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Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information for a Canadian Brigade

Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information for a Canadian Brigade. Fred Cameron and Roger Roy Operational Research Team Kingston, Canada. Introduction. 1997 -- LGen Jeffery (Commander of the Army) established “Future Army Team” in Kingston

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Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information for a Canadian Brigade

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  1. Five Years of Development of New Sources of Information for a Canadian Brigade Fred Cameron and Roger Roy Operational Research Team Kingston, Canada

  2. Introduction • 1997 -- LGen Jeffery (Commander of the Army) established “Future Army Team” in Kingston • Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) • Operational Research Team (from Operational Research Division - ORD, Ottawa) • Scientific Advisor • Army Experimentation Centre (AEC) • Army Simulation Centre (ASC) • Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) • Royal Military College • Concepts of Command, Command Support, and ISTAR • DAD tasked OR Team and AEC to • Study implications of introducing advanced sensors

  3. Command and Command Support • Military Command • Leading, decision-making, motivating, directing • Vision, understanding, art, assessing, evaluating • Command Support • “Integrated system of resources to enable Command” • Information Management • Collection, processing, storing, displaying, disseminating • System Management • Policies, procedures, tools, personnel, structures

  4. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance ISTAR • To integrate the intelligence process with the surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets in order to improve the Commander’s Situational Awareness (SA) and to cue manoeuvre and strike assets. • ISTAR is fully integrated with the Land Force Command and Control Information System • ISTAR is a component of Command Support

  5. Army Experiment 1Integration and ManagementISTAR sensors • Seminar War Game • Previous Results – Reassess: • Composition of Recce, ISTAR • Counter-recce, UAVs, Logistics • Main Issues: • Doctrine, Organization • Passage of Information • Materiel, Training • Modeling and Simulation • R&D

  6. Army Experiment 2Anti-Personnel Mine Replacement • ModSAF • Modeling of entities as expected • Results: • No significant C2 component • Discussion of issues like: • morale • unit cohesion • leadership skills

  7. Army Experiment 3SAS User Trial • Ease of use and utility of Situational Awareness System (SAS) in field environment • Direct observation, Interviews, Questionnaires, and Focus Group (AAR) • 3 Key Functions • Ability to send traces and overlays • Ability to pass Op Orders, Reports and Returns • Tracking of friendly and enemy locations

  8. Army Experiment 4Brigade ISTAR Organization • A-Status Quo • B-ISTAR Coordination Centre • C-ISTAR Unit • Results • Red situational awareness – A weakest, B and C equal • Detections – Higher for B and C • Recce Casualties –Lower for B and C • Recommendations • Longer and different scenarios needed • Battle Procedures/Battlefield Management System • Need to assess sensor-to-shooter links • Actual brigade commander and staff as players

  9. Army Experiment 5LAV III in Company and Combat Team • Combination of constructive and (subsequent) live trials • First major ModSAF experiment • 3D visualization, data capture tools (ModIOS) • Data Analysis, Questionnaires, AARs • LAV III provides a significant enhancement to both offensive and defensive operations.

  10. Army Experiment 6Land Force Command and Control Information System (LFC2IS) at Battle Group and Brigade Tactics Techniques and Procedures validated in user trials • AE6A: 1-week Ex Sleeping Tiger at battle-group level in March 2001 • ModSAF used to stimulate SAS through SATIDS • SAS displays similar to actual operations • AE6B: 2-week Ex Athene Warrior at brigade-group level in May 2002 • Command and Staff Trainer (CAST) used to stimulate Athene Tactical System (ATS) through VCCI

  11. Army Experiment 7AERSTA in a Helo Recce Section

  12. Army Experiment 7A (cont) • Evaluation of Electro-optical Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (ERSTA) on Griffon Helicopters • 2 × ERSTA significantly improved: • Number of detections • Rate of detections • Quantity and quality of situational awareness • Survivability of helicopters and ground troops

  13. LAV III/Leopard Field Trials • Many lessons learned • Better experimental methods • Impact of M&S on future combat dev. • MAIS runs showed: • Value of force-on-force training • Better understanding of LAV capability • Location of commanders and succession issues

  14. Coalition Interoperability Demonstration BOREALIS • ABCA biennial interoperability exercise • America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand • Technical testing of Comms and Information Systems (CIS) • Over 400 soldiers and civilian technicians • Results • Comms links worked as advertised, or • Minor adjustments in settings/procedures, or • Need to address changes (equipment, training,…)

  15. Other Experimentation • Feb 1998: Exercise BROAD PAWS • Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts • June 2001: Operations in the Extended Battlespace 2020 • April 2002: Operations in Urban Terrain 2020

  16. Interface Constructive, Virtual & Live Simulations Stage 3: Virtual Simulation Stage 2: Stimulate Operational Systems (ie AE6A, 6B) Field Trial (ie AE7A Griffon/ERSTA) Experimentation Capability Stage 1- Constructive Simulation Only ModSAF (ie AE 2, 4, 5)

  17. “System of Systems”

  18. Specification Error Measurement Error Error Error Error Complexity Complexity Complexity Model Error Models, Complexity, and Error Minimize Model Error

  19. Specification Error Measurement Error Error Error Error Complexity Complexity Complexity Model Error Minimize Model Error Models, Complexity, and Error

  20. The Decision Making Process

  21. The Operational Planning Process

  22. 3 2 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 Critical Path Analysis

  23. Lessons from Five Years • NATO Code of Best Practice invaluable! • Scenarios critical at each stage • Keep M&S as simple as possible • “Value of information” better understood now than in 1997… but “more work needed” • Mixture of OR Techniques is required: • constructive, virtual, and live simulation • data collection: judgements and insights, as well as ‘numbers’

  24. Questions?

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