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Cross-Sectoral Issues on Internal Governance

Cross-Sectoral Issues on Internal Governance. Ana Moitinho Byrne (Instituto de Seguros de Portugal) Malta, 09/04/2010. Index. 3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues Main findings Next steps.  3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance.

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Cross-Sectoral Issues on Internal Governance

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  1. Cross-Sectoral Issues on Internal Governance Ana Moitinho Byrne (Instituto de Seguros de Portugal) Malta, 09/04/2010

  2. Index • 3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Main findings • Next steps

  3.  3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • The “3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance” (TFIG) • Created according to the 3L3 Committees “Medium Term Work Programme” for 2008-2010 • Internal governance was one of the 6 priority areas identified for joint cross-sector work • Composed of experts from the banking, insurance and securities markets supervisors, members of the three Level 3 committees (CEIOPS, CEBS and CESR)

  4.  3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Mandate • Identify consequences of differences in internal governance requirements in sectoral legislation (both Level 1 and Level 2) which have significant practical consequences for institutions, and making recommendations for Level 3 measures to enhance convergence • Developing cross-sector guidance for institutions and conglomerates operating in different financial sectors in the area of internal governance, within the current legal framework Work developed between September 2008 and December 2009 Scope (and timing) yet to be defined

  5.  3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Deliverables • Preliminary report in December 2008 • Final report • “Cross-sectoral stock-take and analysis of internal governance requirements” (http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/consultations/3L3-call-for-evidence-internal-governance/3L3-cross-sectoral-stock-take-and-analysis-internal-governance-v2.pdf) • Under “Call for Evidence” until... today! (http://www.ceiops.eu/media/files/consultations/3L3-call-for-evidence-internal-governance/3L3-Call-for-evidence-internal-governance.pdf) This report will be the basis for this presentation. However, some adaptations were made to align the analyses made with the final advice from CEIOPS to the European Commission.

  6. 3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Main findings • Next steps

  7.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Scope of the stock-take • Internal governance provisions applicable to entities in the areas of banking, insurance and securities • Includes binding (Level 1 and Level 2) and non-binding (Level 3) provisions

  8.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Material considered Level 1 directive Level 2 directive/regulation Level 3 guidance

  9.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Material considered • Assumptions • Although the CRD and the CAD do not follow the Lamfalussy legislative architecture, they were compared to Level 1 requirements • The annexes of the CRD were considered to be comparable to Level 2 requirements

  10.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Material considered • Interconnections between directives • Article 34 of the CAD applies Article 22 of the CRD and respective Level 3 measures to every investment firm that is not an exempt CAD firm • Article 1(2) of MiFID applies the organisational requirements in its Article 13 (and in the Level 2 implementing directive) to credit institutions that carry on one or more investment services or activities Conclusion: every investment firm that is not an exempt CAD firm is subject to both MiFID and CAD/CRD governance requirements. Consequently, many banks are subject to both MiFID and CRD organisational requirements (at least in relation to the conduct of their securities business). But the purpose of the stock-take was to compare the requirements for each activity on a standalone basis.

  11.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Options to proceed • Challenge • Maintain an appropriate balance between delivering harmonised standards, while maintaining justifiable sectoral differences • Consider carefully the means of delivering effective harmonisation if that is “desirable” • Available possibilities • Legislation – amendment of Level 1 directives and/or Level 2 directives or regulations where relevant, including the Level 2 implementing measures for Solvency II • Guidance– production or amendment of Level 3 guidance either by individual committees (CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR) or by the 3L3 committees together

  12.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Options to proceed • “Desirable degree of harmonisation” • The rating was attributed according to the following scale

  13.  Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Approach adopted – “building block approach” System of internal governance • Corporate structure and organisation (including management body) • Group structures and group specific issues • Risk management system • Internal control system • Supervisory review, internal reporting and public disclosure

  14. 3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Main findings • Next steps

  15.  Main findingsCorporate structure and organisation * DDH = Desirable degree of harmonisation

  16.  Main findingsCorporate structure and organisation

  17.  Main findingsCorporate structure and organisation

  18.  Main findingsCorporate structure and organisation

  19.  Main findingsCorporate structure and organisation

  20.  Main findingsRisk management system

  21.  Main findingsRisk management system

  22.  Main findingsRisk management system

  23.  Main findingsRisk management system

  24.  Main findingsInternal control system

  25.  Main findingsInternal control system

  26.  Main findingsInternal control system

  27.  Main findingsSupervisory review, internal reporting and public disclosure

  28.  Main findingsSupervisory review, internal reporting and public disclosure

  29.  Main findingsSupervisory review, internal reporting and public disclosure

  30.  Main findingsGroup structures and group specific issues

  31.  Main findingsGroup structures and group specific issues * FCD = Financial Conglomerates Directive

  32.  Main findingsGroup structures and group specific issues

  33.  Main findingsMain differences and commonalities • Existing internal governance requirements for the activities undertaken in the banking, insurance and securities sectors are generally similar and have the same intended outcomes or comparable outcomes • For the majority of the internal governance aspects that were analysed, many requirements are set at different levels in different sectors • It was often observed that high-level principles for internal governance that e.g. are defined in the Level 1 directive for the insurance sector are only detailed in Level 3 for the banking sector

  34.  Main findingsMain differences and commonalities • Some differences in the terminology used – or in its interpretation – were also identified, which the TFIG considers would benefit from some further standardisation to promote further convergence between sectors • Principle of proportionality – it is applicable to most of the requirements on internal governance entities are subject to • Proportionality applies to internal governance policies • Supervisory authorities will adapt their supervisory approach to ensure it is proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of an entity Banking • The principle of proportionality does not justify the non-application of any sort of requirements Insurance • The proportionality principle is dealt with slightly differently (wording is often “shall where appropriate and proportionate) Securities

  35.  Main findingsMain differences and commonalities • Some differences in the terminology used – or in its interpretation – were also identified, which the TFIG considers would benefit from some further standardisation to promote further convergence between sectors (cont.) • Concept of “independence” • Does it always imply an organisationally separate unit? • Concept of “function” • E.g. In Solvency II, it is “an administrative capacity to undertake particular governance tasks”

  36.  Main findingsMain differences and commonalities • With regard to the differences between MiFID and CRD, further harmonisation of Level 1 and 2 provisions could be considered in order to reduce the number of different requirements for banks that also undertake investment activities

  37. 3L3 Task Force on Internal Governance • Cross-sectoral stock-take on internal governance issues • Main findings • Next steps

  38.  Next steps • The TFIG considers that guidance would be beneficial on: • Management of conflicts of interest • Policies, processes and procedures related to the risks covered by the risk management systems • How the risk management, compliance and internal audit functions might be “independent” in the light of their different sectoral requirements • The supervisory review process

  39.  Next steps • The development of guidance in these areas would: • Contribute to a more harmonised interpretation of the requirements applicable to each type of activities • Complement the existing gaps between sectors in the cases where no specific requirements exist Further work to be developed will depend on the results of the “Call for Evidence” process and the conclusions to be taken thereof.

  40. QUESTIONS?

  41. Thank you! ana.byrne@isp.pt

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