VIETNAM – 1965

1. VIETNAM – 1965 LtCol Crabtree MA154

2. Learning Objectives • Comprehend and explain the events and circumstances surrounding the commitment of United States ground forces in Vietnam • Comprehend and explain the political and strategic situation facing United States forces in Vietnam • Comprehend and explain the use of heliborne troops in coordination with an amphibious landing

3. Learning Objectives • Comprehend and explain the tactics employed by the Viet Cong • Comprehend and explain the importance of doctrine in the planning and conduct of an amphibious operation

4. SIGNIFICANCE

5. Significance • First major U.S. offensive operation in Vietnam & the First important U.S. tactical victory • The Entire operation was conceived, planned and launched within 3 days • The Use of Heliborne ship-to-shore assault in a combat environment

6. Significance • It was an attempt at envelopment using ground, air, and amphibious operations in combination

7. BACKGROUND

8. Background – Key People & Forces • ADM SHARP – CATF • CAPT McKINNEY – PHIBRON 7 • USS BAYFIELD APA 33 • USS CABILDO LSD 16 • USS VERNON COUNTY LST 1161 GEN WALT – III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) COL PEATROSS – 7TH Marines LtCol Fisher – 2/4 (Heliborne out of Chu Lai. HMM 261, HMM 163 & 36 UH34’s) LtCol Muir – 3/3 LtCol Bodley 3/7 In Reserve

9. Background – Key People & Forces • Fire Support Ships: • USS ORLECK • USS PRICHETT • USS GALVESTON Air Support: Marine Air Group (MAG) 11 and MAG-12

10. Background – Key People & Forces • VIETCONG (VC): • 1ST VC Regiment (1,500) • 60th Battalion • 80th Battalion • 52nd VC Company • Co., 45th Weapons Battalion

11. Background – Chronology • 7 February 1965: VC attack on U.S. support installations near Pleiku Air Base. In response, U.S. begins air war • 8 March: First U.S. ground combat unit, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), arrives at Danang • 6 May: Letter of Instruction (LOI) from General Westmoreland restricts III MAF to reserve/reaction missions in support of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

12. Background – Chronology • July: Intelligence reports VC buildup (1st VC Regiment) and operations in Southern I Corps. This indicates a likely attack on the U.S. enclave at Chu Lai • 30 July: General Westmoreland instructs General Walt to undertake offensive operations in I Corps • 8 August: RLT-7 embarks for Chu Lai • 14 August: RLT-7 arrives Chu Lai

13. Background – Chronology • 15 August: Intelligence locates 1st VC Regiment at Van Tuong Village, 12 miles South of Chu Lai • 16 August: Units at Chu Lai alerted • 17 August: Co. M leaves Chu Lai to establish blocking position

14. Background – Chronology • 18 August: Main Assault • 19 August: Area around Landing Zone (LZ) Blue is secured • 20 August: Operation begins final sweep • 24 August: Operation terminated

15. Background – Losses • U.S. – 45 KIA, 203 WIA • VC – 645 confirmed KIA, 1000 estimated

16. A Close Look at The Battle

17. 17 Aug PM M 3/3 Est. BP North of Van Tuong IOT isolate OBJ. 18 Aug 0630 3/3(-) across beach at An Cuong , prep LZs w/ air and arty

18. 18 Aug 0645 G2/4 and E 2/4 land at LZ’s Red and White 18 Aug 0800 H2/4 lands at LZ Blue H 2/4 assaults Hill 43 I 3/3 clears An Cuong

19. 18 Aug 1100 Relief Column of an M48 and 3 flame tanks ambushed while trying to relieve I 2/4 19 Aug Village by village clearing sporadic fighting

20. The Levels of War

21. Political Considerations • U.S. to support democratic RVN from Communist aggression after defeat and withdrawal of French

22. Political Considerations • U.S. to increase commitment of troops, but intends to minimize combat operations. Restraints on military operations (6 May LOI)

23. Political Considerations • Morale factor if the U.S. suffers a serious loss to the VC, such as the possible loss of Chu Lai

24. Strategic Considerations • Limitations on Marine Corps manpower in the region • Massing of VC forces (1st VC Regiment) in the region surrounding Chu Lai indicates attack imminent !

25. Strategic Considerations • General Westmoreland orders operations to destroy VC forces in region

26. Operational Considerations • There are two III MAF Options: • Await and prepare for VC attack on Chu Lai • Spoiling attack: Requires additional forces to defend Chu Lai

27. Operational Considerations • Arrival of 7th Marines on PHIBRON 7 Ships provides: • * Needed additional forces • * Shipping which allows for amphibious option in conjunction with ground attack

28. Operational Considerations • Benefits of amphibious option: • Allows attack from multiple directions • Amphibious landing allows all the heavy equipment to be brought into the engagement • Logistical support easier and more secure over the beach as well as secure at sea • Chance for surprise • Avoids the difficulties in moving overland on difficult terrain • Improved operational mobility by sea

29. Operational Considerations • Intelligence: • I. Beach reconnaissance done by UDTs in May when Chu Lai base was established (identifies two possible locations • 1. Northern (Nho Na Bay): Good beach, but location poor for cooperation with the heliborne assault • 2. Southern (vicinity of An Cuong Village): Good beach; location beneficial for the overall assault plan; allows for cutting off enemy escape to the South

30. Operational Considerations • Intelligence: • II. Personal helicopter reconnaissance by Colonel Peatross, battalion commanders

31. Operational Considerations • Availability of necessary ships and helicopters for assault forces • Command relations: The various individuals had worked together in past training exercises COMMAND RELATIONS = (+)

32. Operational Considerations • SURPRISE: • * Immediate departure of PHIBRON 7 ships after disembarking 7th Marines did not arouse enemy suspicion • * Ships head East over horizon before turning South toward objective area

33. Tactical Considerations • Terrain in the region: • Flat, few wooded knolls • Many streams • Many hamlets surrounded by rice paddies • Little to no infrastructure besides river systems

34. Tactical Considerations VC Tactics: • Ambush of relief column w/ recoilless rifles • Let the first wave of helos land and debark before • engaging • Hug the populated areas

35. Tactical Considerations • VC Tactics:

36. Tactical Considerations • Use of helicopter in assaults and as weapons platforms

37. Tactical Considerations • Three-prong scheme of maneuver to trap enemy against coast; vicinity of Van Tuong village • 3/3 by amphibious landing to the South • 2/4 by helo from West • 1 co. (M/3/3) South from Chu Lai by land

38. Tactical Considerations • The Base at Chu Lai allows for use of artillery in support of the operation

39. Technical Considerations • Standardized doctrine for the conduct of amphibious operations available to all services • Speed, flexibility of helicopters for ship-to-shore movement • Availability of specialized reconnaissance forces and information in planning • Use of specialized amphibious and armored vehicles

40. CONCLUSIONS

41. Conclusions • Operation spoiled the planned VC attack on the Marine Base at Chu Lai • Illustrates the ability to act quickly and effectively on good intelligence • Doctrine allowed for rapid planning and execution; content unique to “in-country” fighting

42. Conclusions • Navy-Marine command relations were very important in ensuring a successful mission • Operation was successful, but the area was soon reoccupied by the VC • Became the model for a series of similar amphibious attacks against VC positions along the coast

43. Conclusions • Tank and engineer regiments especially effective against enemy fortifications

44. Conclusions • Firepower superiority a definite factor (artillery, NGFS, and CAS)

45. Conclusions • Continuous, consistent logistical support critical • Civilian factor must be considered, to avoid casualties in the private sector

46. Conclusions • Press coverage also a factor in subsequent modern-day operations

47. Conclusion – Question? The 1965 Operation Starlite in Vietnam and the 1945 Operation Forager in Saipan covered about the same area, however, Operation Forager needed three divisions while Operation Starlite needed three battalions. What does this trend of less force per unit of area tell us about the evolution of modern warfare?