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PES and Governance

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  1. PES and Governance Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

  2. Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales • CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design • If not, extremely difficult

  3. Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance • CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years. • We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve. • We have theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well • However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that: • Elites tend to benefit from the status quo (oppose changes) • Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so) • Tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself. • Therefore need to protecting the procedural conditions tfor effective function and evolution of CBNRM. • i.e. protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.

  4. Principles • ECONOMIC: The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS) • POLITICAL: The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them

  5. International Macro Level National State/Provincial Property rights push the locus of power towards the local level ‘Governance’ is the linkage between these different levels of public and civil society entities Civil Society District/Municipal Meso Level Cooperative/Multi- community Local/Community Micro Level Household

  6. Governance & Enabling Environment International • Weak conceptual understanding, within historically and site specific circumstances. • Biggest challenges to success: • incompetence / disinterest • defense of status quo National State/Provincial Civil Society District/Municipal Cooperative/Multi- community Governance of Local Collective Action Strong, widely applicable conceptual and operational model/s High probability of success Local/Community Household

  7. Quality wildlife resources CBNRM in Luangwa: Institutional Lessons

  8. CBNRM in Luangwa, Zambia (NORAD Project) • South Luangwa National Park • 9,050km2 • 9,000 elephants • Costs USD1m / year • Income USD850,000 • Lupande GMA • Six chiefs (4,500km2) • 50,000 people • Six Community Resource Boards • 45 Village Action Groups • Two hunting concessions • Earning USD 230,000 annually South Luangwa National Park

  9. Harsh Climate • Floods • Droughts • Disease

  10. Community Development Programme: Top Down Phase • Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”) • 40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community • But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by them and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not involved) • Did 36 different projects in community: • Women’s programme (chickens) • Roads • Infrastructure / buildings • Culling • Bus service • Tourism and hunting managed by project • Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive funding

  11. When I arrived in 1996: • People did not understand the Project • Very low perception of benefit • Conflict/suspicion over project implementation Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to village level (80%) of income

  12. Resistance to Devolution by “Losers” Revenue distribution meetings held in Malama But chief rejects programme

  13. Success in Chivyololo

  14. Innovations: Mechanisms of Constituent Accountability Recognition that devolution is a RIGOROUS process “Loose-tight” principles • Constitutions • Accounts • Records of decisions

  15. Constituency Accountability Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly)

  16. Innovations: Self Managed Revenue Distribution

  17. The tight part (i.e. procedural) of loose-tight management (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

  18. Community Projects

  19. Investing in Wildlife Management

  20. Financial Flows in CBNRM First Generation CBNRM FIRST GENERATION PERFORMANCE METRICS SECOND GENERATION Participation 100’s 75-100,000 Benefits Few, public 20,500 people got cash Central Government Projects 10? 230+ Local Government 40-80% money missing Accountability 0.8% -86% Attitudes to wildlife +90% Representational Democracy 0% Investment in wildlife 18% of income down Wildlife trends Stable/up Participatory Democracy Second Generation CBNRM

  21. Single versus Multiple Villages Defining local regimes According to Madison/ de Tocqueville: • A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government) • A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons • Multi-Village community • Indirect or representational governance • Single Village • Direct/participatory democracy/ accountability

  22. Real Life Implications Preliminary data from CBNRM (next slide) is intriguing. Suggests Madison’s dichotomy is critical to success

  23. Participatory Governance Representational Governance Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??

  24. The effects of full face-to-face participation Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice) • Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits • This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville) • Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?

  25. CBNRM 2.0 (second generation) • This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability. • There are several critical changes: • Money goes to individuals, and then flows upwards through collective agreement • This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents • An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below) • Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities) • This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information • The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

  26. Sequencing Scale GLOBAL REGIONAL Scaling process is critical: • Scale down by devolving rights • Scale up through upward delegation • Avoid appropriation of rights Read Murphree (2000) NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL Province/State/Department District/County/Traditional Area Scale Down (devolve rights) Community Scaling Up Village Household

  27. I’ve included more detailed notes and recommendations on CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

  28. The Enabling Environment:some preliminary lessons

  29. Some early hints at what a CBNRM enabling environment is • National process work in impersonal states • May need to rely on projects in personalized (neo-patrimonial states) where scaling up is challenging • Legislated use rights (benefit, manage, allocate, sell) critical. Can pilot with project agreements (but vulnerable) • Continuity of champions • Protect conditions for emergence • Inter-disciplinary experience and advice • Innovation requires trust • Pilots critical (pilots lead policy) • Learning through communities of practice Long-term, persistent, consistent facilitation  Aborted devolution

  30. More hints for enabling environments • Donors – variability in outcomes • Design (often flawed; locally envisaged programs worked best) • Tenacity (seldom present) • But financing, political role, can be used positively • Associations invaluable: • Political (e.g. CAMPFIRE Association) • Technical (e.g. CCG, NACSO) • Responsible Research adds value (but research often an irritant) • Need meso-organization (still lots to learn): • Role of local government (district councils) a two-edge sword • Sustainability of NGO support organizations • Capacity-building • Process often misunderstood and badly designed = wasteful, expensive • Across-scale, experiential learning highly effective

  31. REDD – opportunity or threat?

  32. REDD • New resource – limited vested interested allows us to do it properly • But objectives very unclear, and seems to be driven top down with too little listening to landholders and communities • If done properly, could contribute to environment, development, governance: • Land recovery (biodiversity, productivity, carbon) • Improve livelihoods in marginal areas • Incentivize improved governance (build “hollow states” from the bottom up)

  33. Forest Tenure: Who ‘owns’ the World’s Forests? Rights critical to success but unclear and disputed M has M has Africa Latin America African data appears to ignore customary tenure rights? • Gov’t ……………….Owned and Administered by Government • Public-Comm ……Community has usufruct rights (Gov’t owned) • Private-Comm ….Owned by communities and indigenous peoples • Private-Indiv ……..Owned by Individuals or Firms [Sunderlin, Hatcher and Liddle 2008]

  34. Governance in Countries with 10 largest oil reserves (The Resource Curse) Money that flows top-down from a single source => governance problems 90% of these countries ranked in the lowest 1/3 in terms of Governance Oil Reserve Data from: http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countries Governance Indicator Data from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

  35. How do we avoid a Tragedy of the Global Carbon Commons? • Tragedy of the commons occurs in open access situations • Many of the commons situations envisaged by Hardin are in fact subject to rules – local, communal and national • What are the rules and structures that exist to govern Carbon? • Governance = structure and processes that link the macro- with the meso- and micro-levels of NRM

  36. Carbon Governance Mechanisms – Global to Local International UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol • UN Declarations • human rights • civil/political rights • ILO 169 • Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) Regional Inter-American Court of Human Rights Inter-American Commission of Human Rights National Case Law Human Right to Property (Mabo Case) Constitution SocialFunction Doctrine Complex – can we start with very simple and clear goals? Community CBOs CAMPFIRE Conservancies

  37. [RRI 2008]

  38. Conclusion • REDD attaches new value to forests • Threat of elite land speculation • Governance structures/processes need to be developed for REDD • - transparent, accountable, participatory, legitimate • Who makes the new rules? Where is the landholder voice? • Carbon raises all the same concerns and opportunities as CBNRM Thanks to RRI for their support

  39. GOVERNANCE/SCALE ISSUES GLOBAL Accounting REGIONAL • Baseline • Additionality • Distribution • Monitoring NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL Province/State/Department District/County/Traditional Area Community • Projects (low national capacity, • initial pilot startups) Scaling Up Village • Issues: • Size/Pop Density? • tenure security • perverse incentives • capacity building Household

  40. Summary Results of CBNRM Assessment and Priority Recommendations

  41. Overall Findings (2) • Single Village CBOs work far better than multi-village CBOs • CBOs lack procedural guidelines • Large, unsatisfied demand for technical support / information • Managers, on the whole, working well (need technical support, socialization in empowering communities, protection)

  42. Critical Areas for Improvement • Governance, accountability and participation of people (including finances) is weak especially in multi-village CBOs • Benefits at household level far too low (ratio of overhead to benefit is FAR too high)

  43. Overall Judgment

  44. Key Recommendations (1) A. Institutional Design • Break multi-villages up into single villages • Set guidelines for constitutions and for procedural conformance • Monitor conformance

  45. Key Recommendations (2) B. Devolved Capacity • Support and oversee marketing (database, facilitation, training) • Develop participatory revenue allocation and accountability systems • Experiment with participatory quota-setting (and set goals for wildlife monitoring and management responsibilities) • Develop stronger national and internal-CBO information systems

  46. Key Recommendations (3) C. Enabling Environment and Support Agencies • Develop MET capacity for: • Adaptive policy formulation • Conformance monitoring • Develop producer association/s • right to levy communities • provided they fulfill key functions: • Political representation • Peer-based monitoring (Grameen Bank) • Information (capacity-building) • Develop capacity for capacity-building. How?? Who ?? • Independent monitoring and research (adaptive management model?)

  47. Building Capacity through Procedural Conformance Government should monitor procedural conformance to ensure • Full participation and democracy, • Equity, • Transparency and accountability, • Protect the weak against the serious threat of elite capture Hence Capacity-building should focus on: • Sound constitutions and awareness of them • Information flow • Participatory financial allocation and accountability

  48. Conformance Criteria • Budget properly discussed, presented and agreed by whole community • Proper financial and technical general meetings every quarter, well attended • Quarterly financial reports are accurate, follow budget, low variance, no misuse • Annual audit presented to community and approved by them (as an activity-based budget) • Annual/biannual elections Only approve quota / payments on receipt of conformance audit (not just a financial one)

  49. Technical Recommendations for CBO Management • Improve participation and transparency in financial allocation and control • Participatory financial management (budgeting, control) • Use PRA communication techniques to make financial decisions • Quarterly variance analysis • Improve information through carefully planned quarterly meetings • Organize financial information to reflect benefits, overheads, investments • Define roles and procedures in small manuals