Agenda. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview Focused Rotation “a Vehicle for Change” Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No. 99-16 Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat Training Environment (JRTC) The CALL Homepage and MOUT Other CALL Products Questions. CALL Overview.
1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated.
2. The political realities of urban combat have resulted in the use of terms that tend to place limitations on the conduct of these operations.
3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have the soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian experience at Grozny and meet its two regional war mission.
4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for combat in the large metropolitan areas.
5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special weapons needed and lack the quantities of weapons necessary for urban operations. The weapons historically needed to do the job are in many cases either not in the inventory or not available for training in the urban environment.
6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Army must be prepared to address in the urban combat situation. Previous evidence shows that urban combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, from ammunition to bandages.
7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitable for urban combat. In past wars the types of ammunition in the inventory worked for all possibilities.
8. Specialty communications equipment is now only available to special units. This communications equipment is needed now for regular infantry for training and potential combat operations.
9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated into urban combat training.
The Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
The world in which the Army will fight in the 21st century is even more politically complex and dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons available to hostile elements. The United States must cope with advanced technologies that re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks.
The Army now faces a dangerous world without a defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army is caught between a highly successful (but increasingly outmoded) doctrine and the desire to prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat will be a small piece of any new doctrine.
The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the best approach is to develop new TTP for future contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought that will lead to the new doctrine.