Promoting Stability in Liberia: A Security Sector Capacity Building Strategy (SSCB) 2014-2018

1. Security Sector Capacity Building (SSCB) Republic of Liberia as a Case Study SSCB14-1 (Seminars 1 & 4)

2. Aim • To present a strategy which will promote stability in Liberia, using a Security Sector Capacity Building (SSCB) development framework from 2014 -2018

3. Overall Threats • Terrorism in Mali via Guinea • Multiple fragility points • Guinea & Ivory Coast’s elections • Piracy, organized crime and porous borders with Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast & Guinea • Soldiers of fortune

4. Threat Analysis Global & Regional • Terrorism in the AQIM, which changes the MRU security strategy • Instability in the sub-region Sub-Regional • Instability in neighboring countries (internal conflict backed by neighbors, refugees from neighbors, undue influence, etc.) • Business interests by MNCs (diamonds, oil, lumber, iron ore, etc.) Internal Threats • Extremely fragmented society (ethnic, religious, political, urban/rural, etc.) • Land disputes • Widespread corruption • Poverty, unemployment, poor health and education system, sensitive demographic structure • Poor central government authority and capacity • Gender-based violence and discrimination • Lawlessness undermines public confidence in the security sector/security forces predatory towards civilians

5. Functions of Stability • SSR Concerns • President (leadership) • Parliament (lack of diverse representation) • Armed Forces of Liberia (capabilities) • Liberian National Police/Monrovia City Police • Intelligence Institutions (bilateral developments) • Judicial, legal and correctional institutions • Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization

6. Gaps • President and Parliament • Nepotism • Corruption • Oversight • Police • Not well-trained and equipped • Lack of resources outside Monrovia (4`500/8`000) • Progress made under UN Lead • 150 graduated (46 Women) • Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization • Not properly paid/training/laws

7. Gaps • Armed Forces • Not fully operational (expected by 2014) • Insufficiency of financial, operational, logistical • means • Dependency on external support • Not trained • Judicial, legal and correctional institutions • Lack of trained judges, prosecutors & lawyers • Timely case management is still a challenge • Infrastructure of prisons and correctional institutions is fragile

8. Gaps • Human Rights • Police brutality • Predatory policing • Mob justice • Gender violence/discrimination (rapes, assaults, etc.) • Humanitarian Situation • 60,000 refugees from Cote d`Ivoire • 80 % Live below poverty line • 85 % Unemployed • 35 % Insufficient food

9. Gaps

10. Functional Analyses Gap Analyses • Political: Poor leadership , heightened political turmoil • Economic: Increasing prices, significant unemployment • Rule of Law: Lawlessness impedes humanrights (women, children) • Governance: Projects are yet to reach the rural people, poor and women cratic Deficit • Party patronage & trust in leadership • Presidential election approaching • More space for democratic practice cratic Deficit • Price increase of food • Unemployment • Food production & Roads • Improving on exports • Trust in LNP & AFL • Local courts in rural areas • Roads to rural areas • Lack of capacity • Deliver rule of law • Poor road conditions for elections • Sensitization visits upcountry • Customary law visits Note: Activities are iterative

11. SSCB Strategy • Vision • Reintegration of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons • Robust Rule of Law (whole-of-government approach) • De-politicization of all sectorsGoals • Peace (sustainable) • Oversight • Education • Infrastructure • Economy • Employment • Strategy: Promotestability in Liberia to allow human development through justice and social delivery by 2015 (UN transition)

12. Objectives & Outputs • Analysis and research for policy development (link DDR, SSR & SSCB to development of national security strategy) • Peace & stability • Mainstreaming gender and information exchange • Key Stakeholders • UNDP, UNMIL, multiple countries, ECOWAS, MRU and the civil society, including the 4th Estate

13. Anti-Corruption Commission Crosscutting Issues

14. Implementation Plan (In priority/time order) • Establish anti-corruption commission/committee • Employ a local consultant (to write a draft strategy) • Appoint a Liberian Steering Committee: NSC, MoD, MIA(working groups) • Appoint a resident commissioner for SSCB • Steering Committee to write: Communication Strategy & Development Framework in consultation with donors & private sector • Identify pillars to drive the strategy with pillar goals (5 pillars) • Distribute themes to coordinated donors • Do the resources plan: money, staff, funding & time with donors • Identify communication infrastructure improvements (feasible) • Presidential approval • Brief the Commission (twice weekly) • Coordinate and brief the population: All “peace actors” • Follow the change management {International Security Assistance Team (ISAT) theory}

15. Development Framework

16. Sustainability Strategy • SSCB must be continuouslyassessed • Local dev (PRSP) & SSCB • The ISAT theory • Public oversight ss RoL ISAT& PRSP SUPERVISION ($) ? rolReintegration SSR DDR ROL Capacity building - Peace & Stability - RoL Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration Decision Point A Decision Points B Decision Point C Who stays behind ?

17. Monitoring, Review and Evaluation • Monitoring & Evaluation structure is established • NSC/SSR Commissioner briefs National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) monthly • NSC 2-weekly with local stakeholders in attendance • Donor meeting(s) held at the NSC • End of year symposium on achievements on SSCB • SSCPB projects • Resource allocation • PRSP vs. SSCB • ISAT shadow theory • Change strategy

18. Conclusion • Communication • Cooperation • Collaboration • Consensus • Coordination at the grassroots level • Mutual transparency