FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS 37 TH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 5th JUNE 2013 BRUSSELS. A Warm Welcome to all Members, Delegates and Guests. Item 1 CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS. Daniel Antille. 37 th FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING (DRAFT) AGENDA.
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Mr. D. Antille, President SSE Group, Switzerland
Mr. B. Pougny, Vice-President EPC Groupe, France
Mr. G. Facchinetti, Past President Pravisani, Italy
Mr. S. Connolly Orica EMET, Germany
Mr. O. Greben (as of 27.2.13) Austin Detonators, Czech
Mr. V. Huelamo Maxam Group, Spain
Mr. U. Sjöblom Forcit, Finland
FEEM is an affiliated Member of CEFIC the European Chemistry
Federation. CEFIC is the Brussels based organization representing
the European chemical industry. CEFIC represents directly or
indirectly, about 29.000 large, medium and small chemical
companies which employ about 1.3 million people and account for
nearly a third of world’s Chemical production. CEFIC guides and
advises FEEM in matters related to
STATUS OF PREPARATIONS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING TRANSPOSITION OF DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EUAt the beginning of 2013 only 14 Member States had fully transposed the amending Directive 2012/4; 4 Member States had partially implemented the Directive and 9 Member States have not yet communicated their measures to the Commission. The Commission strongly encouraged those Member States that had not yet transposed the Directive to do so urgently, otherwise formal infringement proceedings, which had so far been deferred, were likely to follow soon. To our knowledge no infringement proceedings have been started so far.
UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN ON ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF EXPLOSIVESThe Commission (DG HOME) is producing a progress report by the mid of 2013, which would contribute towards a review of the plan. In parallel a review of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) action plan was ongoing with a view to developing a more coherent and streamlined approach with greater synergies between CBRN and explosives security policies at EU level in a future combined CBRNE STRATEGY. This had been discussed at a strategic EU level conference on 2-3 October 2012 in Malmo, the outcome of which would inform Council conclusions on a new CBRNE agenda later this year, leading to a Commission communication around mid 2013.
RECAST OF DIRECTIVE 93/15/EEC
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses. Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993 on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses has been substantially amended. In order to ensure the free movement of explosives it is necessary to harmonise the laws relating to making available explosives on the market. Presently a package of nine Directives is regulating the European Explosives Industry, e.g. 93/15, 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 (control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 2008/43, 2012/4). You will find the complete revised text of the DRAFT DIRECTIVE on our website.
UPDATE ON SCEPYLT, THE PAN-EUROPEAN INFORMATION SYSTEM ON EXPLOSIVES CONTROL TO PREVENT AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, AND ITS FUTURE
The SCEPYLT system has been operational since October 2011. Since then various functional, technical and documentary improvements had been introduced. Currently 11 Member States are connected to the system. However it was being used by only 3 Member States. Some indicating that they hoped to be ready to use the system, some others indicating that although they were ready they would not do so until their neighbours did. E.g. Spain was unable to use the system since its neighbours were not doing so. Spain also mentioned that it would like to see SCEPYLT linked with the unique identification and traceability required by DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC.
The Commission intends that the system eventually be made mandatory, but before that the system needed to be seen to be operating well and being more widely used than currently. The Commission had invested over 2 MILLION EUROS in the project and there was a danger that all this would be wasted if the project could not be taken further forward after the end of this year.
There seemed to be three possible options:
(1) A further grant if a Member State was willing to assume responsibility for future project coordination;
(2) A contract between the system provider and individual user Member States covering software maintenance and a help-desk function;
(3) In the longer term, the Commission taking over responsibility for the system.
Compliance with essential safety requirements:
Because of the specific nature of explosives, the Commission services (= Juridical Dept.) recommend to apply the relevant general and specific essential safety requirements to all ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES, whether they are placed on the market or not.
(EU Commission’s Recommendation)
Compliance with essential safety requirements (cont.):
AFFIXING THE CE MARKING:
Pursuant to Article 2.2 (DIR 93/15) if a company places an explosive on the market, this explosive has to be CE marked. Article 2.2 prescribes that “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that explosives falling within the scope of this Directive may be placed on the market only if they comply with on the provisions of this Directive, are provided with the CE marking described in Article 7 and their conformity has been assessed in accordance with the procedures referred to in Annex II (different approval modules). Therefore, if a company places an explosive on the market, this explosive has to be CE marked.
Placing on the market is defined as “any first disposal against payment or free of charge of explosives covered by this Directive with a view to their distribution and/or use on the Community market”. According to the “guide to the implementation of directives based on the new approach and the global approach”, PRODUCTS BUILT FOR OWN USE ARE, GENERALLY, NOT CONSIDERED AS BEING PLACED ON THE MARKET.
The Commission therefore suggests the following distinction:
In general, the explosives are placed on the market and have to be CE marked if the quarry or mine company is responsible for most aspects of the blasting operations while the explosives manufacturer for example only pumps the explosive down the holes and initiates the blast. In such a situation, the explosives are for the use of the quarry operator and therefore have been placed on the market;
EXPLOSIVES ARE NOT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE MARKET IF THE EXPLOSIVES COMPANY CARRIES OUT, AND HAS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR, THE BLASTING OPERATIONS. In this case, the explosives are for the use of the explosives company in the provision of blasting services, rather than for the use of the mine or quarry operator (although the quarry operator receives the benefit).
To use the industry expression the quarry operator buys 'rock on the floor / ground [of the quarry]'.
The general and the relevant special essential safety requirements should in all cases also apply to explosives manufactured on site which fall under the scope of the Explosives Directive. These explosives should also be CE marked except in the ‘own use’ case as explained above, where the CE mark is not required.
As far as the CE mark is concerned, Article 7.1 of the Explosives Directive gives the possibility to affix the CE mark on an IDENTIFICATION PLATE.
A practicable solution could therefore be to attach a REMOVABLE IDENTIFICATION PLATE to the mixing truck. It is also possible to carry the relevant documentation on the mixing truck.
WHICH NOTIFIED BODY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THE MANUFACTURER TO CE-MARK THE PRODUCT?
The affixing of the CE marking is also primarily the manufacturer’s
responsibility. However, when the CE marking appears on products
with an IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF A NOTIFIED BODY,
the notified body also assumes responsibility. The CE marking must
be affixed at the end of the production phase. The CE marking shall
only be followed by the identification number of the notified body if
the notified body is involved in the production phase. Thus, the
identification number of a notified body involved in conformity
assessment according to module B does not follow the CE marking.
It is therefore the notified body that carries out module C, D, E or F
(and whose identification number figures on the product together
with the CE marking) that assumes responsibility.
CAN CERTIFICATES [for the different modules] BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, IF YES, AT WHICH OCCASIONS AND HOW?
CAN CERTIFICATES BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, if yes, at which occasions and how? (cont.)
In all cases it needs to be stressed that when a Notified Body finds that requirements of the Directive have not been met or are no longer met, it has to restrict, suspend or withdraw certificates, approvals or other relevant conformity assessment results, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the risk involved, unless compliance is ensured through the implementation of appropriate corrective measures.
In accordance with Article 1(3) first indent, Directive 93/15/EEC does not apply to explosives, including ammunition, intended for use, in accordance with national law, by the ARMED FORCES or the POLICE. How should this exclusion be interpreted in the context of intra-EU transfers to differentiate between commercial and military explosives, for example in cases where a commercial company supplies an explosive to another company for further processing and/or incorporation into a finished product destined for MILITARY USE?
It should be first underlined that the exclusion in Article 1(3) of the Directive refers to the 'intended use'. In that context a distinction needs to be drawn between immediate use and possible eventual use for military purposes. In particular, the eventual intended use may not always be evident so that in the example quoted above the first company may be unaware of the final use and may have no control over this or the finished product placed on the market or know the final consignee.
A basic starting point for determining whether the explosive falls within the exclusion in Article 1(3) would be whether or not the explosive falls within the COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION* (the latest version of which was adopted by the Council on 27 February 2012 (2012/C 85/01) (equipment covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology equipment). In principle such explosives could be regarded as military explosives. However the possibility of possible dual use cannot be excluded and due regard should also be paid as to who the consignee is. If the immediate consignee is a commercial company, the rules of the Directive should apply up to the point that it becomes clear that the ultimate use is military.
If the explosive is not on the Common Military List it should be regarded as a commercial explosive and treated accordingly unless the consignee is the armed forces or the police. If the immediate consignee is a commercial company, even if the explosive is expected to be for military use, it should be regarded as falling under the Directive until the point that it becomes clear the final consignee is the military.
Shock tubes are used to deliver the ignition impulse over intermediate or short distances through a plastic tube, while the tube itself stays fully intact and does not rupture. Due to the low exterior effects of shock tubes upon ignition they are often excluded from class 1 under Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations since, when not attached to a detonator, they are non-hazardous. As such they cannot be used for a blasting purpose and do not show explosive properties and can be considered as similar to the lead wires of electric detonators.
It follows that shock tubes as such should not normally fall within the Directive's scope. When attached to the detonator to form a detonator assembly (as a non-electronic detonator, for example) they would however fall within the Directive's scope (for example the proper functioning between the shock-tube and the detonator cap would be part of the conformity assessment).
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
Where manufacturing sites are located outside the EU, the procedures of Article 3(5) of Commission Directive 2008/43/EC should be followed. However, in cases where the overseas manufacturer is also established in the EU, he could contact the national authority of the Member State in which he is established or of first import and obtain a single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all imports into the EU. The manufacturer established in the EU would assume responsibility for compliance with the Directive for all those imports, including in particular the obligations of undertakings in relation to record-keeping.
WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
In all other cases where the manufacturing site is located outside the EU, the importer of the explosives will have to obtain a code in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3(5) of the Directive.
To further reduce the administrative burdens, and also in cases where the overseas manufacturer is not established in the EU, the imports need not physically go through the location of the importer or of the EU legal entity of the manufacturer, but any point of entry, provided that they are handled in line with the single authorisation for simplified procedures (SASP)/centralised customs clearance used throughout the EU under customs legislation, whereby the import paperwork is submitted in one Member State, but the products can be shipped directly to another Member State or States (with the customs authorities there not requiring additional paperwork).
HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC?
Chapter 3 of the Directive relating to data collection and record-keeping provides that undertakings in the explosives sector collect and maintain data relating to each explosive in their possession or custody throughout the supply chain and life cycle until it is transferred to another undertaking or used.
The end-user would be the last undertaking to take possession or custody and to use the explosive, for example operating blasting on site. In certain cases this could be the sub-contracting company undertaking the blasting. In other words, those responsible for the last place of storage on a site prior to use should keep records from the time they take possession or custody of the explosive until it is used.
HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC (cont.)?
It should not however normally be necessary for records to be kept on the individual person, such as the individual shot-firer, to whom the explosive is given to use.
The end-user would not necessarily be the undertaking authorised to carry out blasting on site. This would depend on whether they have possession/custody when the explosive is used. In cases where a subcontractor is operating all the blasting process, including the bringing out and taking back of explosives from storage, that undertaking would be perceived as the end-user and assume responsibility for compliance.
MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES IN COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIVES 2008/43 AND 2012/4/EU
What should be on an “ASSOCIATED LABEL”? If a box contains 50 primers does the associated label have to state the unique identifications for all 50 or can the label simply state something like “Contains 50 primers”?
There is no need that the label contains all numbers of the items in the box. The matrix/bar code should suffice. The related information is available in the systems / database of the producer / distributor and is transferred to the buyer via XML file. If police stopped a truck and wanted to check a specific item number in connection with the box, they should be able to scan the box themselves or obtain information on the number and unique identifications of the items in the box from the manufacturer or distributor. There should be no need to print all item numbers on the box or the delivery documents.
If the primers are less than 8.5 mm in diameter and therefore the SPU needs to be labelled, do all 50 unique identifications have to be marked on the SPU?
Does the manufacturer’s name need to be in full or can it be abbreviated (eg RHEMCO instead of Rhinoceros and Hippopotamus Explosives Manufacturing Co) to assist the marking of smaller items?
This has benefits and in any event the Member State will be able to identify the manufacturer from their records using the 3 digit site code.
This is a matter for the competent authorities in the Member State issuing the code to judge on a case-by-case basis. If the abbreviated name is a commonly known and recognisable trade name, this should be acceptable; if the abbreviation makes it impossible to identify the manufacturer it would not be advisable.
THE TRANSFER OF EXPLOSIVES FROM ONE NON-EU COUNTRY TO ANOTHER NON-EU COUNTRY THROUGH EUROPE. Have products got to be marked?
If the products are in transit only, i.e. if they do not enter the EU customs territory and are kept under customs control (bonded warehouse), the Directive clearly does not apply. In other cases where the products are imported into the EU customs territory, this would be regarded as placing on the market and the Directive's rules on marking would apply.
FEEM has developed a Guidance Note for a HARMONIZED STANDARD CODING SYSTEM in order to minimise logistical problems throughout the explosives supply chains in Europe. The Coding System is primarily based on the GS1 STANDARD using so-called Application Identifiers (AI). The applied “Application Identifiers” will enable harmonisation by recognising the format of a database in which the information is being received in. This enables the explosives code structure to be flexible. Individual fields within the overall code at different positions with various lengths and combinations on alpha, numeric and alpha-numeric characters are possible. The Application Identifiers are not normally visible within a code, but if they were, they are recognised by being two, three or four digit numbers within brackets. These technologies are therefore recommended to enable each individual explosives item to be allocated a unique number for the purpose of tracing that item throughout its life cycle.
In the Annex to the Track & Trace concerning the Human Readable Part of the Identification there is no mention of Application Identifiers. Actually the Directive is very clear in this respect; the requirement for the readable number is an alphanumeric code containing details of the country, site number and unique number. There is no reference to any Application Identifiers being readable. However, some of our member companies print the AI on their labels in order to make it easier for a human to read the label and to facilitate key entry in the event that the symbol cannot be scanned. Other members are not printing the AI on the labels because they think that it is illegal to do so because it is not mentioned in the Directive.
Is it illegal to print AI visibly on labels?
In the text of the modified FEEM Guidance Note we have added: AI may optionally be printed (i.e. visual) on the labels in order to make it easier for a human to read the label and to facilitate key entry in the event that the symbol cannot be scanned.
In December 2012 additional lead-compounds mentioned in the ROI list have been added in the CANDIDATE LIST:
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SUBSTANCES AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE REGISTRY OF INTENTION?
The authorisation process is divided into four stages and the LEAD COMPOUNDS are now in the first stage which is the Registry of intention (ROI). ECHA has been compiling Annex XV dossiers for all the substances and after completion, it was followed by a Public Consultation in early September 2012. Stakeholders only had 45 days to respond and that is why it was critical to provide crucial information that can be used during this and other phases of the AUTHORISATION PROCESS.
From the LEAD COMPOUNDS 3 have already been added into the Candidate List.
After the public consultation, comments received are sent to the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE (MSC) and they will give an opinion as to whether a substance will be added to the candidate list based on scientific evidence available on whether the SVHC criteria* are met. If there is a unanimous agreement by the MSC then we can envisage that the Pb compounds will be added to the candidate list between December 2012 and February 2013 and if there is no unanimous agreement the date will be August 2013 since the Commission will need to be involved.
*Very Persistent and very Bio-accumulative & Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic
LISTING OF LEAD COMPOUNDS ON THE ROI SVHC:
LEAD TETROXIDE (Orange Lead) is being used in the explosives industry in pyrotechnic mixtures. This substance is mixed with silicon and other chemicals in order to obtain a redox reaction during use of these pyrotechnic mixtures. This kind of mixture is used in delay elements in civil electrical detonators around Europe and in the entire world. PB3O4 and silicon react during use of delay elements. After detonation, the chemicals inside the delay system react and the final products are silica (SIO2), metal lead (Pb) and unreacted silicon (Si).
The FEEM HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP has reviewed the Annex XV dossiers submitted by the European Chemical Agency at the request of the European Commission, concerning the above mentioned substances. These substances are lead compounds having explosive properties and applications. Some of FEEM member company members produce these substances and every company has expert judgement on the production, storage, transport and use of these substances. These lead compounds are incorporated in explosive items and the final products (detonators, primers, etc) are only sold for industrial applications.
HOW FEEM REACTS!
Since the 1st publications of lead compounds in the ROI about 2 years ago FEEM had numerous contacts with representatives of ECHA, the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE, the International Lead Association and CEFIC in order to prevent that lead compounds will be subject to the so-called “CANDIDATE LIST” or even worse that they will be subject for AUTHORIZATION with the consequence of a possible ban in the future.
REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE
After our last meeting FEEM has drafted a letter to explain why LEAD COMPOUNDS should not be subject to AUTHORIZATION. This letter has been distributed to the national members of the so-called REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE. A list of the names and addresses of the relevant MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE members had been handed-out to the FEEM Working Group Members. All of our WG members contacted their national MSC delegate.
This action has been an enormous success because we have managed that ECHA has received numerous comments either dircetley by FEEM MEMBER companies or other European organisations or through their national member of the so-called Member State Committee:
Here is a list of organisations which have actively supported our proposal:
E.g. the responsible UK officer Gary Dougherty , wrote in a letter to ECHA that he thinks the lead compounds issues in detonators was a done deal in that it was very unlikely that these lead compounds will be included in the next stage. Apparently he had attended an ECHA meeting in Helsinki where the lead issue was raised and it was suggested that they be excluded on the grounds of the small quantities involved, which gives rise to a low score; careful control during manufacture which also gives a low score; and the small quantities of oxides of lead produced after detonation were widely distributed and unlikely to cause harm. There was no adverse reaction to this suggestion from the other member states who attended.
2) THE QUANTITIES USED ARE VERY LOW
3) NO SUBSTANCE CONTACT OF SUBSEQUENT USERS OF EXPLOSIVE ITEMS AND NO EXPOSURE DURING HANDLING AND USE OF FINAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION
Last week FEEM has distributed another letter to ECHA and the INTERNATIONAL LEAD ASSOCIATION with technical information and comments concerning the non-inclusion of Orange Lead and explaining why the use of this substance in the explosive sector should not be prioritized by ECHA for inclusion in the Annex XIV (Authorisation List) of REACH. Even if Orange-lead is included in the future in the mentioned Annex, we propose that the use as “ingredient for delay elements in explosive production” should be specifically included under the heading “Exempted categories of use” of the Annex XIV.
FEEM would like to acknowledge the excellent contribution from the Working Groups and its members. Special thanks go to Jose Castresana from Maxam who has contributed
Transport of ANFO (UN 0331) in 30 m³ tank trucks and other changes in 2013 ADR
The BAM proposal to the UN PANEL FOR DANGEROUS GOODS (WP 15) to legalize transport of ANFO 1.5d (UN 0331) in tanks has been accepted and has been incorporated into the new 2013 ADR. However, the original proposal to carry up to 30
m³ ( ≈24 tons) was not accepted. The volume is now limited to 16 tons.
You can find detail under chapter 4.3 “UN 0331 EXPLOSIVE, BLASTING, TYPE B in S2.65AN tanks”. The transport is subject to special provisions according to 184.108.40.206.3.
The EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY has started a discussion process whether it could be worthwhile to investigate if there is a chance to increase the transport volumes of Class 1 products in general. The views of our members are controversial.
Initiated and financed by one of our members BAM, Germany has started research work based on ANFO / TNT equivalents to support the increase of ANFO volumes in tanks above the 16 ton tier.
The requirements for bursting disks/pressure relief devices in 220.127.116.11.2 and 18.104.22.168.2 have been reworded so that they only apply to tanks for ammonium nitrate UN 1942 or 3375, not for the fuel oil. Also it is the Competent Authority of the country of use that must now approve the bursting discs. New transitional measure 22.214.171.124 allows continued use of tanks approved before 1 July 2013 according to the previous requirements.
There have been editorial corrections to include reference to MEMUs
in the definitions of AT vehicles and ADR approval. EN 15207:2006
has been added to the reference standards for electrical connectors.
EX/III VEHICLE FIRE PROTECTION: A new Section 9.7.9 has
been inserted to require that EX/III vehicles carrying tanks are
equipped with automatic fire extinguisher systems for the engine
compartment and the load is protected from tire fires by metal
thermal shields. As no specific transitional measure has been
inserted, the standard six month transitional period will apply.
THE FEEM WORKING GROUPS
4 FEEM Working Groups have
been active in 2012:
HEALTH AND SAFETY
TRACK & TRACE TECHNICAL WG
The Group has met two times since the 2012 AGM
The main subjects which were discussed are:
Robert Farnfield EPC UK
Nello Contardi Orica, Belgium
Frank Hammelmann Orica, Germany
Marcos Perena Maxam, Spain
Knut Tanbergmoen* Forcit, Norway
* as of September 2013
The Blasting Practice Working Group has met twice since the last AGM 2012:
The main working subjects were:
The FEEM Transport and Storage Working Group has met
two times since the last AGM in 2012.
The main working subjects were:
4 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
15 INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES
As budgeted and forecasted the 2012 financial situation is again healthy and balanced.
Consequently, the Executive Committee has decided that the membership fees will remain unchanged in 2013.
ITEM 12 OF THE AGENDA
For several years FEEM has managed a confidential statistics service for its members. It acts as a trustee company in compliance with competition laws. In order to estimate accurate annual sales per product in Europe we need from you all your best sales estimates from all the countries your are represented in. We will consolidate your data and give global figures of the European sales estimate per product only to those companies which provided figures.
The numbers are based on FEEM member’s input and represent the arithmetic average of the reported country numbers.
The volume of explosives consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to
This is 11,5% lower compared to 2011.
The amount of detonators consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to
This is 18% lower compared to 2011.
Deviation from 2011
ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The FEEM President CARL-ANDERS LINDGREN from Austin Explosives has stepped down from the Committee for personal reasons. Austin has suggested co-opting OTTA GREBEN from Austin Detonators to the Executive Committee according to Article 7.2 of FEEM’s Constitution (CO-OPTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE). The Executive Committee has agreed to this process at their meeting on 27 February 2013 in Brussels.
According to the Constitution Otta Greben has to step down at this meeting and is offering himself for election at this meeting.
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DATE AND PLACE OF THE NEXT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGinWarsaw, Poland(in conjunction with the XVIII SAFEX Congress)onWednesday, 21 May 2014&a Gala Dinner on Tuesday, 20 May 2014at Warsaw Marriott HotelAl. Jerozolimskie 65/79 00-697 Warsaw, Poland Tel: +48 22 630 5240 Fax: +48 22 630 7332 Email: firstname.lastname@example.orgWeb: WarsawMarriott.com
CLOSURE OF THE MEETING
by our President
Thank you very much for your kind attention and see you next year in Warsaw again!