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A History of the Early HST Bob O’Dell STScI -21 April 2006. A highly personal version of the history of the program up through launch. 1923. Hermann Oberth publishes “Die Rakete zu den Planetenraumen” In this small book he elucidates most of the modern reasons for putting telescopes in space.
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A History of the Early HSTBob O’DellSTScI -21 April 2006 A highly personal version of the history of the program up through launch.
1923 • Hermann Oberth publishes “Die Rakete zu den Planetenraumen” • In this small book he elucidates most of the modern reasons for putting telescopes in space.
1946 • The first “Think-Tank”, the RAND corporation commissions a study of potential uses of rockets. • Lyman Spitzer, then a 32 year old professor at Yale is included. • In his study he proposes building space observatories, leading up to something very similar to today’s HST.
Earliest Years • 1957 Soviets launch Sputnik. • 1958 NASA created as the civilian space agency to counter the Soviets. • 1962 The NAS’s SSB identifies as a goal for NASA the creation of a large space observatory.
Early Astronomical Satellites • The OAO series was the first large astronomy satellites. • They employed a common outer support-systems module with different astronomy instruments inside. • OAO-A2 launched in 1968 (Wisconsin & Smithsonian). • OAO-C (Copernicus launch in 1972, PI Lyman Spitzer). • The IUE (a joint US-ESA) satellite was launched into geosynchronous orbit in 1978.
1969-Getting ready for HST. • NASA establishes the Astronomy Missions Board to define astronomy payloads over more than a decade. Our report in 1969 included the goal of the HST. • Also published in 1969 was “Chairman Spitzer’s Little Black Book.” • In 1969 a three person panel of consultants recommended to von Braun that MSFC should go for several astronomical satellites, including the HST.
1971-72 Feasibility Studies and the Roman Group. • One of the first things NASA did was to establish if the project was feasible (a Phase-A Study). • In parallel with studies by multiple contractors a group of scientists was convened at NASA HQ by Roman to provide feedback.
1972-MSFC becomes the Lead Center • Associate Administrator John Naugle was convinced that MSFC would do a better job on this magnitude of task, although GSFC would retain responsibility for the SI’s and operations. • MSFC had no optical astronomers. • Stuhlinger approached Spitzer about becoming Project Scientist, which would have involved spending lots of time in Huntsville. • Spitzer fingered me as “the man” and Naugle backed this idea.
From Eric Chaisson & Ray Villard’s April, 1990 Sky&Tel article.
1973-A broad Scientific Base is established. • I came on board in September, 1972. • In December NASA issued an AO for creation of Instrument Definition Teams, the leaders plus a few generalists would form a Science Working Group. • January, 1973 a dog-and-pony show was presented at CalTech, Chicago, and Harvard advertising the AO.
The Phase B SWG. • NASA-O’Dell, Roman, Boggess • ESA-added later, eventually F. Duccio Macchetto. • Princeton-Spitzer, Danielson,John Bahcall. • Wisconsin-Arthur D. Code • Harvard-George Field & Bob Noyes • Virginia-Larry Fredrick • JPL-Brad Smith • CalTech-Gary Neugebauer • UC San Diego-Margaret Burbidge
1974 • However, we needed an even broader constituency. • This was done in part by having special sessions at the AAS. • The pivotal event was the January 30 AIAA meeting.
We had $$ problems from the beginning. • The original $300M price-tag was a bartered price. • Different configurations were considered. • Different sizes (1.8-m, 2.4-m, 3.0-m) were considered. • The 2.4-m configuration was chosen in June, 1975.
1975-Seeking Funding for Actual Construction (Phase C/D) • The escalating identified costs caused many in the Congress to balk. Several times the program was considered dead. • NASA negotiates its budgets internally, then with the White House, and then the Congress approves-modifies-rejects the submitted presidential budget. • NASA employees must support the submitted budget and DO NOT make end-runs to Capitol Hill.
Convincing the Congress • Non-NASA scientists COULD go directly to the key members of the House and Senate. • This was done with wisdom and vigor by Lyman Spitzer and John Bahcall. • The truth of their arguments won the day, which may not have been the case without them. • In the early years these efforts kept HST alive as congress stretched out the Phase B activities. • In the final years, the lobbying efforts resulted in the HST being included in the FY1978 budget almost in spite of NASA.
1976-European Participation • The first major joint NASA-ESA venture was the IUE (launched in 1978). • Negotiations with the ESA started in Phase B as soon as we started having cost problems. • The areas of participation were finally narrowed down to the Solar Arrays and a Scientific Instrument (the FOC). • Although probably financially and scientifically attractive, the primary determinant was the will of the Congress. • A NASA-ESA agreement was reached in late 1976.
FY1978-HST is given its New Start (Phase C/D) funding. • This was anticipated by the selection of the contractors to build the optical system (Perkin-Elmer) and the overall observatory (Lockheed-Martin). • To the scientists, the greater impact was the selection of science-teams (with associated contractors) to provide the SI’s (scientific instruments).
The SI’s Selected. • The Wide Field/Planetary Camera; PI, Jim Westphal of CalTech. • The Faint Object Spectrograph; PI, Richard Harms of UC San Diego. • The Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph; PI, Jack Brandt (Sally Heap). • The High Speed Photometer; PI, Bob Bless of the University of Wisconsin. • The Faint Object Camera; ESA (preselected) PI Duccio Macchetto & Henk van de Hulst. • Astrometry with the FGS; Leader,BillJeffereys
The Phase C/D SWG. • NASA-Project Scientist (O’Dell, Brown, Boggess),and Program Scientist Ed Weiler. • SI Team Leaders (seven in all, John Trauger of JPL added later). • Telescope Scientists: Dan Schroeder -Beloit College & Bill Fastie-JHU) • At Large Members: John Caldwell-Toronto,Malcolm Longair-Edinburgh,Ed Groth-Princeton(Physics), David Lambert-Texas,John Bahcall, and Riccardo Giacconi (added).
Where were the Princeton Astronomers? • Of course JNB was from the IAS, Ed Groth from PU-Physics and Jim Gunn (a WF/PC co-I) were in Phase C/D. • However, Bob Danielson had died and Spitzer led a team proposing a camera with an obsolete detector. • Their earlier activity became a hindrance in proposing a modern instrument.
How was the Science Data to be managed? • Traditionally astronomer’s data didn’t transport well (mostly photographic). • NASA’s experience was similar, with the instrument teams exclusively using the results from the spacecraft. • Clearly, these were NOT the ways to do the HST.
Data Rights and Distribution • Very early we established that the GTO’s were to have a rapidly decreasing reward in use of the SI’s. • This meant that GO’s would be the primary users of the SI’s. • It was clear that there had to be a central facility(ies) for routine processing and archiving the data.
How was the Science to be Managed? • Astronomers were used to the national facilities being run by consortia of universities. • KPNO+CTIO-AURA, NRAO-AUI. • The idea of the STScI was first advocated by the ad hoc Ramsey Committee in 1965, before HST was started, but then forgotten. • Within the HST project, an STScI was first advocated by the Project Scientist in 1972, eventually this idea was embraced by the Phase B SWG. • A National Academy of Science study in July, 1976 endorsed the concept and NASA reluctantly accepted it.
1981-The STScI is Established. • A call for bids to run the STScI was made in December, 1979; this described the type of institute to be built . • Five formal responses were received. • Semi-finalists were AUI-Princeton and AURA-JHU. • AURA was selected in January, 1980 and appointed Arthur Code the acting first director, then succeeded by Riccardo Giacconi.
Schedule HistoryRichard Tresch Fienberg 1990, Sky & Tel, April Issue
1983-The HST is named. • 1971 Large Space Telescope • 1975 Space Telescope • 1983 Hubble Space Telescope
OTA Development Problems • The manufacture of a light-weight, highly precise mirror was considered to be an established technology by the project managers. • As the primary mirror was being tested and finished, the FGS was shown to be inadequate. • This all occurred as a new Project Manager came on-board, whose mandate was to control the escalating costs.
Spherical Aberration • This was discovered as the first images were made. • The cause was a misaligned optical device used to measure the shape of the primary mirror. • This device made the mirror appear to be flat when it was of the right shape.
Contributing Factors • The primary mirror was not considered the most demanding part of the HST. • The method of testing had become routine. • Management was concentrating on a redesign of the FGS, which WAS new. • The resident MSFC QA person had not been changed. • The report on the anomaly with the alignment was not forwarded to MSFC.
SI Development Problems • Each SI had its own set of problems. • The FOC was the most complex instrument, but ESA did the most testing and quality assurance. • The HSP was the simplest SI. Although it grew in cost, it remained simple.
Spacecraft Development Problems. • LMSC had at least its share of problems, however they were usually within areas of their experience and expertise. • An important interface change was when the Gyros were made the primary source of pointing information, with updating by the FGS, rather than the reverse.
