Agenda

1. SCWMD/T 13-5Topic # 4:Assessment of the Proliferation Security Initiative’s (PSI) ability to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials

2. Agenda • Origins • Overview • Positives & Negatives • Measures of Success • Summary & Conclusions

3. Background • On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea • The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas. • The boarding party found Scud missiles, warheads, and fuel. • The boarding was legal but the Spanish authorities had no legal basis to seize the cargo, and the ship was allowed to continue and deliver its cargo to Yemen. • This incident preceded the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative

4. PSI Overview • Launched May 31, 2003. • The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern • PSI provides committed states with a framework for strengthening counter proliferation capabilities and is a state-to-state cooperation enabler • Participants agreed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (adopted in Sept, 2003) that identifies specific steps participants can take to effectively interdict WMD-related shipments and prevent proliferation

5. PSI Interdiction Principles • PSI participants are committed to: • Interdicting transfers of WMD and WMD-related material • Streamlining information exchange • Strengthening national legal authorities to facilitate interdiction • Taking specific actions in support of other interdiction efforts • Overall goals: • Stop shipments of WMD and WMD-related materials • Make proliferation more costly and more difficult for the proliferators • Reveal covert proliferation behavior and networks

6. PSI: A political commitment by 102 endorsing nations A flexible arrangement of international cooperation A robust capacity-building program Over 60 exercises involving over 70 nations Regular meetings of operational experts to share best practices Builds relationships through bilateral and regional engagement Based on voluntary, national actions Consistent with domestic and international legal authorities and frameworks PSI Is • A legally-binding, rules-based regime • A source of new authorities to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials • Administered by a Secretariat nor governed by consensus • A coordinator of real-world interdictions PSI Is Not

7. Afghanistan Albania Andorra Angola Antigua/Barbuda* Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas* Bahrain Belarus Belgium Belize* Bosnia Brunei Bulgaria Cambodia Canada Chile Colombia Croatia* Cyprus* PSI Endorsing States • 25. Czech Republic • 26.Denmark • Djibouti • Dominica • Dominican Republic • 30. El Salvador • 31. Estonia • 32. Fiji • 33. Finland • 34. France • 35. Georgia • 36. Germany • 37. Greece • 38. Holy See • 39. Honduras • 40. Hungary • 41. Iceland • 42. Iraq • 43. Ireland • 44. Israel • 45. Italy • 46. Japan • 47. Jordan • 48. Kazakhstan • 49. Kuwait • 50. Kyrgyzstan • 51. Latvia • 52. Liberia* • 53.Libya • 54. Liechtenstein • 55. Lithuania • 56. Luxembourg • 57. Macedonia • 58. Malta* • 59. Marshall Islands* • 60. Moldova • 61. Mongolia* • 62. Montenegro • 63. Morocco • 64. The Netherlands • 65. New Zealand • 66 Norway • 67. Oman • 68. Panama* • 69. Papua New Guinea • 70. Paraguay • 71. Philippines • 72. Poland • 73. Portugal • 74. Qatar • 75. Romania • 76. Russia • 77. Samoa • 78. San Marino • 79. Saudi Arabia • 80. Serbia • 81. Singapore • 82. Slovakia • 83. Slovenia • 84. South Korea • 85. Spain • 86. Sri Lanka • 87. St. Lucia • 88. St. Vincent/Grenadines* • 89. Sweden • 90. Switzerland • Tajikistan • Thailand • 93. Tunisia • 94. Turkey • 95. Turkmenistan • 96. Ukraine • 97. United Arab Emirates • 98. United Kingdom • 99. United States • 100. Uzbekistan • 101. Vanuatu • 102. Yemen Bold = Operational Experts Group / *Shipboarding Agreement

8. PSI Positives • There is a close and complementary relationship between UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and PSI • The United States has worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern • PSI participants have conducted over 60 interdiction exercise since the initiative’s inception. The exercises are intended to increase the participants' capabilities and to facilitate cooperation with one another • Indirectly, PSI has strengthened alliances and could be argued to have eased tensions thereby creating endorsement of international agreements for embargoes and sanctions against proliferators • PSI participants played an instrumental role in the adoption of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 SUA Protocol) that came into force on 28 July 2010

9. PSI Negatives • PSI’s lack of formal organization and sustained leadership is viewed by some as a weakness • PSI does not provide actual authorities for interdiction above national and international laws • PSI is a non-binding agreement that doesn't establish task forces or combined joint operations; it merely facilitates agreements between like minded nations to ease interdiction approval • There are a number of key nations that have not endorsed the PSI and sit astride key shipping lanes and/or are important players in global maritime commerce • There are several reasons for some states’ reluctance to become PSI partners. Most importantly, non-participating states continue to have concerns about the legality of interdiction operations. They worry that, in the course of interdiction, PSI participants could infringe on their sovereignty, especially the right of innocent passage

10. PSI Measures of Success • Develops national and international counter proliferation capacities and capabilities • Sends a strategic message to proliferators and those that support proliferation activities • Reaches out to nations that have not yet endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles

11. Summary/Conclusions • PSI’s impact cannot be measured by interdictions. In many cases, countries take action and the results are not published. Many successful interdictions are kept confidential. Often, interdictions are accomplished without boarding or military confrontation. • The errors associated with M/V So San interdiction would not be repeated today because of the numerous national and international legal authorities that prohibit proliferation such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1540. • The original PSI goal of supplementing other non-proliferation regimes is still valid. The effective conduct of interdiction operations still remains of crucial importance. There also remains a need to dissuade state and non-state actors from engaging in proliferation activities by making the transport of proliferation-related material more risky, costly and less legitimate. • Although the PSI has become a useful platform for promoting enhanced common standards, not all PSI participating states have in place the national legislation that would allow land, sea and air interdiction to the extent permitted by international norms.