk • # Collisions or intersections between two random walks each starting from Alice and Bob respectively. • Simulation: • Selecting a random node, Alice. • Bob is selected as follows: • With p=0.5, choose another node uniformly at random • With p=0.5, choose Bob as the destination of a random walk of 100 steps with Alice as the starting node • Conduct a single random walk from each node. • Measure the # collisions generated. University of Cambridge

  15. Protocol 1 – LJ vs Scale-free Scale-free Random LiveJournal University of Cambridge

  16. Protocol1 – LJ vs small-world LiveJournal KWS –Weak/Strong ties University of Cambridge

  17. Protocol 2 • Instead of a single walk, Alice and Bob conduct k walks of length t each. • We chose k=50 walks of length t=40 steps each. • The length is roughly twice that required for convergence with the stationary distribution for LJ. • The objective is to create a favourable bias in the neighbourhood of Alice and Bob. University of Cambridge

  18. LJ – Protocol 2 Shortest path distance = 4 Shortest path distance = 2 University of Cambridge Shortest path distance = 3

  19. LJ – Protocol 2 Shortest path distance = 10 Shortest path distance = 8 University of Cambridge Shortest path distance = 9

  20. Scalefree (SFR)– Protocol 2 University of Cambridge

  21. Small world (KWS)– Protocol 2 University of Cambridge

  22. Analysis • Protocol 1 (single random walk) - small-world and scale-free perform comparably. • In Protocol 2 (Multiple random walk), both scale-free and small-world seem to do far worse than LJ! • Reason – Community structure of LJ • So here it is – avoid the dodgy guys by controlling the number of walks and the walk-length – SybilGuard [YH 2006] proposed this first. University of Cambridge

  23. Analytical reasoning • We can formulate this as the “same birthday as you” problem on a heavy tailed distribution of urn sampling. • SybilGuard assumes a uniform distribution and is therefore wrong to conclude that the reqd length of random walk is sqrt(n)*logn. University of Cambridge

  24. Checking back with the framework … • Protocol efficiency - #collisions/walk-length • Avoid key amplification with dodgy nodes • Lower the risk of manipulation from corrupt nodes • Lower the risk from localized graph sampling University of Cambridge

  25. Corrupt nodes – Random selection • Probability of a walk of length t going through ts randomly selected nodes of G(V,E) - Gilbert 1998 (Upper bound) University of Cambridge

  26. Efficiency of random walks on KWSnetwork model N=5000 nodes Walk length University of Cambridge

  27. Mixing efficiency of SFR and KWS topologies University of Cambridge

  28. Mixing efficiency of LiveJournal topology University of Cambridge

  29. Protocol details • Token collection • List negotiation • Amplification University of Cambridge

  30. TokenCollection University of Cambridge

  31. List exchange & amplification • Alice and Bob now exchange the list of nodes on their random walk. • If Alice and Bob belong to different components that are weakly connected, then this list will be very small. • Amplification: University of Cambridge

  32. Conclusions • We have proposed a decentralized key amplification scheme, that combines a measure of network distance with key amplification success, to avoid dodgy nodes. • We have shown from simulations that such a scheme is practical in the real world. • We have played with a number of topology properties to conclude that community structure is vital for high efficiency. • Applications to other unstructured networks such as sensor networks. University of Cambridge

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