Hedonism, False Pleasures and the Role of Intuitions in Assessing Theories of Well-Being

1. Hedonism, False Pleasures and the Role of Intuitions in Assessing Theories of Well-Being Dan Turton Victoria University of Wellington dan.turton@vuw.ac.nz

2. Plan • Hand-waving & definitions • My overall project • The problem: the objection from false pleasures • The solution: a better understanding of moral intuitions and what they are useful for • The result: hedonism about well-being is plausible

3. Scope (hand-waving) • Hedonism, not: • Psychological hedonism • Folk hedonism • Rather: pleasure (enjoyment) is the only thing of intrinsic value for an individual • Well-being, not: • The aesthetically, exemplary, or morally good life • Rather: the life that is good for the subject of that life • intrinsic value for an individual • Hedonism about well-being claims that the good life for the one living it contains lots of enjoyment and very little suffering

4. Reviving Hedonism • History of unpopularity (philosophical death) • Profligate image, Moore, Nozick & Nagel/Kagan • Current teaching of moral philosophy • Aim is for plausibility (equal with p-s & list) • General strategy • Assume plausibility • Refute objections • (Re-) assume plausibility

5. False Pleasures • False pleasure = pleasure based on something that isn’t true • 1) Hedonism states that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value • 2) Pleasure based on truth is more valuable than pleasure based on falsity • 3) Therefore, something other than pleasure is intrinsically valuable • 4) Therefore, hedonism is false • Evidence for 2 comes via thought experiments

6. Deceived Businessman • Nagel, Kagan, Rachels etc. • Fred and Ted experience their lives as equally full of enjoyment and free of suffering • But Fred is deceived! • Try to imagine that Fred never finds out about it • Who has the better life? • Even some hedonists give up the fight here • Why? • Truth must have value

7. Intuition vs Reason • Reason says that their lives are of equal value (if hedonism is believed apriori) • Intuition says Ted’s life is more valuable • And intuition challenges hedonistic reasoning: • ‘If hedonism leads to that conclusion, then it’s a ridiculous theory of well-being!’ • But reason also challenges intuition: • How can something that Fred never experiences affect his well-being?

8. Assessing Theories of Well-Being • The old way (Griffin, Kagan etc) • i) Produce intuitively pleasing results in most cases • ii) Have a compelling rationale • iii) Be meta-ethically and -physically consistent • iv) Be functional • Certainly most of discussion around i and ii • Because i trumps ii, hedonism is seen as implausible

9. Stalemate? • Some will say the intuition arises because truth is valuable • (since that’s the only difference) • And insist that truth is, therefore, valuable regardless of if we experience it • I think the intuition is probably about: • The risk of finding out, • An ingrained dislike of deception and • The worry that Fred will get less love • None of which should be relevant! • Can hedonists give good reason to believe that the intuition is not about the intrinsic value of truth? Yes, but…

10. Intuitions (W&A 2007) • But should intuitions be allowed to trump reason anyway? • An intuition is a valenced feeling about something • Formed by fast unconscious assimilation of large amounts of data • Similarities are processed and potential outcomes are simulated • Intuitions are not introspectible

11. Intuitions about Moral Theories • Woodward & Allman (2007) say they are often misused but can be useful • Don’t use intuitions • For unrealistic thought experiments • Do use intuitions • When you have a lot of relevant experience • In complex cases

12. A Limited Role for Intuitions in Moral Theory • Based on Woodward and Allman’s work: • The Adjusted old method for assessing theories of well-being: • i) Produce intuitively pleasing results in realistic cases • ii) Have a compelling rationale • iii) Be meta-ethically and -physically consistent • iv) Be functional

13. More Implications from W&A’s Work: • 1) Intuitions do not always track features that are relevant to a situation • 2) There is no way to be sure what specific features an intuition is tracking • No introspection • No reconstruction • 3) Therefore, it is not possible to know if an intuition is tracking features that are relevant to the situation

14. Intuitions in Theories of Well-Being • Extra reasons that intuitions aboutwell-being might not track relevant features: • Self-serving/endowment/familiarity bias (Bentham, Singer, Unger, Gilbert) • We perceive the world and our position in it with bias • Our perceptions shape our memories • Therefore, our memories and perceptions are biased • Our intuitions are based on our perceptions and memories • Therefore, our intuitions are biased towards more familiar types of well-being

15. A Very Limited Role for Intuitions in Theories of Well-Being • 1) It’s not possible to know if intuitions about well-being are tracking relevant features • 2) Our intuitions about well-being are likely to be biased • 3) Therefore, if we have another (more trust-worthy) method of assessing theories of well-being, then we should use it • Especially in unrealistic thought experiments

16. A New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-Being • A good theory of well-being should: • i) Have a compelling rationale • Internal consistency • Rationally compelling • Intuitive* • ii) Be meta-ethically and -physically consistent • iii) Be functional • Be useful for policy-making • Agree with widespread intuition*

17. Applying the New Assessment Scheme • The deceived businessman asks us to imagine the impossible • So, we should be very skeptical about any intuitions it raises • It is impossible for anti-hedonists to introspect that their intuition is caused by the value of truth • Indeed, it is impossible to know whether the intuition in this case has anything to do with the value of truth • Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the intuition is not based on the intrinsic value of truth • There is also a compelling reason to believe that Ted and Fred have equally valuable lives

18. The Verdict on the Deceived Businessman • Hedonists can stand firm on their compelling reason (how can something that you don’t experience affect your life?) and… • The anti-hedonists’ reason (truth) is only supported by a flimsy intuition that cannot prove its relevance • Therefore, the deceived businessman objection fails to provide good evidence for thinking that something other than pleasure intrinsically increases well-being

19. Implications for Hedonism • If the current method of assessing theories of well-being is revised either moderately or radically, then: • The deceived businessman objection fails • The objection from false pleasures fails • Hedonism about well-being will be seen as plausible (revived!) • And, because hedonism may soon prove to have a sound scientific basis: • Hedonism might even be seen as more plausible than other theories about well-being (very revived!!)