Why was ELM Present in Miami?

1. Why was ELM Present in Miami? VIII FTAA Ministerial meeting started on 17 November with the convening of the Americas Business Forum (ABF) and the Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Forum (ATSDF) ATSDF = more than 300 civil society representatives discuss FTAA in “thematic tents” relating to: agriculture; environment; transparency; investment; smaller economies; democracy and human rights; participation and info access; IPR; sustainable livelihoods.

2. Why was ELM present in Miami? • To present “Greening the FTAA?” Conference Report (www.law.mcgill.ca/elmftaaconference) • results of ATSDF forum presented to the Ministers in a meeting on November 19, 2003 • Also, to participate in alternative events beyond the security perimeter (anti-FTAA discussions) • Impromptu meeting with Jack Layton

3. Basic Positions: Brazil vs. US • Brazil seeks to slow down and minimize scope of FTAA – no IPR, no services, no investment; • seeks movement on agricultural market access and subsidy reduction • Note: Brazil has not ratified a single bilateral investment treaty • US wants broader FTAA incl. IPR, services, investment, gov’t procurement, but NO agriculture • U.S. export business interests seek re-birth of NAFTA Chapter 11 • Canada supports this ambitious vision, wants to avoid isolation • Interaction between negotiating processes • Context of failure in Cancun • Refocus on bilateral and regional trade liberalization – impact on multilateralism

4. U.S. Trade Politics: The Power of Bilateral Bullying • US strategy of pursuing simultaneous bilateral and regional strategies of hemispheric integration • Phenomenon of competitive (or selective) liberalization • Announced intention of launching bilateral agreements with 4 Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia) and Panama • Dominican Republic to be included in CAFTA negotiations, scheduled to conclude before end of year • Threat of leaving Canada on the “outside” is by-product of attempt to isolate and pressure Argentina and Brazil • But since they represent 80% of South American GDP, no deal with them is no good for US exports

5. History of Negotiations • Text of Ministerial Declaration negotiated to establish framework to guide future discussions • Due to ongoing lack of agreement between the US and Brazil on key issues, Miami was pitched as a revision of activities • In many ways, Miami must be seen as the regional chessboard in a three-dimensional game (multilateral, regional, and bilateral) • Critical importance of where the games (negotiations on different issues) are being tackled

6. FTAA and Environment • Major problem: is no forum to discuss environmental, human rights, or labour dimensions of FTAA • No CTE as in WTO – only the Committee on Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society • Claudette Bradshaw participated as Labour Ministers with colleagues from Mexico and Brazil; no environmental analogue

7. ATSDF Meeting with Ministers • issue receiving most attention was development of a permanent participation mechanism for civil society in FTAA negotiating and implementation processes. • follow-up mechanism for different civil society proposals provided to the negotiating process also suggested • IPR “tent” rejected US-led idea of seeking an agreement that went beyond the WTO TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS +) • Investment “tent” also rejected idea of a hemispheric agreement with investor-protection provisions

8. FTAA “Lite” – 2003 Miami Declaration • balanced formula that gives each country the flexibility to decide its level of commitment according to its needs, objectives and specific capacities (glass half-full) • Recharting an uncertain path, not reaffirming a shared agenda (glass half-empty) • Brazil and Argentina (MERCOSUR leaders) argue that the “crisis of internal contradictions” demanded re-evaluation of FTAA project • Goal of flexibility, asymmetric commitments • 2 negotiation processes – although Canada argues that this is not FTAA “a la carte” • “Single-undertaking” aim has evaporated

9. Miami Declaration (cont’d) • level of commitments in each negotiating group has yet to be negotiated • depends on each country’s ambitions, internal politics (U.S. election in 2004) • scope of FTAA will not be clear before the negotiations conclude • Miami Declaration leaves difficult bargaining to bureaucrats

10. Uncertain Future and Unclear Agenda • Core negotiations contains 10 negotiating groups:market access; investment; competition policy, anti-dumping and countervailing duties; services;government procurement; dispute settlement; IPR; agriculture; subsidies. • Depth of liberalization commitment in these areas will be determined during winter meetings • commitment to the successful conclusion of the FTAA negotiations by January 2005

11. Miami Declaration (cont’d) • Support (but no hard $) capacity-building funds (grants) to help pay for developing country negotiation of FTAA, implement its terms, enhance capacity to trade, and adapt to integration. • interest in creating a permanent Civil Society Consultative Committee inside the FTAA, with the objective of contributing to transparency and creating a space for dialogue between civil society and governments (at the entry in force of the agreement, NOT during the negotiations phase)

12. Integrating the Environment • Canada supported creation of “Consultative Groups” on Environment and Labour • Support from Chile, CARICOM, Central America, Andean Community • US pushed for environment to be integrated into core negotiating groups • Brazil and Argentina still resist – not really out of fear of “green” protectionism • Awareness that these issues are key requirements according to US TPA legislation – negotiating leverage • How hard Canada and US push for an environmental side agreement? • Willingness to settle for plurilateral enviro deal?

13. Protest Effect • Hemispheric Social Alliance claim that the 20 000 protesters in Miami, in conjunction with coordinated protests across the hemisphere helped slow progress • While protester numbers in Miami were dwarfed by military masses, the threat of disobedience loomed large • Protests in Canada drew little media attention; however, strength of MST movement in Brazil in relation to the Lula administration cannot be denied

14. Next Steps • Starting in February, the assymetric negotiating architecture will be begun --- core framework of negotiations • Special Summit of the Americas to be held in Mexico: January 12-13, 2004 • economic growth with equity • social development • democratic governance • Regional Forum, "Civil Society in the Process of Hemispheric Integration within the Framework of the Special Summit of the Americas" held November 24 and 25, 2003 in Mexico City

15. Next Steps • Officials are also to meet in Mexico in January, in preparation for Vice-Ministers meeting in Brazil in February • Next major ministerial meeting scheduled for Brazil in summer of 2004 • Look for major demonstrations in Brazil