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Purpose. It's sole purpose is to introduce a way of thinking about the future that will result in changing attitudes, priorities and expectations . . . . This briefing is not asking for money, proposing new systems or attacking the way things have been done to date . . . . Center for Strategy
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1. Colonel John Geis This briefing details the conclusions of the third year of the Blue Horizons study (2009). Entitled “The Age of Surprise,” this briefing examines the implications of exponential technological change on Air Force Strategy, and the implications for how we select and grow new leaders, out to the year 2035.This briefing details the conclusions of the third year of the Blue Horizons study (2009). Entitled “The Age of Surprise,” this briefing examines the implications of exponential technological change on Air Force Strategy, and the implications for how we select and grow new leaders, out to the year 2035.
2. Purpose Unlike many briefing given inside the beltway, this is not a briefing asking for resources. We seek neither money, new systems, nor are we attacking the way things are being or have been done.
What this briefing does seek to do is to introduce a way of thinking about the future that will result in changing attitudes, priorities, and expectations. It is this slight change in thinking that is critical today, if we are to meet the challenges of the world of tomorrow.Unlike many briefing given inside the beltway, this is not a briefing asking for resources. We seek neither money, new systems, nor are we attacking the way things are being or have been done.
What this briefing does seek to do is to introduce a way of thinking about the future that will result in changing attitudes, priorities, and expectations. It is this slight change in thinking that is critical today, if we are to meet the challenges of the world of tomorrow.
3. Center for Strategy & Technology Air University What we do
Assess strategic impact of rapidly accelerating technological change
Blue Horizons Program
A CSAF directed study on future strategy and technology to inform the debate on AF future thinking and investment
Sponsors
A8
AFRL
Researchers
Air War College
Air Command and Staff
Research Support
AFRL
Sandia National Lab
Los Alamos National Lab
This briefing was compiled by the Center for Strategy and Technology, which is part of Air University, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
The Center’s mission is to assess the strategic impact of rapidly accelerating technological change on the future strategic landscape, and to recommend policy options to the Air Force’s senior leadership on the strategic implications of these emerging technologies.
In the interests of disclosure, our program is a Chief-of-Staff-directed annual study, which is administered by the HQ USAF/A8. As monetary sponsors, the Center enjoys funding from HQ USAF/A8 and the Air Force Research Laboratory. We draw upon the student resources from Air Command and Staff College and Air War College for researcher support, which enables the Center to produce annual products representing dozens of man-years of effort, for around $500,000 pear year.
This briefing was compiled by the Center for Strategy and Technology, which is part of Air University, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
The Center’s mission is to assess the strategic impact of rapidly accelerating technological change on the future strategic landscape, and to recommend policy options to the Air Force’s senior leadership on the strategic implications of these emerging technologies.
In the interests of disclosure, our program is a Chief-of-Staff-directed annual study, which is administered by the HQ USAF/A8. As monetary sponsors, the Center enjoys funding from HQ USAF/A8 and the Air Force Research Laboratory. We draw upon the student resources from Air Command and Staff College and Air War College for researcher support, which enables the Center to produce annual products representing dozens of man-years of effort, for around $500,000 pear year.
4. The J Curve and Rapid Exponential Change Our study examined a myriad of different technologies, the development of which is represented by what is called the “J Curve.” While the graph here shows the number of internet hosts, we easily could have produced graphs of computer processing speed, pulsed power generation output, information data storage, or any number of other electronic, biological, nano-technological or directed-energy technologies. In all these cases, the curve of technological growth has the shape of the letter “J,” even, as we did here, if this graph is plotted on using a Y-axis that itself, is exponential in units of change. For all these, and other, technologies, history has shown that the rate of growth increases rapidly over time, producing a long period of little change on the left edge of the time-line, curving toward a near vertical line on the right. Extended further, this curve looks like the classic English letter “J,” from which the curve derives its name.Our study examined a myriad of different technologies, the development of which is represented by what is called the “J Curve.” While the graph here shows the number of internet hosts, we easily could have produced graphs of computer processing speed, pulsed power generation output, information data storage, or any number of other electronic, biological, nano-technological or directed-energy technologies. In all these cases, the curve of technological growth has the shape of the letter “J,” even, as we did here, if this graph is plotted on using a Y-axis that itself, is exponential in units of change. For all these, and other, technologies, history has shown that the rate of growth increases rapidly over time, producing a long period of little change on the left edge of the time-line, curving toward a near vertical line on the right. Extended further, this curve looks like the classic English letter “J,” from which the curve derives its name.
5. Harsh Realities When we speak regarding this change, there is frequently some “push-back” from the audience on the nature of this change. There is, rightly, a focus within the Pentagon on the wars in which we are currently engaged. Few nations in world history have successfully fought two-front wars, and the challenge facing the U.S. is daunting. So, we often hear that we should wait to address these issues until after the fight as we have insufficient resources today. Sometimes, we are accused of having “next-war-itis” and that we fail to have a grip on current reality…or that this briefing is too technical and is all “Star Wars.”
Yet, this type of thinking is critical to the Air Force. While not a named “core competency,” it has been the Air Force and its predecessor, the Army Air Corps, which has foreseen where technology was leading, and what the next new strategic leaps would be. As has been true so many times in the past, we, as a nation, find ourselves in an unsustainable “boots-on-the-ground” strategy when it comes to all responses in the war on terror. If, every time a building falls in New York, or a military installation is attacked in Washington, the only answer DOD can offer the nation is a strategy that costs over $1 trillion, and leads to the deployment of hundreds of thousands of forces, then we, the Department of Defense are not only strategically, but we are also intellectually bankrupt. As has been the case throughout all of history, tomorrow’s wars will be different than today’s, and we need to see through that change to that reality and the changes that lie in the future that will be spawned by technology revolutions.When we speak regarding this change, there is frequently some “push-back” from the audience on the nature of this change. There is, rightly, a focus within the Pentagon on the wars in which we are currently engaged. Few nations in world history have successfully fought two-front wars, and the challenge facing the U.S. is daunting. So, we often hear that we should wait to address these issues until after the fight as we have insufficient resources today. Sometimes, we are accused of having “next-war-itis” and that we fail to have a grip on current reality…or that this briefing is too technical and is all “Star Wars.”
Yet, this type of thinking is critical to the Air Force. While not a named “core competency,” it has been the Air Force and its predecessor, the Army Air Corps, which has foreseen where technology was leading, and what the next new strategic leaps would be. As has been true so many times in the past, we, as a nation, find ourselves in an unsustainable “boots-on-the-ground” strategy when it comes to all responses in the war on terror. If, every time a building falls in New York, or a military installation is attacked in Washington, the only answer DOD can offer the nation is a strategy that costs over $1 trillion, and leads to the deployment of hundreds of thousands of forces, then we, the Department of Defense are not only strategically, but we are also intellectually bankrupt. As has been the case throughout all of history, tomorrow’s wars will be different than today’s, and we need to see through that change to that reality and the changes that lie in the future that will be spawned by technology revolutions.
6. USAF Strategic Inflection Points Such technology revolutions have been with us since the early days of airpower.
In World War I, during an era of an entrenched “boots-on-the-ground” strategy, it was the early airpower theorists who were able to see that these lines could be broken through, or more accurately, be flown over, by men in combat flying machines. While admirals scoffed at the idea of airpower every playing a combat role, Billy Mitchell conducted the experiment that sank the Ostfriesland and showed the importance of strategic bombing at sea.
In World War II, when the Army’s only solution to the war in the Pacific was a land invasion risking the lives of over 1,000,000 men in uniform, it was the scientists and airmen in the Army Air Corps who found a way to bring the Second World War to a conclusion without the need for a land combat invasion.
When the U.S.S.R. shocked the world by launching the singing golfball, Sputnik, on a multiple orbit of the earth and the specter of nuclear attack loomed over the United States, it was the Air Force, under the leadership of General Shriever, who rapidly developed a rocket force enabling us to respond.
As adversary weapon systems threatened to negate air assets of all three services, with over 7000 aircraft shot down, most in the Army, it was the Air Force and her scientists that examined the need for greater precision and lower aircraft signatures, which enabled the development of platforms such as the F-117 and B-2, which enabled subsequent wars in Kosovo, Serbia, and Iraq to be fought with smaller losses in spite of these countries having improved defensive systems.
In this latest era – one where rapid technological change and proliferation of the skills to use this technology creates ever greater threats to the U.S. homeland, it may again fall upon the Air Force to help the Department of Defense and the nation out of the budget-busting, unsustainable, operations cycle that we now find ourselves in.Such technology revolutions have been with us since the early days of airpower.
In World War I, during an era of an entrenched “boots-on-the-ground” strategy, it was the early airpower theorists who were able to see that these lines could be broken through, or more accurately, be flown over, by men in combat flying machines. While admirals scoffed at the idea of airpower every playing a combat role, Billy Mitchell conducted the experiment that sank the Ostfriesland and showed the importance of strategic bombing at sea.
In World War II, when the Army’s only solution to the war in the Pacific was a land invasion risking the lives of over 1,000,000 men in uniform, it was the scientists and airmen in the Army Air Corps who found a way to bring the Second World War to a conclusion without the need for a land combat invasion.
When the U.S.S.R. shocked the world by launching the singing golfball, Sputnik, on a multiple orbit of the earth and the specter of nuclear attack loomed over the United States, it was the Air Force, under the leadership of General Shriever, who rapidly developed a rocket force enabling us to respond.
As adversary weapon systems threatened to negate air assets of all three services, with over 7000 aircraft shot down, most in the Army, it was the Air Force and her scientists that examined the need for greater precision and lower aircraft signatures, which enabled the development of platforms such as the F-117 and B-2, which enabled subsequent wars in Kosovo, Serbia, and Iraq to be fought with smaller losses in spite of these countries having improved defensive systems.
In this latest era – one where rapid technological change and proliferation of the skills to use this technology creates ever greater threats to the U.S. homeland, it may again fall upon the Air Force to help the Department of Defense and the nation out of the budget-busting, unsustainable, operations cycle that we now find ourselves in.
7. This presentation is designed to examine some of the underpinnings behind the age of surprise, and the new implications for strategy that this age contains.
This briefing follows a non-standard organizational framework. It begins broadly with a brief introduction to the previous two Blue Horizons studies and what these studies have found regarding the changing implications of new technologies. It then narrows, taking a “deep dive” into two separate technologies. It is important to note that we examined a multiplicity of technologies during this study year, and we could have chosen any of them for this discussion, but to keep this report to a reasonable length, we will examine new breakthroughs in biotechnology and cyber technology, and examine what these breakthroughs mean for our future airmen and their development. From this narrow examination of each of these two technologies, we will step back and examine what lessons, more broadly, these two “deep dives” have for the broader Air Force and for our nation.
This presentation is designed to examine some of the underpinnings behind the age of surprise, and the new implications for strategy that this age contains.
This briefing follows a non-standard organizational framework. It begins broadly with a brief introduction to the previous two Blue Horizons studies and what these studies have found regarding the changing implications of new technologies. It then narrows, taking a “deep dive” into two separate technologies. It is important to note that we examined a multiplicity of technologies during this study year, and we could have chosen any of them for this discussion, but to keep this report to a reasonable length, we will examine new breakthroughs in biotechnology and cyber technology, and examine what these breakthroughs mean for our future airmen and their development. From this narrow examination of each of these two technologies, we will step back and examine what lessons, more broadly, these two “deep dives” have for the broader Air Force and for our nation.
8. A8 Taskings for Blue Horizons In the first year of the Blue Horizons program, named “Horizons 21,” our Center examined a broad range of technologies. We found that improvements in the underlying science was happening across-the-board at an exponential rate, and we concluded that the capabilities available to actors in the international arena would continue to expand at an ever-increasing rate. In Blue Horizons II, the 2008 study, we created four alternative futures based on the 2006 National Security Strategy penned by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and used the scenarios to evaluate 58 notional concepts or capabilities, as well as their 172 underpinning technologies, for Air Force programmatic investment.In the first year of the Blue Horizons program, named “Horizons 21,” our Center examined a broad range of technologies. We found that improvements in the underlying science was happening across-the-board at an exponential rate, and we concluded that the capabilities available to actors in the international arena would continue to expand at an ever-increasing rate. In Blue Horizons II, the 2008 study, we created four alternative futures based on the 2006 National Security Strategy penned by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and used the scenarios to evaluate 58 notional concepts or capabilities, as well as their 172 underpinning technologies, for Air Force programmatic investment.
9. Blue Horizons I (2007) In 2007, as we examined the ever increasing rate of technological change, we found that improvements across a broad range of technologies were happening at an exponential rate. This chart, plotted on a scale where every major tick mark on the vertical axis represents a 10-fold improvement, shows the impact on the number of computer transistors on a chip as a result of these changes. Driven by motives of profit, social pressures for ever-more-capable goods, as well as scientific curiosity and military necessity, continued exponential technological change is inevitable.
Yet, our study in 2007 also showed that the United States and her military have an ever decreasing say in they types of technology that are developed. Seventy percent of all new technological breakthroughs happen outside the United States. Further, even among the 30 percent that happen within our own borders, 70 percent of those technological developments are privately funded and are solutions or breakthroughs over which the military has no influence or sway. As such, less than 10 percent of modern technological research is within the purview of the Department of Defense – a radical departure from 50 years ago, when that number was nearly 50 percent. In the future, one of the potential causes of surprise is that our government and its Air Force will virtually no say over who gets the new technologies, or how they will be employed.
In 2007, as we examined the ever increasing rate of technological change, we found that improvements across a broad range of technologies were happening at an exponential rate. This chart, plotted on a scale where every major tick mark on the vertical axis represents a 10-fold improvement, shows the impact on the number of computer transistors on a chip as a result of these changes. Driven by motives of profit, social pressures for ever-more-capable goods, as well as scientific curiosity and military necessity, continued exponential technological change is inevitable.
Yet, our study in 2007 also showed that the United States and her military have an ever decreasing say in they types of technology that are developed. Seventy percent of all new technological breakthroughs happen outside the United States. Further, even among the 30 percent that happen within our own borders, 70 percent of those technological developments are privately funded and are solutions or breakthroughs over which the military has no influence or sway. As such, less than 10 percent of modern technological research is within the purview of the Department of Defense – a radical departure from 50 years ago, when that number was nearly 50 percent. In the future, one of the potential causes of surprise is that our government and its Air Force will virtually no say over who gets the new technologies, or how they will be employed.
10. The New Battlespace Future enemies
motivated by resources, fear, and hate;
empowered through education; and
enabled through technology and globalization to directly challenge the US
The enemy will be different – the targets they present will be more difficult to find, harder to hit, more widely distributed, and more dangerous At the same time technology is leaving the purview of the government, our battlespace is changing.
In some respects, battlespace and warfare are timeless. Future enemies, like those of the past, will be motivated by issues such as resources, fear, and hate. These are among the same motivations Thucydides mentions in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars, penned more than 2000 years ago.
What is changing, however, is that these adversaries are being empowered through ever more ubiquitous education, much of it now available on the internet, and enabled through technology and globalization, to make potential adversaries more dangerous.
Thus, future enemies will be different. As we’ve already seen in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they will be more difficult to find (for example, where is Osama bin Laden anyway), harder to hit, more widely distributed – often via networking, and potentially more dangerous. As we grapple with these issues, and as we will show shortly, the implications of these shifts have profound implications for Air Force structure.
At the same time technology is leaving the purview of the government, our battlespace is changing.
In some respects, battlespace and warfare are timeless. Future enemies, like those of the past, will be motivated by issues such as resources, fear, and hate. These are among the same motivations Thucydides mentions in his History of the Peloponnesian Wars, penned more than 2000 years ago.
What is changing, however, is that these adversaries are being empowered through ever more ubiquitous education, much of it now available on the internet, and enabled through technology and globalization, to make potential adversaries more dangerous.
Thus, future enemies will be different. As we’ve already seen in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they will be more difficult to find (for example, where is Osama bin Laden anyway), harder to hit, more widely distributed – often via networking, and potentially more dangerous. As we grapple with these issues, and as we will show shortly, the implications of these shifts have profound implications for Air Force structure.
11. Blue Horizons I (2007) As these technologies advance throughout the world, the cost of these technologies goes down. For example, only 20 years ago, a $1000 computer operated at around 16 megahertz speed, and had around 8 megabytes of memory. Today, that same system comes with not one, but four processors, each of which operate at nearly 3 gigahertz; with a total system memory now measured in terabytes. This trend will continue, not only in computer processing, but in other technologies as well. The cost of new technologies and their systems will continue to rapidly decline. What this means, in a world where we control very little of the development and proliferation of technology, is that access to these technologies will rapidly increase.
As this access increases, the study concluded that warfare in the future may change. Historically, wars of high consequence, like the two World Wars, have been rare and of low probability; and wars of high probability have been those that often could be ignored. As we look forward, warfare may jump off of this orange line, with wars of high probability, those waged by small groups and individuals, being potentially of high consequence as a result of their access to increasingly inexpensive and disruptive technologies.As these technologies advance throughout the world, the cost of these technologies goes down. For example, only 20 years ago, a $1000 computer operated at around 16 megahertz speed, and had around 8 megabytes of memory. Today, that same system comes with not one, but four processors, each of which operate at nearly 3 gigahertz; with a total system memory now measured in terabytes. This trend will continue, not only in computer processing, but in other technologies as well. The cost of new technologies and their systems will continue to rapidly decline. What this means, in a world where we control very little of the development and proliferation of technology, is that access to these technologies will rapidly increase.
As this access increases, the study concluded that warfare in the future may change. Historically, wars of high consequence, like the two World Wars, have been rare and of low probability; and wars of high probability have been those that often could be ignored. As we look forward, warfare may jump off of this orange line, with wars of high probability, those waged by small groups and individuals, being potentially of high consequence as a result of their access to increasingly inexpensive and disruptive technologies.
12. Blue Horizons II (2008) In 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs asked the Center to evaluate 58 potential future capabilities for their utility across a broad range of potential scenarios. The 2008 study began by creating four alternative futures, using the National Security Strategy Document as its basis. These four scenarios included a Peer China, a Resurgent Russia, a failed-state scenario in Nigeria, and a jihadist insurgency launched from the heart of the Middle East. Against these four highly disparate scenarios, a formal Delphi analysis, a wargame, and a quantitative value-focused thinking methodology were applied to rank-order these notional capabilities in order of importance. All three methods achieved the same results. As is depicted here, contrary to what was commonly-held beliefs, the nature of the required future capabilities was almost invariant across the four scenarios. In fact, the only area where there was a significant difference was for systems in space. In conventional conflict, space systems and systems that protect our space capabilities, score better than they do in scenarios of unconventional warfare where these systems are much less likely to be at risk. For all other Air Force missions, however, the types of capabilities required do not vary significantly from conventional to un-conventional conflict.
These 58 capabilities were then mapped to a mutually exclusive but comprehensively exhaustive list of 172 key enabling technologies. Here, also, the list of technologies required in conventional warfare did not significantly vary from those required in unconventional operations. What was surprising, however, is that 57 of the 58 notional future capabilities all required key technologies that scored near the bottom of the list. Thus, any disinvestment in science or technology research, even of the lowest-ranking technologies, foreclosed the option to produce large numbers of possible capabilities at a later date. In fact, disinvestment in the bottom 20 percent of the ranking technologies created a scenario whereby roughly half the future capabilities and/or systems could not be built. Thus, any strategy that disinvests in science and technology, should be viewed as a very high risk strategy. In 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs asked the Center to evaluate 58 potential future capabilities for their utility across a broad range of potential scenarios. The 2008 study began by creating four alternative futures, using the National Security Strategy Document as its basis. These four scenarios included a Peer China, a Resurgent Russia, a failed-state scenario in Nigeria, and a jihadist insurgency launched from the heart of the Middle East. Against these four highly disparate scenarios, a formal Delphi analysis, a wargame, and a quantitative value-focused thinking methodology were applied to rank-order these notional capabilities in order of importance. All three methods achieved the same results. As is depicted here, contrary to what was commonly-held beliefs, the nature of the required future capabilities was almost invariant across the four scenarios. In fact, the only area where there was a significant difference was for systems in space. In conventional conflict, space systems and systems that protect our space capabilities, score better than they do in scenarios of unconventional warfare where these systems are much less likely to be at risk. For all other Air Force missions, however, the types of capabilities required do not vary significantly from conventional to un-conventional conflict.
These 58 capabilities were then mapped to a mutually exclusive but comprehensively exhaustive list of 172 key enabling technologies. Here, also, the list of technologies required in conventional warfare did not significantly vary from those required in unconventional operations. What was surprising, however, is that 57 of the 58 notional future capabilities all required key technologies that scored near the bottom of the list. Thus, any disinvestment in science or technology research, even of the lowest-ranking technologies, foreclosed the option to produce large numbers of possible capabilities at a later date. In fact, disinvestment in the bottom 20 percent of the ranking technologies created a scenario whereby roughly half the future capabilities and/or systems could not be built. Thus, any strategy that disinvests in science and technology, should be viewed as a very high risk strategy.
13. Blue Horizons I and II Bottom Line In summary, the first two years of the Blue Horizons studies found that exponential change is very real. It has been with us for years and will continue to occur. It is being driven by profit-seeking corporations, which means its continuation is inevitable and that the U.S. government will have little, if indeed any, control over its proliferation.
These developments have been due, in great part, to synergies between various technologies, especially the computing sciences, materials sciences and biological sciences. Looking forward, as computing technologies are brought to bear at the nexus of materials sciences and biotechnology, enabling molecular-level design of new substances, medicines, and computer processors. These efforts, however, will be privately led, with governments able to shape developments only on the margins.In summary, the first two years of the Blue Horizons studies found that exponential change is very real. It has been with us for years and will continue to occur. It is being driven by profit-seeking corporations, which means its continuation is inevitable and that the U.S. government will have little, if indeed any, control over its proliferation.
These developments have been due, in great part, to synergies between various technologies, especially the computing sciences, materials sciences and biological sciences. Looking forward, as computing technologies are brought to bear at the nexus of materials sciences and biotechnology, enabling molecular-level design of new substances, medicines, and computer processors. These efforts, however, will be privately led, with governments able to shape developments only on the margins.
14. Purpose of Blue Horizons III Given “head nods” all around in response to Blue Horizons I and II, Blue Horizons III asked:
What changes in Air Force culture and organization are needed to address disruptive technology?
How will Exponential Technological Change affect employment in the air, space and cyber domains?
What changes in Airmen development are needed to deal with the world of 2035?
Given the ubiquitous nature of new technology, and its importance to future capabilities, the key question for the third year of the study was how to prepare the Air Force to deal with the exponential changes that lie ahead.. Specifically, the questions addressed in the 2009 study included, “What changes in Air Force culture and organization are needed; How will exponential change affect the air, space, and cyberspace domains; and how should the development of our future Airmen be transformed concomitantly with these other changes?
Given the ubiquitous nature of new technology, and its importance to future capabilities, the key question for the third year of the study was how to prepare the Air Force to deal with the exponential changes that lie ahead.. Specifically, the questions addressed in the 2009 study included, “What changes in Air Force culture and organization are needed; How will exponential change affect the air, space, and cyberspace domains; and how should the development of our future Airmen be transformed concomitantly with these other changes?
15. To answer these questions, the study participants conducted a “deep dive” into several different technologies. As mentioned above, this report will detail two. In this section, we will narrow our focus and examine the changing nature of biotechnology and cyber-technology in depth. We will later use what we find in this deep dive to develop the answers to the questions asked above.To answer these questions, the study participants conducted a “deep dive” into several different technologies. As mentioned above, this report will detail two. In this section, we will narrow our focus and examine the changing nature of biotechnology and cyber-technology in depth. We will later use what we find in this deep dive to develop the answers to the questions asked above.
16. Changing Role of Man and Machine As we step back across history, the role of man in warfare has been changing. From the time of Sun Tzu, and for thousands of years hence, man was the machine. Our special operations forces will still argue that this is true, but historically it was the man, by virtue of his force and training, that engaged in combat.
For the Army Air Corps, this began to change shortly after the Wright Brother’s successful flight at Kitty Hawk. Man became the element controlling the machine – and his capabilities were enhanced by the machine, to do reconnaissance and for attack. As aircraft grew in sophistication, man employed the machine. We gave aircrew members titles such as “Weapon Systems Officers” in recognition that it was the man operating a system that itself was doing the killing or the destroying of the adversary’s forces or war-making capabilities. Today, we now call these same people “Computer Systems Operators” or CSOs, as we are moving into an era where man is now more engaged in monitoring his machine rather than employing it.
As we look toward the future, we see autonomous systems, operating at machine speeds, able to engage the enemy at super-human speeds, where man neither controls or employs the weapon – he is relegated merely to observer status as he watches the machines engage in combat on his behalf. The technology to do warfare of this kind already exists in early stages. This begs the question of what man’s role is in such a future. Here, we believe the answer lies in the area of ethics. Man’s value added as warfare speeds up toward machine-speed conflict, is one of ensuring the traditional ethical or human dimension to warfare is not lost. Yet, as warfare speeds up, this is increasingly difficult to assure.
Images from:
http://sped2work.tripod.com/leoglider.html
http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/types/usa/wright/flyer/flyer.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-16
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQ-1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQ-9
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AVENGER041709.xml&headline=Predator%20C%20Avenger%20Makes%20First%20Flights&channel=defense
As we step back across history, the role of man in warfare has been changing. From the time of Sun Tzu, and for thousands of years hence, man was the machine. Our special operations forces will still argue that this is true, but historically it was the man, by virtue of his force and training, that engaged in combat.
For the Army Air Corps, this began to change shortly after the Wright Brother’s successful flight at Kitty Hawk. Man became the element controlling the machine – and his capabilities were enhanced by the machine, to do reconnaissance and for attack. As aircraft grew in sophistication, man employed the machine. We gave aircrew members titles such as “Weapon Systems Officers” in recognition that it was the man operating a system that itself was doing the killing or the destroying of the adversary’s forces or war-making capabilities. Today, we now call these same people “Computer Systems Operators” or CSOs, as we are moving into an era where man is now more engaged in monitoring his machine rather than employing it.
As we look toward the future, we see autonomous systems, operating at machine speeds, able to engage the enemy at super-human speeds, where man neither controls or employs the weapon – he is relegated merely to observer status as he watches the machines engage in combat on his behalf. The technology to do warfare of this kind already exists in early stages. This begs the question of what man’s role is in such a future. Here, we believe the answer lies in the area of ethics. Man’s value added as warfare speeds up toward machine-speed conflict, is one of ensuring the traditional ethical or human dimension to warfare is not lost. Yet, as warfare speeds up, this is increasingly difficult to assure.
Images from:
http://sped2work.tripod.com/leoglider.html
http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/types/usa/wright/flyer/flyer.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-16
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQ-1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MQ-9
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AVENGER041709.xml&headline=Predator%20C%20Avenger%20Makes%20First%20Flights&channel=defense
17. Impact: Human Driven Out of the Loop The result of this evolution is that man is rapidly being driven out of the loop. The number of inputs that are coming into our decision-making processes is rapidly increasing. Our ability to fully analyze these inputs is not keeping up, and intelligence analysts have been saying for years that more than 90 percent of the data we gather falls to the cutting-room floor. Yet, as the number of inputs are increasing, automation, computer processing, and the speed of modern weapons systems is shrinking the time for decisions to be made. The 72-hour air tasking order cycle which was the norm at the start of the first Gulf War, is now often reduced to minutes. The traditional “obeserve – orient – decide – act” or OODA-Loop is shrinking, and is rapidly moving toward becoming an OODA-point. – a loop so small, that it is literally faster than the decision-making process of the human mind.
In one domain, this has already occurred. On the computers we use in the Air Force, each of us has delegated our “commander’s intent” to a piece of software. The speed of warfare in the cyber domain is so fast that none of us are fast enough to stop intruding malware or viruses. So, we have delegated to a computer program – an anti-viral piece of software, our commander’s intent to keep our computer secure and are hard drive protected. We have automated warfare in this domain, because we recognize that we can no longer operate at the speed of warfare.
All we are suggesting here is that this dynamic will gradually migrate to the other domains of warfare as well. Yet, as we look at the future planning documents, we see blissful ignorance of this coming reality.The result of this evolution is that man is rapidly being driven out of the loop. The number of inputs that are coming into our decision-making processes is rapidly increasing. Our ability to fully analyze these inputs is not keeping up, and intelligence analysts have been saying for years that more than 90 percent of the data we gather falls to the cutting-room floor. Yet, as the number of inputs are increasing, automation, computer processing, and the speed of modern weapons systems is shrinking the time for decisions to be made. The 72-hour air tasking order cycle which was the norm at the start of the first Gulf War, is now often reduced to minutes. The traditional “obeserve – orient – decide – act” or OODA-Loop is shrinking, and is rapidly moving toward becoming an OODA-point. – a loop so small, that it is literally faster than the decision-making process of the human mind.
In one domain, this has already occurred. On the computers we use in the Air Force, each of us has delegated our “commander’s intent” to a piece of software. The speed of warfare in the cyber domain is so fast that none of us are fast enough to stop intruding malware or viruses. So, we have delegated to a computer program – an anti-viral piece of software, our commander’s intent to keep our computer secure and are hard drive protected. We have automated warfare in this domain, because we recognize that we can no longer operate at the speed of warfare.
All we are suggesting here is that this dynamic will gradually migrate to the other domains of warfare as well. Yet, as we look at the future planning documents, we see blissful ignorance of this coming reality.
18. The Man in the Loop Dilemma We examined the policy assumptions that underpin current doctrinal and future thinking with respect to remotely piloted and unmanned vehicles. Inherent in our guiding documents on these new warfighting technologies is an implicit assumption that man will remain a central element of the control loop, and that there are no ethical, moral, or legal considerations involved in this evolution toward greater autonomy in warfighting machines. We even did a word count in these documents looking for words such as “ethics,” “values,” or “morals.” We found none.
Yet the realities of modern warfare require constant staring at parts of the battlespace, and increased autonomy of action. There appears to be a belief that these new machines will avoid errors because of their lack of emotion. Yet, this lack of emotion may not necessarily be an asset. Further, there are a myriad of cultural issues that are unaddressed by this drive to autonomy. Under the Geneva and Hague Conventions, who do you prosecute or hold responsible when an autonomouse machine commits a war crime? The operational commander? The system designer? The computer programmer?
The problem is that exponential technological change is outpacing our ability to program ethics into these machines, yet as we’ve already seen in cyberspace, some aspects of warfare are happening faster than humans can react.
We examined the policy assumptions that underpin current doctrinal and future thinking with respect to remotely piloted and unmanned vehicles. Inherent in our guiding documents on these new warfighting technologies is an implicit assumption that man will remain a central element of the control loop, and that there are no ethical, moral, or legal considerations involved in this evolution toward greater autonomy in warfighting machines. We even did a word count in these documents looking for words such as “ethics,” “values,” or “morals.” We found none.
Yet the realities of modern warfare require constant staring at parts of the battlespace, and increased autonomy of action. There appears to be a belief that these new machines will avoid errors because of their lack of emotion. Yet, this lack of emotion may not necessarily be an asset. Further, there are a myriad of cultural issues that are unaddressed by this drive to autonomy. Under the Geneva and Hague Conventions, who do you prosecute or hold responsible when an autonomouse machine commits a war crime? The operational commander? The system designer? The computer programmer?
The problem is that exponential technological change is outpacing our ability to program ethics into these machines, yet as we’ve already seen in cyberspace, some aspects of warfare are happening faster than humans can react.
19. Approaches to Keep Man in the Loop So, our deep dive into biology began with looking at how we keep the human element in this ever-tightening OODA-loop. The technologies we examined are those at the bottom of the slide. Each of these, in time, offers at least a partial solution to the problem.
As the time-frame for this study is 2035, we needed to look at the level of technological availability in the next 20-30 years. Three basic categories of solutions have been mentioned: artificial intelligence; intelligence augmentation; and education and training. It is important to understand that our discussions with the technologists both in the Air Force and National Laboratories universally believed that full artificial intelligence, like the android “Commander Data” in Star Trek, while technologically achievable in time, was unlikely to be reached before 2035. The other technology assessed to be unachievable in this timeframe was establishing connections between computers and the human cerebral cortex enabling human cognitive augmentation allowing individuals to truly think at machine level speeds. Both these developments are assessed to be unlikely until the 2040s.
What may be possible in an effort to keep ethical thinking inside the compressing OODA cycle are the use of biological and pharmacological enhancement, including nano-engineered pharmaceuticals; as well as enhancements in education and training. While collectively these will not fully solve the problem of the OODA-Loop compressing toward the OODA-point, they have the potential to allow us to keep the human in the loop longer than if these technologies are not employed.So, our deep dive into biology began with looking at how we keep the human element in this ever-tightening OODA-loop. The technologies we examined are those at the bottom of the slide. Each of these, in time, offers at least a partial solution to the problem.
As the time-frame for this study is 2035, we needed to look at the level of technological availability in the next 20-30 years. Three basic categories of solutions have been mentioned: artificial intelligence; intelligence augmentation; and education and training. It is important to understand that our discussions with the technologists both in the Air Force and National Laboratories universally believed that full artificial intelligence, like the android “Commander Data” in Star Trek, while technologically achievable in time, was unlikely to be reached before 2035. The other technology assessed to be unachievable in this timeframe was establishing connections between computers and the human cerebral cortex enabling human cognitive augmentation allowing individuals to truly think at machine level speeds. Both these developments are assessed to be unlikely until the 2040s.
What may be possible in an effort to keep ethical thinking inside the compressing OODA cycle are the use of biological and pharmacological enhancement, including nano-engineered pharmaceuticals; as well as enhancements in education and training. While collectively these will not fully solve the problem of the OODA-Loop compressing toward the OODA-point, they have the potential to allow us to keep the human in the loop longer than if these technologies are not employed.
20. Pharmo-Genetic Enhancement Timeline In the realm of pharmacological and genetic research, major advances have recently occurred and will likely soon occur that will enable faster human cognition.
The human genome was fully sequenced in 2004. While we have the sequence, we do not yet fully understand what every one of our genes does. Some understanding, however, has already been achieved, and pharmaceuticals are already being engineered using nano-technology to treat diseases (Gleevec and Sprycel for leukemia, for example). Within the next year, animal studies of pharmacological substances that are nano-engineered to enable enhanced expression of existing genetic traits will likely commence. These substances, at the nano-scale, will enable existing genes within the animal to express certain inherent traits at enhanced levels, and these medicines can be precisely calibrated. For example, a nano-blood pressure medicine would kick in only when needed, and then only in the amount needed to keep the blood pressure within precisely defined boundaries.
One should note that as these substances are nano-engineered, they can be made small enough to defy attempts at filtration. Within five years, organ-specific nano-delivery of FDA certified pharmaceuticals is likely. As stated above, some such pharmaceuticals are already approved for cancer applications – but more and smaller nano-technological derived medicines are coming soon. Full human trait studies of nano-pharmaceuticals to enhance human performance without disease are likely by 2025, with such substances commercially available before the end of the 2020s. This has the risk of creating two classes of humans. Those wealthy enough may invest in having nanotechnology-designed pharmaceuticals to help them think more clearly, run faster, improve their strength, or make decisions more quickly. Those who cannot afford it may be left behind. Of equal concern, however is that once we understand the human genome sufficiently to design substances to enhance human performance, we will also understand the genome sufficiently to design substances to degrade performance. The weaponization of these materials will follow closely on the heels of the advances that may make us healthier, faster, brighter, and stronger. Nano-engineered pharmaceuticals may enable precise control of an opponents level of brain function, alertness, sleep cycles, energy levels, and decision-making capability. The first nation that is able to achieve this technology will have an insurmountable advantage.In the realm of pharmacological and genetic research, major advances have recently occurred and will likely soon occur that will enable faster human cognition.
The human genome was fully sequenced in 2004. While we have the sequence, we do not yet fully understand what every one of our genes does. Some understanding, however, has already been achieved, and pharmaceuticals are already being engineered using nano-technology to treat diseases (Gleevec and Sprycel for leukemia, for example). Within the next year, animal studies of pharmacological substances that are nano-engineered to enable enhanced expression of existing genetic traits will likely commence. These substances, at the nano-scale, will enable existing genes within the animal to express certain inherent traits at enhanced levels, and these medicines can be precisely calibrated. For example, a nano-blood pressure medicine would kick in only when needed, and then only in the amount needed to keep the blood pressure within precisely defined boundaries.
One should note that as these substances are nano-engineered, they can be made small enough to defy attempts at filtration. Within five years, organ-specific nano-delivery of FDA certified pharmaceuticals is likely. As stated above, some such pharmaceuticals are already approved for cancer applications – but more and smaller nano-technological derived medicines are coming soon. Full human trait studies of nano-pharmaceuticals to enhance human performance without disease are likely by 2025, with such substances commercially available before the end of the 2020s. This has the risk of creating two classes of humans. Those wealthy enough may invest in having nanotechnology-designed pharmaceuticals to help them think more clearly, run faster, improve their strength, or make decisions more quickly. Those who cannot afford it may be left behind. Of equal concern, however is that once we understand the human genome sufficiently to design substances to enhance human performance, we will also understand the genome sufficiently to design substances to degrade performance. The weaponization of these materials will follow closely on the heels of the advances that may make us healthier, faster, brighter, and stronger. Nano-engineered pharmaceuticals may enable precise control of an opponents level of brain function, alertness, sleep cycles, energy levels, and decision-making capability. The first nation that is able to achieve this technology will have an insurmountable advantage.
21. Education and Training In the areas of education and training, there are other things we can do to keep humans in this ever-decreasing decision cycle.
Our research suggests that militaries in the future would benefit from deliberately creating officers with the philosophical and psychological ability to expect and accept surprise. Educationally, this is done through a broad education that spans sciences, technology, the arts, and humanities – by creating a modern “renaissance person” or a “man for all seasons.”
Greater application of virtual reality training can also enhance operations. While we have done this on an elementary level in the flying environment, we need to do this in other areas as well. Air Force officers are negotiating contracts in Afghanistan. Future virtual training would include modeling the behavior of various clans and tribes so that a prospective deploying airman can practice interactions in a responsive culturally accurate virtual environment before arriving in the ground. Aircrews can fly virtual missions daily, training in new environments and in different missions in places and conditions quite different from their home base. These same simulations can be extended to maintenance, logistics, security forces, and survive to operate procedures. In short, if one trains for a vast array of highly disparate conditions, surprise becomes the norm, and the mind is prepared. In the areas of education and training, there are other things we can do to keep humans in this ever-decreasing decision cycle.
Our research suggests that militaries in the future would benefit from deliberately creating officers with the philosophical and psychological ability to expect and accept surprise. Educationally, this is done through a broad education that spans sciences, technology, the arts, and humanities – by creating a modern “renaissance person” or a “man for all seasons.”
Greater application of virtual reality training can also enhance operations. While we have done this on an elementary level in the flying environment, we need to do this in other areas as well. Air Force officers are negotiating contracts in Afghanistan. Future virtual training would include modeling the behavior of various clans and tribes so that a prospective deploying airman can practice interactions in a responsive culturally accurate virtual environment before arriving in the ground. Aircrews can fly virtual missions daily, training in new environments and in different missions in places and conditions quite different from their home base. These same simulations can be extended to maintenance, logistics, security forces, and survive to operate procedures. In short, if one trains for a vast array of highly disparate conditions, surprise becomes the norm, and the mind is prepared.
22. As we surveyed education throughout the department of defense, what we found was an educational curriculum quite different from this ideal. While the percentages do vary a couple of points from the median numbers shown here, in general, senior PME spends about a quarter of its time studying the past, about two-thirds of its time on the present, and only about seven percent of its time looking at the future, and all of that is within the FYDP. Yet, it is this future in which our graduates will spend the rest of their lives.
Historically, this method of SDE has served us well. However, technologies are changing and will do so with increasing rapidity. Our concern, is that as DOD’s technical leader, the Air Force will do itself a disservice if it fails to adapt. Our education and training systems will need to not only keep up with the “J Curve,” they will need to lead it, to prepare our officers for it, so that they are intellectually ready for the surprises exponentially accelerating technology will present.
As we surveyed education throughout the department of defense, what we found was an educational curriculum quite different from this ideal. While the percentages do vary a couple of points from the median numbers shown here, in general, senior PME spends about a quarter of its time studying the past, about two-thirds of its time on the present, and only about seven percent of its time looking at the future, and all of that is within the FYDP. Yet, it is this future in which our graduates will spend the rest of their lives.
Historically, this method of SDE has served us well. However, technologies are changing and will do so with increasing rapidity. Our concern, is that as DOD’s technical leader, the Air Force will do itself a disservice if it fails to adapt. Our education and training systems will need to not only keep up with the “J Curve,” they will need to lead it, to prepare our officers for it, so that they are intellectually ready for the surprises exponentially accelerating technology will present.
23. Take Aways Keeping Man in the Loop Air Force future leader:
Selected based on demonstrated proclivity for success in a chaotic environment, genetics and way of thinking
Educated to instill a philosophical and psychological capacity to expect and accept surprise
Cognitively enhanced through Pharmo-genetic technology
Trained in a virtual reality environment . . . conditioned to think clearly and rapidly . . . brings ethics into machine dominated world
Thus, as we look at the biological and human aspects of keeping ethical decision-making in the loop we find that the Air Force’s future leaders will need to have a set of traits.
They will need to be selected based on a demonstrated proclivity for success in a chaotic environment. As the genetic makeup of such individuals will be knowable, genetic selection likely ought to play a role. Further, selection of airmen based on their genetic ability to be nano-pharmacologically enhanced may also be necessary.
Once we have these people, we need to educate them to instill a philosophical and psychological ability to expect and accept surprise and rapidly changing environments. We will need to cognitively enhance these individual using pharmo-genetic technologies to enable them to operate at their fullest potential – levels far above those at which they would perform unenhanced.
Lastly, we need to train (daily or nearly so) these individual in a virtual reality environment where they are conditioned to think clearly and rapidly and to bring ethical decision-making into an increasingly machine-dominated world.Thus, as we look at the biological and human aspects of keeping ethical decision-making in the loop we find that the Air Force’s future leaders will need to have a set of traits.
They will need to be selected based on a demonstrated proclivity for success in a chaotic environment. As the genetic makeup of such individuals will be knowable, genetic selection likely ought to play a role. Further, selection of airmen based on their genetic ability to be nano-pharmacologically enhanced may also be necessary.
Once we have these people, we need to educate them to instill a philosophical and psychological ability to expect and accept surprise and rapidly changing environments. We will need to cognitively enhance these individual using pharmo-genetic technologies to enable them to operate at their fullest potential – levels far above those at which they would perform unenhanced.
Lastly, we need to train (daily or nearly so) these individual in a virtual reality environment where they are conditioned to think clearly and rapidly and to bring ethical decision-making into an increasingly machine-dominated world.
24. Surprise #1 Rosetta Stone We have decoded the human genome, but lack a gene-to-function Rosetta Stone
Lack computational power, algorithms . . . ethics block research
Don’t have full set of behavioral traits or understand how the psyche affects cognition
Not being extensively researched in national labs
Requires intensive intelligence monitoring on private sector research
Deserves military R&D effort
Potentially, next ‘Manhattan Project’
Pharmaceutical industry focused on nearer term applications . . . may require prodding in this direction
As we look back through this deep dive into the biological sciences with the focus of keeping man in the loop, we uncovered one major surprise finding that warrants highlighting here.
While we have decoded the human genome, we currently lack a gene-to-function Rosetta Stone. Largely, this is a function of computational power, which will be solved in the next few to several years. In some niche areas, ethics become a barrier to research. What we have discovered, however, is that once this Rosetta Stone is built, which will occur over the next 20-30 years, the development of technologies, both biological and nanotechnological, to enhance, activate, deactivate, or interfere with the functioning with the mammalian genetic sequence will become possible. Human traits such as intelligence, strength, agility, speed, and alertness will all be able to be enhanced or degraded using materials of a scale too small to be filtered out by water treatment or breathing apparatuses. The first nation to develop this functional capability may have an insurmountable advantage over all others. This strongly suggests that this should become a major research effort in the years ahead, and while a trite and overused phrase, it may be the next “Manhattan Project” for the Department of Defense.As we look back through this deep dive into the biological sciences with the focus of keeping man in the loop, we uncovered one major surprise finding that warrants highlighting here.
While we have decoded the human genome, we currently lack a gene-to-function Rosetta Stone. Largely, this is a function of computational power, which will be solved in the next few to several years. In some niche areas, ethics become a barrier to research. What we have discovered, however, is that once this Rosetta Stone is built, which will occur over the next 20-30 years, the development of technologies, both biological and nanotechnological, to enhance, activate, deactivate, or interfere with the functioning with the mammalian genetic sequence will become possible. Human traits such as intelligence, strength, agility, speed, and alertness will all be able to be enhanced or degraded using materials of a scale too small to be filtered out by water treatment or breathing apparatuses. The first nation to develop this functional capability may have an insurmountable advantage over all others. This strongly suggests that this should become a major research effort in the years ahead, and while a trite and overused phrase, it may be the next “Manhattan Project” for the Department of Defense.
25. As mentioned above, there are two deep technological dives in this presentation. The first was in the biological sciences. This next one is in the area of cyber.
As mentioned above, there are two deep technological dives in this presentation. The first was in the biological sciences. This next one is in the area of cyber.
26. Trajectory of Cyber Development It is important to note that this diagram is not to scale. If it were, the small green box representing 1980, would be no bigger than a single pixel. 30 years ago, we had television, telephones, and the first most rudimentary computers. It wasn’t until later that we had a functioning internet.
If this were to scale, the blue box, representing today, would be as big as this page. It would represent the increase in size from the infancy of cyberspace in 1980 to the era of smart phones, internet, PDAs, and early types of cyber warfare that we see now.
Twenty-five years from now, the realm of cyberspace will be much larger still. Relative to this page, the cloud depicted here would be the size of a large office building, representing the ubiquitous nature of information, the resultant transparency, and what is now being called cloud computing. In 1943, the Chairman of IBM, Thomas Watson, remarked that “I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” This quote was well-discussed at the 2009 World Future Society Conference in Chicago, where the consensus was that Mr. Watson was off – by four. The future, the conferees believed, would contain but one computer – the internet – and anything else would be but a node; a node plugged into this cloud.
The cloud is already reality. If you initiate a search using Google, the search does not occur on your hard drive, but rather occurs on thousands or millions of drives around the world. The results are consolidated from these outputs, and then are routed from the cloud, back to your computer. In the future, this cloud will envelop almost all searching and computing processes.It is important to note that this diagram is not to scale. If it were, the small green box representing 1980, would be no bigger than a single pixel. 30 years ago, we had television, telephones, and the first most rudimentary computers. It wasn’t until later that we had a functioning internet.
If this were to scale, the blue box, representing today, would be as big as this page. It would represent the increase in size from the infancy of cyberspace in 1980 to the era of smart phones, internet, PDAs, and early types of cyber warfare that we see now.
Twenty-five years from now, the realm of cyberspace will be much larger still. Relative to this page, the cloud depicted here would be the size of a large office building, representing the ubiquitous nature of information, the resultant transparency, and what is now being called cloud computing. In 1943, the Chairman of IBM, Thomas Watson, remarked that “I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” This quote was well-discussed at the 2009 World Future Society Conference in Chicago, where the consensus was that Mr. Watson was off – by four. The future, the conferees believed, would contain but one computer – the internet – and anything else would be but a node; a node plugged into this cloud.
The cloud is already reality. If you initiate a search using Google, the search does not occur on your hard drive, but rather occurs on thousands or millions of drives around the world. The results are consolidated from these outputs, and then are routed from the cloud, back to your computer. In the future, this cloud will envelop almost all searching and computing processes.
27. Cyber in 2035 Not better . . . radically different
Driven by innovation . . . not governments
Transparency changes the game
“Dominance” not possible
Our conclusion then, is that cyberspace in 2035 is not merely better, though it will be that; it will be radically different. These changes will be driven by private enterprise and innovation, and governments will be relegated largely to the sidelines. It will produce a level of transparency that will significantly change the nature of security and military operations, creating a world where information “dominance,” a core tenet of our doctrine, will simply be impossible. Our conclusion then, is that cyberspace in 2035 is not merely better, though it will be that; it will be radically different. These changes will be driven by private enterprise and innovation, and governments will be relegated largely to the sidelines. It will produce a level of transparency that will significantly change the nature of security and military operations, creating a world where information “dominance,” a core tenet of our doctrine, will simply be impossible.
28. Beyond Big Brother: Transparency in 2035 Cyber vector: “One Machine”
World interconnectedness creates “One Machine”
One Machine constantly
Redesigns itself moment to moment
Develops new architectures daily
Never fails (nodes may fail but not the “Machine”)
Innovates – surprise the result
Already, today, we are approaching this world of one machine.
The internet redesigns itself from moment to moment. It re-routes data to free up bottlenecks, and re-designs itself to accommodate new servers and new nodes. In so doing, it autonomously develops new architectures daily. When you purchase a new computer from Gateway, or HP, or Dell; you plug it into the internet, the cloud assigns you a new address, and the cloud has adapted to your presence.
Interestingly, the internet itself has never failed. Nodes occasionally do; and the servers on my air force base fail more often than I care to admit, but the internet is sufficiently redundant that it never has. It constantly innovates, and surprise can be the result.Already, today, we are approaching this world of one machine.
The internet redesigns itself from moment to moment. It re-routes data to free up bottlenecks, and re-designs itself to accommodate new servers and new nodes. In so doing, it autonomously develops new architectures daily. When you purchase a new computer from Gateway, or HP, or Dell; you plug it into the internet, the cloud assigns you a new address, and the cloud has adapted to your presence.
Interestingly, the internet itself has never failed. Nodes occasionally do; and the servers on my air force base fail more often than I care to admit, but the internet is sufficiently redundant that it never has. It constantly innovates, and surprise can be the result.
29. Beyond Big Brother: Transparency in 2035 Human vector: Drives reliance on Cyber
Society, industry, government, military: Ever greater dependency on autonomous machines
Constant: All recorded, catalogued, tracked The other interesting aspect of the internet is that almost everything that has ever been there, is still there. Search engines like Google catalogue past pages or ‘cache” them. If you want to see a page that has long since disappeared from the internet, one need only use Google or a similar engine to call up previous versions. The data is all there.
This suggests that in the future, the internet may provide a level of transparency never before imagined. Every action that has happened on-line, every time a person passes in front of a camera, every moment a person is in a public space; their lives are being catalogued. Imagine the power of having the ability to stare at a person’s life via cyberspace, and re-construct almost every last significant action they have ever taken. The internet enables a tool similar to “Angel Fire” on steroids.
The other interesting aspect of the internet is that almost everything that has ever been there, is still there. Search engines like Google catalogue past pages or ‘cache” them. If you want to see a page that has long since disappeared from the internet, one need only use Google or a similar engine to call up previous versions. The data is all there.
This suggests that in the future, the internet may provide a level of transparency never before imagined. Every action that has happened on-line, every time a person passes in front of a camera, every moment a person is in a public space; their lives are being catalogued. Imagine the power of having the ability to stare at a person’s life via cyberspace, and re-construct almost every last significant action they have ever taken. The internet enables a tool similar to “Angel Fire” on steroids.
30. Beyond Big Brother: Transparency in 2035 Transparency: Integrates knowledge and things
Hoarding knowledge difficult to unlikely
Nations lose asymmetric advantage
Knowledge shifts from nation to group to individual
Transparency provides answers to questions like:
Who are the 25,000 most influential people in the world and how many of them are within 10NM of my location?
This ability to backtrack or constantly stare at locations via cyberspace will provide a level of transparency never seen before. Hoarding data and knowledge will become difficult, or impossible; and the control of knowledge and intelligence, once the purview of states, will be in the hands of groups and individuals.
By 2035, this new level of transparency will enable you to ask of your cell phone, of the 25,000 most influential people on Earth, how many are within 300 feet of me? Are there any in the coffee shop across the street? It will enable new methods of finding data and networking.This ability to backtrack or constantly stare at locations via cyberspace will provide a level of transparency never seen before. Hoarding data and knowledge will become difficult, or impossible; and the control of knowledge and intelligence, once the purview of states, will be in the hands of groups and individuals.
By 2035, this new level of transparency will enable you to ask of your cell phone, of the 25,000 most influential people on Earth, how many are within 300 feet of me? Are there any in the coffee shop across the street? It will enable new methods of finding data and networking.
31. Operations in Virtual and Live Domains It will also be an potential enhancer for security purposes.
Imagine a street scene as the one above. In an instant, a law enforcement officer takes a snapshot of the scene. It will also be an potential enhancer for security purposes.
Imagine a street scene as the one above. In an instant, a law enforcement officer takes a snapshot of the scene.
32. Farmed Data Display From that snapshot, he is able to tell who works together, who is linked to each other’s facebook or myspace web pages, what their credit scores are, who has certain key medical conditions, and whether any are wanted criminals. In this example, an individual on the FBI’s most wanted list with a limited income and poor credit score is standing next to a well-paid professional, whose credit score is also very poor, suggesting that some sort of illegal activity may be going on.
In cities, like Chicago, permanent cameras have recently been installed to provide permanent monitoring of all terrain within the central city. This camera system is tied into the 911 calling system, enabling the cameras to immediately slew to the location of any crime or emergency. The cameras are also able to follow or trace criminals or other bad actors to their point of origin – both as they flee a scene…and backtracking from the original activity to the location from which they came.
All of this is not 2035 – it is reality now, or coming by 2015.From that snapshot, he is able to tell who works together, who is linked to each other’s facebook or myspace web pages, what their credit scores are, who has certain key medical conditions, and whether any are wanted criminals. In this example, an individual on the FBI’s most wanted list with a limited income and poor credit score is standing next to a well-paid professional, whose credit score is also very poor, suggesting that some sort of illegal activity may be going on.
In cities, like Chicago, permanent cameras have recently been installed to provide permanent monitoring of all terrain within the central city. This camera system is tied into the 911 calling system, enabling the cameras to immediately slew to the location of any crime or emergency. The cameras are also able to follow or trace criminals or other bad actors to their point of origin – both as they flee a scene…and backtracking from the original activity to the location from which they came.
All of this is not 2035 – it is reality now, or coming by 2015.
33. Reality in Combat Today we have a program called Angel Fire. It is a program of using overhead remotely piloted sensors to provide constant staring over a geographical territory. This capability allows monitoring of sections of the battlefield, and like the cameras in our nation’s cities, allows for the ability to trace those who have implanted IEDs along the side of roadways back to their homes, or monitoring the activities of suspected terrorist organizations on a 24/7/365 basis. New sensing technology, will soon enable us to accomplish this same task from higher altitudes – eventually geostationary orbit, and by 2035, we may be able to accomplish this on a planetary basis.
Yet, closer to Earth, the internet may be enabling exactly the same capability. Microsoft’s program “Photosynth” has extraordinary capacity for increasing transparency. Photosynth takes pictures that are published on web sites such as facebook, MySpace, or YouTube, and geo-references them, placing them in exactly the correct physical location. Photosynth then fuses these pictures together, enabling a internet user to do a virtual three-dimensional walk around, through, or inside, any location that has ever been photographed. As these pictures on the internet are updated, so too is the 3-D model. Cyberspace is now a place where you can walk through government buildings, critical infrastructure, or anywhere for that matter, and survey the facility down to the detail of the location of the electrical outlets, circuit breaker panels, and critical information technology ports and plumbing lines.
With all internet data catalogued and tracked, and with Photosynth and like capabilities, by 2035, the entire life history of virtually anyone who lives in civilization will be knowable, and traceable back in time to their birth. We will have complete transparency on everyone, and everything. Cyberspace may be the single greatest repository of information of value as national intelligence. Today we have a program called Angel Fire. It is a program of using overhead remotely piloted sensors to provide constant staring over a geographical territory. This capability allows monitoring of sections of the battlefield, and like the cameras in our nation’s cities, allows for the ability to trace those who have implanted IEDs along the side of roadways back to their homes, or monitoring the activities of suspected terrorist organizations on a 24/7/365 basis. New sensing technology, will soon enable us to accomplish this same task from higher altitudes – eventually geostationary orbit, and by 2035, we may be able to accomplish this on a planetary basis.
Yet, closer to Earth, the internet may be enabling exactly the same capability. Microsoft’s program “Photosynth” has extraordinary capacity for increasing transparency. Photosynth takes pictures that are published on web sites such as facebook, MySpace, or YouTube, and geo-references them, placing them in exactly the correct physical location. Photosynth then fuses these pictures together, enabling a internet user to do a virtual three-dimensional walk around, through, or inside, any location that has ever been photographed. As these pictures on the internet are updated, so too is the 3-D model. Cyberspace is now a place where you can walk through government buildings, critical infrastructure, or anywhere for that matter, and survey the facility down to the detail of the location of the electrical outlets, circuit breaker panels, and critical information technology ports and plumbing lines.
With all internet data catalogued and tracked, and with Photosynth and like capabilities, by 2035, the entire life history of virtually anyone who lives in civilization will be knowable, and traceable back in time to their birth. We will have complete transparency on everyone, and everything. Cyberspace may be the single greatest repository of information of value as national intelligence.
34. With this in mind, it is appropriate to examine how the Air Force views cyberspace. Today, Air Force doctrine and publications defines cyberspace solely as the networks, wires, nodes, and servers. It is defined as the hardware that connects us – and nothing more.
On January 1, 2010, the Chief Naval Officer issued a directive that for their service defines cyberspace as including the cognitive domain. For that service, it is not just the hardware, but the information that crosses the hardware, and the impact this information has on the thinking of those who receive it.
This re-definition is appropriate. For years, social science researchers have been interviewing Al Qaeda adherents and Taliban in northeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. Consistently they find that much of Al Qaeda’s success in recruiting is from the internet. Social networking as well as a realm of integrated extremist web sites serve to reinforce the views of those inclined to accept Al Qaeda’s ideology. News sites broadcast a slanted view of world events. Even the weather is distorted, with Hurricane Katrina describes as the finger of God wiping out the non-believers in the “Bible Belt” of the United States in retribution for the sins of the West. On these web sites are advertisements. Yes, you can “click here” to sign up to be a suicide bomber. Type in your name and address, and an Al Qaeda representative will come to your door, fit you for a vest, and tell you where to go to become a martyr. The conclusion of these researchers can be paraphrased as this. The war we are now fighting in Afghanistan is nothing more or less than the manifestation in physical space, of a lost war in cyberspace. The ultimate irony is that in this, the first real cyber war, the world’s most technologically advanced power may yet end up the loser – in part because we define this warfighting domain strictly as a bunch of hardware. With this in mind, it is appropriate to examine how the Air Force views cyberspace. Today, Air Force doctrine and publications defines cyberspace solely as the networks, wires, nodes, and servers. It is defined as the hardware that connects us – and nothing more.
On January 1, 2010, the Chief Naval Officer issued a directive that for their service defines cyberspace as including the cognitive domain. For that service, it is not just the hardware, but the information that crosses the hardware, and the impact this information has on the thinking of those who receive it.
This re-definition is appropriate. For years, social science researchers have been interviewing Al Qaeda adherents and Taliban in northeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. Consistently they find that much of Al Qaeda’s success in recruiting is from the internet. Social networking as well as a realm of integrated extremist web sites serve to reinforce the views of those inclined to accept Al Qaeda’s ideology. News sites broadcast a slanted view of world events. Even the weather is distorted, with Hurricane Katrina describes as the finger of God wiping out the non-believers in the “Bible Belt” of the United States in retribution for the sins of the West. On these web sites are advertisements. Yes, you can “click here” to sign up to be a suicide bomber. Type in your name and address, and an Al Qaeda representative will come to your door, fit you for a vest, and tell you where to go to become a martyr. The conclusion of these researchers can be paraphrased as this. The war we are now fighting in Afghanistan is nothing more or less than the manifestation in physical space, of a lost war in cyberspace. The ultimate irony is that in this, the first real cyber war, the world’s most technologically advanced power may yet end up the loser – in part because we define this warfighting domain strictly as a bunch of hardware.
35. USAF Foundational Shifts Rise of ISR in Cyberspace As we look to the future, we believe this has profound effects on our way of thinking as to how we conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Today, the Department of Defense gathers much of its information through air and space-based platforms. As we move forward toward 2035, cyberspace will not only become more important to our situational awareness and understanding, it may well be more important than air and space combined. Just as crucial, cyberspace is an inexpensive domain in which to gather information, so anyone can do this, though sorting through the information to produce meaningful interpretations may be a more difficult undertaking.
As we look to the future, we believe this has profound effects on our way of thinking as to how we conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Today, the Department of Defense gathers much of its information through air and space-based platforms. As we move forward toward 2035, cyberspace will not only become more important to our situational awareness and understanding, it may well be more important than air and space combined. Just as crucial, cyberspace is an inexpensive domain in which to gather information, so anyone can do this, though sorting through the information to produce meaningful interpretations may be a more difficult undertaking.
36. USAF Foundational Shifts End of US Air, Space, Cyber Hegemony What this means for the Air Force is that what we have declared to be a central operating tenet of air, space, and cyber power – namely achieving “domain superiority,” will not be possible.
The spread of technology will level the battlefield. We will no longer be able to achieve dominance in these domains. Instead, we will need to revert back to how we thought during the two world wars. We will be able to temporarily attain degrees of domain control sufficient to accomplish a particular mission, but this control and our ability to achieve it will be fleeting. This is a different form of thinking than we, in the U.S., have had to engage in for nearly five decades. Yet, tactics and strategies with this as a premise will be required in the future.
Among the ways we will need to respond is to embrace less centralized control, as battlefield automation increases, the speed of decision-making quickens, and combat actions have to be made at faster speeds. The future will not give us the luxury of elevating every combat decision to the headquarters for adjudication.
In short, by 2035, dominance will no longer be possible; superiority will be fleeting; and the defense will be increasing in importance. What this means for the Air Force is that what we have declared to be a central operating tenet of air, space, and cyber power – namely achieving “domain superiority,” will not be possible.
The spread of technology will level the battlefield. We will no longer be able to achieve dominance in these domains. Instead, we will need to revert back to how we thought during the two world wars. We will be able to temporarily attain degrees of domain control sufficient to accomplish a particular mission, but this control and our ability to achieve it will be fleeting. This is a different form of thinking than we, in the U.S., have had to engage in for nearly five decades. Yet, tactics and strategies with this as a premise will be required in the future.
Among the ways we will need to respond is to embrace less centralized control, as battlefield automation increases, the speed of decision-making quickens, and combat actions have to be made at faster speeds. The future will not give us the luxury of elevating every combat decision to the headquarters for adjudication.
In short, by 2035, dominance will no longer be possible; superiority will be fleeting; and the defense will be increasing in importance.
37. It is here that we end the two deep dives into the technologies that we said would have impacts on how we develop train future airmen. The purpose of these deep dives was to better understand this future environment so that we could draw some conclusions.
As we looked at these two technologies, as well as similar developments in directed energy, space, nanotechnology, and other areas, our study generated some findings that we believe to be valid across the range of future environments we will face. It is here that we end the two deep dives into the technologies that we said would have impacts on how we develop train future airmen. The purpose of these deep dives was to better understand this future environment so that we could draw some conclusions.
As we looked at these two technologies, as well as similar developments in directed energy, space, nanotechnology, and other areas, our study generated some findings that we believe to be valid across the range of future environments we will face.
38. Findings Challenge: Compressing tech life cycle
We must move toward a one-year FYDP and a one-month POM, a one-week acquisition cycle with . . .
Continuous upgrades
Throw-away capabilities
“Any year” money
Evolve to a World War II cycle for major systems The first area in which we generated conclusions was in the area of acquisition. The technology life-cycle is compressing. Computers become obsolete in only a couple of years, as do the systems built based on them. An acquisition cycle based on 20 years development time for an ACAT I program is a path toward failure.
We conclude therefore, that the Air Force needs to move away from its five-year planning, reminiscent of the Soviet Era, and toward a more agile one-year fiscal year defense plan, a one-month program objective memorandum, and a one-week acquisition cycle with continuous upgrades, throw-away capabilities, using any-year money. In short, we need to evolve (or is it devolve) toward the type of system we had in World War II where new fighter aircraft routinely went from first pencil drawn sketch to initial operational capability of the first squadron in well under a year. Anything slower will not address the rapid pace of the future.The first area in which we generated conclusions was in the area of acquisition. The technology life-cycle is compressing. Computers become obsolete in only a couple of years, as do the systems built based on them. An acquisition cycle based on 20 years development time for an ACAT I program is a path toward failure.
We conclude therefore, that the Air Force needs to move away from its five-year planning, reminiscent of the Soviet Era, and toward a more agile one-year fiscal year defense plan, a one-month program objective memorandum, and a one-week acquisition cycle with continuous upgrades, throw-away capabilities, using any-year money. In short, we need to evolve (or is it devolve) toward the type of system we had in World War II where new fighter aircraft routinely went from first pencil drawn sketch to initial operational capability of the first squadron in well under a year. Anything slower will not address the rapid pace of the future.
39. Findings Challenge: R&D no longer driven by US government
Unable to fully follow and report on state of technical innovation outside the United States
Investment in basic research for military applications increasingly important
Next Manhattan Project: Develop the “Rosetta Stone” for the human genome (gene to function)
In the area of research and development, the study discovered, as we did in 2007, that the majority of research and development worldwide is done outside the U.S. In fact, less than 1/3 of all R&D is done inside the United States, and of that, only 30 percent is within the purview of the government. This suggests two things. First, the military must do a better job of keeping its proverbial pulse on the nature of changing technologies so that we can leverage our limited spending to move forward those technologies of military significance. In short, investment in basic research of militarily relevant technologies is where we will receive the best payback for our dollar. Secondly, a stable and fully funded R&D program is essential, as the government must be prepared for civilian technologies, developed without government funds, to be employed on future battlefields.
As was mentioned above, the finding on nanotechnological-engineered biological substances, both to treat illness and enhance performance; as well as to make people ill or reduce performance; is an area of such great importance to the medium-range future, that DOD ignores this area of research at its peril. The Rosetta-Stone for the human genome (gene-to-function mapping) should be the next “Manhattan Project.”
In the area of research and development, the study discovered, as we did in 2007, that the majority of research and development worldwide is done outside the U.S. In fact, less than 1/3 of all R&D is done inside the United States, and of that, only 30 percent is within the purview of the government. This suggests two things. First, the military must do a better job of keeping its proverbial pulse on the nature of changing technologies so that we can leverage our limited spending to move forward those technologies of military significance. In short, investment in basic research of militarily relevant technologies is where we will receive the best payback for our dollar. Secondly, a stable and fully funded R&D program is essential, as the government must be prepared for civilian technologies, developed without government funds, to be employed on future battlefields.
As was mentioned above, the finding on nanotechnological-engineered biological substances, both to treat illness and enhance performance; as well as to make people ill or reduce performance; is an area of such great importance to the medium-range future, that DOD ignores this area of research at its peril. The Rosetta-Stone for the human genome (gene-to-function mapping) should be the next “Manhattan Project.”
40. Findings In the area of future training to prepare our airmen for this future, we uncovered several findings.
The Air Force has a need to develop airmen who can thrive in an environment where surprise and change will be ubiquitous. These are people who have a broad range of knowledge and who can excel under an avalanche of data.
To find and train these people, genetic testing and cognitive testing will be needed to find those who will be best suited to this environment. These airmen will need to be challenged and evaluated at multiple points in their career to ensure we select only the best possible leaders for our senior positions.
Lastly, Air Education and Training Command will need to do more to leverage virtual technologies to train airmen to master complexity, whether it is in the cockpit of a fighter, in a bench-shop repairing avionics, patrolling the perimeter of an installation to protect from terrorists or intruders, or negotiating a contract with a people of different nationality and culture. By 2035, the era of the “holodeck” or something closely equivalent for training and simulation will have arrived. In the area of future training to prepare our airmen for this future, we uncovered several findings.
The Air Force has a need to develop airmen who can thrive in an environment where surprise and change will be ubiquitous. These are people who have a broad range of knowledge and who can excel under an avalanche of data.
To find and train these people, genetic testing and cognitive testing will be needed to find those who will be best suited to this environment. These airmen will need to be challenged and evaluated at multiple points in their career to ensure we select only the best possible leaders for our senior positions.
Lastly, Air Education and Training Command will need to do more to leverage virtual technologies to train airmen to master complexity, whether it is in the cockpit of a fighter, in a bench-shop repairing avionics, patrolling the perimeter of an installation to protect from terrorists or intruders, or negotiating a contract with a people of different nationality and culture. By 2035, the era of the “holodeck” or something closely equivalent for training and simulation will have arrived.
41. Findings Challenge: Air Force in danger of losing strategic relevance
Maintain offensive posture while increasing defensive capabilities
It’s a transparent world – AF must operate while hiding in plain sight
Systems engineering – apply technology faster than anyone
Cyber in 2035 will be radically different and it’s a race . . . AF must excel As we look toward 2035, there is a danger of the Air Force failing to adapt in a way to maintain its strategic relevance. In all three of our warfighting domains, we need to be able to maintain an offensive posture while increasing our defensive capabilities. The world of the future will be increasingly transparent, enabling earlier detection of strategic operations. The Air Force will need to develop tactics and strategy to hide in plain site, while preparing for operational combat.
As technologies advance at an ever increasing rate, one area the U.S. has traditionally excelled at is its ability to engineer systems faster and better than anyone else. This capability needs to remain in tact. If it does not, then qualitatively, there will be little to differentiate the Air Force of today from that of our adversaries. If such a day ever comes, then quantity will become as or more important than quality – and the U.S. would be on the losing side of that cost-benefit curve.
Lastly, it is key to this presentation to understand that cyberspace in 2035 is not merely better, it will be substantially different. Transparency and the ability to do “Angel Fire” from cyberspace means that the cost of entry will be very low, and the payback very high, for any adversary that can do this. This will become a race – for the cognitive domain – and we must win.
As we look toward 2035, there is a danger of the Air Force failing to adapt in a way to maintain its strategic relevance. In all three of our warfighting domains, we need to be able to maintain an offensive posture while increasing our defensive capabilities. The world of the future will be increasingly transparent, enabling earlier detection of strategic operations. The Air Force will need to develop tactics and strategy to hide in plain site, while preparing for operational combat.
As technologies advance at an ever increasing rate, one area the U.S. has traditionally excelled at is its ability to engineer systems faster and better than anyone else. This capability needs to remain in tact. If it does not, then qualitatively, there will be little to differentiate the Air Force of today from that of our adversaries. If such a day ever comes, then quantity will become as or more important than quality – and the U.S. would be on the losing side of that cost-benefit curve.
Lastly, it is key to this presentation to understand that cyberspace in 2035 is not merely better, it will be substantially different. Transparency and the ability to do “Angel Fire” from cyberspace means that the cost of entry will be very low, and the payback very high, for any adversary that can do this. This will become a race – for the cognitive domain – and we must win.
42. Findings Challenge: Keeping the force at the leading edge
Flexibility is no longer key to airpower . . . it is essential to Air Force survival
Mental Agility
Individual innovation
Rethink Risk: “Fail early, fail fast,” then win
More doctrine can limit flexibility
As stated above, the implications of all these changes reach to the very culture of the Air Force itself. Our traditional mantra, “Flexibility is the key to airpower,” is now an understatement. It is no longer merely key, it is essential to our survival as a service. To maintain this flexibility requires agility of thinking, individuals to be motivated, and for us to re-thing risk.
In this area of re-thinking risk, we need to get out of the mentality of “the one-mistake Air Force.” This is not to say that we allow crimes or negligence…but it is to say that we need to allow our airmen to risk new approaches, when they believe them appropriate, and try them without fear of retribution. At the same time, we need to educate and train them to recognize when a new approach is working and when it is not. In short, they should be able to try something new, if it fails – fail early and fast, and then recover from the failure and win.
We have also found that doctrine has become a barrier to flexibility. This is not because it was intended to be, but because doctrine is being misused. In the modern joint environment, Air Force culture is clashing with the culture of the Army, where doctrine is directive, and where deviations from doctrine are not permitted. This clash, and the experiences of working side-by-side with a sister service whose view of doctrine is inflexible, is creating a generation of airmen who are reluctant to innovate, and are thus are being hamstrung by doctrinal writings. We need to re-emphasize to our service that in the Air Force, doctrine is merely a collection of best practices from past conflicts. As such, it is a historical basis from which one can address a problem. If the situation at hand is not exactly like the past, then doctrine is merely authoritative – it is a reference, like an authoritative encyclopedia – it is something to be consulted, learned from, and, if not relevant, discarded. The study does not find that the Air Force needs to abandon doctrine or its creation, only that we need to abandon the methods with which doctrine is currently being used. As stated above, the implications of all these changes reach to the very culture of the Air Force itself. Our traditional mantra, “Flexibility is the key to airpower,” is now an understatement. It is no longer merely key, it is essential to our survival as a service. To maintain this flexibility requires agility of thinking, individuals to be motivated, and for us to re-thing risk.
In this area of re-thinking risk, we need to get out of the mentality of “the one-mistake Air Force.” This is not to say that we allow crimes or negligence…but it is to say that we need to allow our airmen to risk new approaches, when they believe them appropriate, and try them without fear of retribution. At the same time, we need to educate and train them to recognize when a new approach is working and when it is not. In short, they should be able to try something new, if it fails – fail early and fast, and then recover from the failure and win.
We have also found that doctrine has become a barrier to flexibility. This is not because it was intended to be, but because doctrine is being misused. In the modern joint environment, Air Force culture is clashing with the culture of the Army, where doctrine is directive, and where deviations from doctrine are not permitted. This clash, and the experiences of working side-by-side with a sister service whose view of doctrine is inflexible, is creating a generation of airmen who are reluctant to innovate, and are thus are being hamstrung by doctrinal writings. We need to re-emphasize to our service that in the Air Force, doctrine is merely a collection of best practices from past conflicts. As such, it is a historical basis from which one can address a problem. If the situation at hand is not exactly like the past, then doctrine is merely authoritative – it is a reference, like an authoritative encyclopedia – it is something to be consulted, learned from, and, if not relevant, discarded. The study does not find that the Air Force needs to abandon doctrine or its creation, only that we need to abandon the methods with which doctrine is currently being used.
43. Findings Challenge: Leaders require more strategic breadth in The Age of Surprise
Traditional education approach falls short
History and current events adequate
Study of future political, economic and military disciplines lacking
Little technology or impact of exponential change covered
Technology is the engine of AF power, but we lack commitment in personnel and resources to teach future studies
In the area of education, the study concludes that while the historic methods of educating airmen have served us well in the past, these traditional approaches will not suffice in the future. The existing emphasis in historical case studies at the various professional military education institutions is adequate and need not be altered. However, the study of future military, political, and economic disciplines is lacking. Future studies is now a recognized academic discipline, and if we are to prepare our airmen for the future, then these studies need to be incorporated into the educational growth of Air Force personnel throughout their career.
Further, in an era of exponential technological change, our education needs to broaden our airmen’s understanding of emerging technologies and the opportunities and threats they pose. As this study examined the faculty of the leading educational institutions across DOD, if finds a lack of qualified personnel and resources to teach either the future studies or technology aspects that will be so central to the Air Force of the future.In the area of education, the study concludes that while the historic methods of educating airmen have served us well in the past, these traditional approaches will not suffice in the future. The existing emphasis in historical case studies at the various professional military education institutions is adequate and need not be altered. However, the study of future military, political, and economic disciplines is lacking. Future studies is now a recognized academic discipline, and if we are to prepare our airmen for the future, then these studies need to be incorporated into the educational growth of Air Force personnel throughout their career.
Further, in an era of exponential technological change, our education needs to broaden our airmen’s understanding of emerging technologies and the opportunities and threats they pose. As this study examined the faculty of the leading educational institutions across DOD, if finds a lack of qualified personnel and resources to teach either the future studies or technology aspects that will be so central to the Air Force of the future.
44. From these findings the study has distilled a list of specific recommendations for the Air Force to pursue.From these findings the study has distilled a list of specific recommendations for the Air Force to pursue.
45. What This All Means As reminder, this study was not constructed to ask for money, or to propose the purchase of new systems. It’s purpose was to propose a way ahead to foster a new way of thinking to keep our airmen cognitively capable of handling the rapid changes that will occur over the next 20-30 years. In some respects, this minor philosophical change may be more difficult to manage than a new system, but it is far more important.As reminder, this study was not constructed to ask for money, or to propose the purchase of new systems. It’s purpose was to propose a way ahead to foster a new way of thinking to keep our airmen cognitively capable of handling the rapid changes that will occur over the next 20-30 years. In some respects, this minor philosophical change may be more difficult to manage than a new system, but it is far more important.
46. Recommendations Operations: Define Cyber more broadly - not just about electrons - it also includes focused operations against cognitive-social networks
Acquisition: AF in 2035 will fail with the current system . . . need rapid prototype, short operational life strategy
R&D: Next Manhattan Project . . . develop the gene to function “Rosetta Stone” for the human genome
AF Culture: Establish agile doctrinal process reflecting rapidly changing nature of threats
Training: Invest in advanced tools and technologies to better prepare them for their role as strategic Airmen
Education: Make future studies a keystone of AF education . . . produce officers who innovate and thrive on change
In the end, the study participants have six concrete recommendations for the Air Force:
In the area of operations, the Air Force needs to begin by defining cyberspace as much more than merely the hardware and software. This is a warfighting domain, but the domain includes cognitive and social networks. The hardware and software is merely the means to access them, just as aircraft are a means to access the air domain. We don’t define the air domain as restricted to the interior of our aircraft, neither should we define the cyber domain as nodes, wires, and networks.
In the area of Acquisition, we must abandon the current system in favor of a system which rapidly prototypes new operational systems, with the expectation that they will have a short operational life span. In a world of exponential technological change, acquisition strategies of ACAT I programs that take 20 years to conclude means guaranteed obsolescence of warfighting systems long before they reach the warfighter.
The U.S. government needs to initiate a major research effort to develop the gene-to-function Rosetta Stone for the human genome. Once this is complete, we also need to use this data to develop the ability to rapidly decode the genetic code of genetic pharmaceuticals as well as bio-engineered pathogens, and rapidly prototype vaccines for these pathogens in time spans of hours, not months as is currently the case.
The Air Force needs an agile doctrinal process that updates doctrine on a far more rapid basis than is currently the case. As this study goes to press, the AF Doctrine Center under the leadership of Major General Stephen Miller has not produced a single publication in nearly two years. A doctrinal system operating at such a glacial pace is insufficiently responsive for the needs of the future.
Air Education and Training Command needs to invest in advanced virtual reality tools to enhance the realism of training environments for everything from flying aircraft, to maintenance, security forces, as well as negotiations. Immersive environments for training need to be available for every specialty. These simulations need to prepare future airmen for the potential for cultural and technological surprise.
Lastly, the Department of Defense in general and Air University in particular, needs to make “future studies” a key core component of the professional military education curriculum for every airman. As change, societal and technological, increases in speed and scope, our educational courses need to prepare future airmen by forcing them to look ahead toward the future, which is where they will spend the rest of their careers.
If we, as an Air Force, do these things, then our culture, our systems, and our airmen will be as prepared as they can be to accept and conquer the challenges that await them in the year 2035.In the end, the study participants have six concrete recommendations for the Air Force:
In the area of operations, the Air Force needs to begin by defining cyberspace as much more than merely the hardware and software. This is a warfighting domain, but the domain includes cognitive and social networks. The hardware and software is merely the means to access them, just as aircraft are a means to access the air domain. We don’t define the air domain as restricted to the interior of our aircraft, neither should we define the cyber domain as nodes, wires, and networks.
In the area of Acquisition, we must abandon the current system in favor of a system which rapidly prototypes new operational systems, with the expectation that they will have a short operational life span. In a world of exponential technological change, acquisition strategies of ACAT I programs that take 20 years to conclude means guaranteed obsolescence of warfighting systems long before they reach the warfighter.
The U.S. government needs to initiate a major research effort to develop the gene-to-function Rosetta Stone for the human genome. Once this is complete, we also need to use this data to develop the ability to rapidly decode the genetic code of genetic pharmaceuticals as well as bio-engineered pathogens, and rapidly prototype vaccines for these pathogens in time spans of hours, not months as is currently the case.
The Air Force needs an agile doctrinal process that updates doctrine on a far more rapid basis than is currently the case. As this study goes to press, the AF Doctrine Center under the leadership of Major General Stephen Miller has not produced a single publication in nearly two years. A doctrinal system operating at such a glacial pace is insufficiently responsive for the needs of the future.
Air Education and Training Command needs to invest in advanced virtual reality tools to enhance the realism of training environments for everything from flying aircraft, to maintenance, security forces, as well as negotiations. Immersive environments for training need to be available for every specialty. These simulations need to prepare future airmen for the potential for cultural and technological surprise.
Lastly, the Department of Defense in general and Air University in particular, needs to make “future studies” a key core component of the professional military education curriculum for every airman. As change, societal and technological, increases in speed and scope, our educational courses need to prepare future airmen by forcing them to look ahead toward the future, which is where they will spend the rest of their careers.
If we, as an Air Force, do these things, then our culture, our systems, and our airmen will be as prepared as they can be to accept and conquer the challenges that await them in the year 2035.
47. Backup
48. Areas for Additional Research Nano and Bio-technologies – surge in research is not reflected in AFRL, AF/A8, or AU concepts
Etho-cognitive Artificial Intelligence
Pharmo-genetics
Alternative energy sources and solutions
Organizing the AF for operations in 2035 and beyond
Personal Loyalty or Competence? – finding, growing, and promoting future AF leaders
49. The Road Ahead Blue Horizons IV – Exponential technological change in the world of 2035
Deterring hostile nations, groups and individuals
Employing highly advanced disruptive technologies
New threats to national survival
Publish results of Blue Horizons III
Develop a research plan for Blue Horizons V
