Williams: Persons Character and Morality

1. Williams: Persons Character and Morality Consequentialism [utilitarianism abstracts from the separateness of persons. Kantianism from their identity.]

2. Character & Impartiality • Three main focal points about the impartial character of Kantian theory (and to some degree consequentialism). • (1) The moral point of view is fundamentally different from the non-moral point of view. • (2) U and K theory and impartiality are indifferent to relations between particular persons (the drowning wife example) • (3) Moral thought requires abstraction from particular circumstances and characteristics of the person (such as their choices).

3. Worries about impartiality • (4) Universality—all features of morally similar situations are treated the same • (4) Motivations of moral agents involve rational applications of impartial principles and are different in kind from motivations for treating particular persons differently (e.g., drowning wife) (

4. When should we be partial? • When does it seem right to be partial toward ourselves and others • When does it seem right (if ever) to be impartial to ourselves and others? • Does Kantian theory get this right? (Does utilitarian theory?)

5. What is character? • Williams—Impartial theories abstract from character • (Parfits complex view—relations of psychological connectedness are what matter in personal identity. So if I have the same ‘set’ of items in my psychology at Time1 and T2 I am the same person. • Parfit thinks our morality should reflect the levels of connectedness. • Williams’ objection: How would we do this? If there is a scale according to which the moral relations hold the more a person P is connected at two times, how would we reflect it in moral action/choice? (E.g., If I promised P in 2005 do I only have to do half what I promised in 2010)

6. Issue with selves • One way to read Williams—yes, the contents of the self can change but we have to be authentic to the self we are…Our character demands it. • Similar to ‘integrity’ idea. Integrity is holding fast to our own principles, values (for Williams—desires, etc.)

7. Why do we go on at all? • What motivates us to go on? (p. 10) • Why is death an evil? One answer—we desire certain things. If we desire something, then we have a reason to resist whatever prevents one’s getting it. • [2 different kinds of desires: (1) Desires for satisfaction that only matter if one experiences them (2) Desires for aims that are wanted whether or not one experiences them. Williams seems to be interested in (2)]

8. Categorical Desires • Categorical desires are desires for ground projects and commitments. “The point once more involves the idea that my present projects are the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all…” • Remember: The categorical imperative is entirely unconnected to inclination/desire.

9. What kinds of things can be ground projects • P. 13 “Ground projects do not have to be selfish…they may certainly be altruistic….there is no contradiction in the idea of a man’s dying for a ground project…if death really is necessary for the project, ten to live would be to live with it unsatisfied…”

10. Main problem: CDs conflict with impartial morality • P. 14: “A man who has [a gp that conflicts] will be required to to give up what it requires…if that conflicts with impersonal utility… • For the Kantian: “For impartial morality, if the conflict really does arise, must be required to win, and that cannot necessarily be a reasonable demand on the agent…”

11. The Drowning Wife… • P. 17…”this construction provides the agent with one thought too many…it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought…would be that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.”