General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

1. General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts

2. Agenda • Key Theorists • Principles of War • Facets of the Operational Art • Forms of Maneuver • METT-TC • Strategy • Strategic Leadership

3. Key Theorists Clausewitz Jomini

4. Clausewitz • Carl von Clausewitz • Prussian officer born in 1780 • Resigned his commission in 1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon • Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst • Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

5. Clausewitz • War is neither an art nor a science • It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by other means. • A form of social intercourse • War is like a wrestling match • It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” • But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between two independent wills.

6. Clausewitz • Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy • Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the government” • Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract • Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) • Very important concept in American military doctrine

7. Jomini • Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was a Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon • Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838 • Became the premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals. • “Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle) • Product of the Enlightenment • Very geometrical and scientific approach to war • Stressed interior lines

8. Interior Lines Interior Lines Exterior Lines

9. Principles of War

10. Principles of War • British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I • The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921 • Objective • Offensive • Mass • Economy of force • Maneuver • Unity of command • Security • Surprise • Simplicity

11. Objective • When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them. • Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters. • Example: Pemberton is going to have difficulty determining if his objective is to defend Vicksburg or defeat Grant’s army

12. Offensive • Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. • Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. • Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it is the essence of successful operations. • Example: Both Pemberton and Johnston are defensively minded generals. Grant is exactly the opposite.

13. Mass • Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation. • Time: applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously • Space : concentrates the effects of different elements of combat power against a single target • Example: McPherson will fail to mass his forces at Raymond, instead piecemealing them into the battle as they arrive.

14. Economy of Force • Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform. • Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation. • Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. • Example: Pemberton will leave two divisions guarding Vicksburg that could have been of better use to him at Champion’s Hill.

15. Maneuver • As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well. • Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly • Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them. • Example: One of the main themes of this course is that the brilliance of Grant’s generalship is not the siege of Vicksburg itself, but the maneuver that makes it possible.

16. Unity of Command • Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. • Develops the full combat power of a force • Usually requires giving a single commander authority • Example: The Confederate departmental system will hinder unity of command (and effort) at Vicksburg. On the other hand, Grant and Porter will achieve great unity of effort in a joint operation.

17. Security • Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power. • Does not involve excessive caution • Measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat • Example: Threats to the Federal lines of communication from Van Dorn and Forrest will markedly influence Grant’s conduct of the campaign.

18. Surprise • Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared. • It is only necessary that the enemy become aware too late to react effectively. • Contributions to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry. • Example: Grant’s preliminary efforts to take Vicksburg between Dec 1862 and Apr 1863 are all failures, but they do serve to keep Pemberton guessing as to the ultimate Federal intent.

19. Simplicity • Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late. • Clear and concise plans cut down on misunderstandings • Example: The frontal assault is the simplest, but often the most costly, form of maneuver. Lawler successfully used the frontal attack at Big Black River.

20. Facets of the Operational Art

21. Facets of Operational Art • Synergy • Simultaneity and depth • Anticipation • Balance • Leverage • Timing and tempo • Operational reach and approach

22. Facets of Operational Art (cont) • Forces and functions • Arranging operations • Centers of gravity • Direct versus indirect • Decisive points • Culmination • Termination

23. Facets of Operational Art • Synergy • Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties • Example: Grant’s efforts will combine pressure on Vicksburg from both land and naval forces. • Simultaneity and depth • Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled both in terms of time and space • Example: Grierson’s raid against the Southern Railroad east of Jackson will cause Pemberton to almost completely ignore Grant’s move down the west side of the Mississippi River.

24. Facets of Operational Art • Anticipation • Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the situation • Example: Pemberton completely misjudges Grant’s intentions and fails to anticipate Grant’s crossing at Bruinsburg. • Balance • Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness • Example: Pemberton completely fails to achieve balance by being constantly distracted by Grant’s diversions.

25. Facets of Operational Art • Leverage • Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions • Example: Grant’s siege of Vicksburg caused Pemberton to have to deal with not just military, but civilian considerations as well. • Timing and tempo • Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary • Example: Once Grant crosses the Mississippi he moves with such speed that Pemberton is left paralyzed.

26. Facets of Operational Art • Operational reach and approach • The distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively • Example: Grant’s decision to cut loose from his base of supplies allows him to fight a war of maneuver. • Forces and functions • Focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both • Example: Grant’s victory at Jackson isolates Pemberton from any potential support from Johnston. Grant effects both Confederate forces (reinforcements) and functions (logistics).

27. Facets of Operational Art • Arranging operations • Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations • Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations, Transition • Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combine to produce a logical line of operation. • Centers of gravity • Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight • Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory • Example: Grant cuts Pemberton’s lines of communication to supplies and reinforcements.

28. Facets of Operational Art • Direct versus indirect • To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength seek an indirect approach • Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts such as the Yazoo Pass are all indirect approaches that try to avoid directly confronting Vicksburg’s strong river defenses. • Decisive points • Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events or systems • Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them • Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity • Example: Victory at Champion Hill guarantees Grant’s success in the campaign by forcing Pemberton to withdraw to Vicksburg.

29. Facets of Operational Art • Culmination • Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer can preserve his force • Example: Grant starves Pemberton into submission through his siege. • Termination • Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which then allows transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals • Example: The surrender of Vicksburg gives the North control of the Mississippi River. Grant agrees to parole the 30,000 Confederates so as not to encumber his lines of communication with prisoners and to conclude the siege before Johnston might arrive to support Pemberton.

30. Forms of Maneuver

31. Forms of Maneuver • The five forms of maneuver are the • envelopment, • turning movement, • infiltration, • penetration, and • frontal attack.

32. Envelopment

33. Envelopment • The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. • Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires. • Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement. • Example: Gregg attempts an envelopment at Raymond but is confused and overwhelmed by McPherson’s larger force

34. Turning Movement

35. Turning Movement • A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat. • A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions. • Turning movements typically require greater depth than other forms of maneuver. • Example: Grant turns Grand Gulf by crossing at Bruinsburg and seizing Port Gibson

36. Infiltration

37. Infiltration • An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires • Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to continue their mission. • Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations. • Example: Running the gauntlet (?) (Probably better described as a penetration)

38. Penetration

39. Penetration • A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. • Commanders direct penetrations when enemy flanks are not assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to enemy rear areas. • Because penetrations frequently are directed into the front of the enemy defense, they risk significantly more friendly casualties than envelopments, turning movements, and infiltrations. • Example: Porter successfully runs the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries and takes a position south of the city to support Grant’s operation.

40. Frontal Attack

41. Frontal attack • The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders. • As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance. • It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and the initiative. • Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation. • Example: Grant will make two failed frontal assaults on Vicksburg before resorting to a siege.

42. 1 May 12 May 14 May 16 May 17 May Big Black River Champion Hill Port Gibson Raymond Jackson Maneuver and Tempo of Operations 1862 1863 Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun March Down River End TN/KY Campaign Siege First Offensives Bayou Expeditions Campaign

43. N 0 Scale (miles) 10 Yazoo River Snyder’s (Haynes’) Bluff Milliken’s Bend Chickasaw Bayou Young’s Point Vicksburg Edwards Champion Hill Jackson Raymond Mississippi River Big Black River Vicksburg Campaign Overview Grand Gulf Willow Springs Port Gibson Bruinsburg Route of Grant’s Army Rodney

44. N Por New Carthage XX Smi For XXXX Grant XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) Milliken’s Bend SPT SPT Young’s Point March To Bruinsburg I 31 March-18 April

45. N Por XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow Bruinsburg 10 0 Scale (miles) Milliken’s Bend SPT SPT Young’s Point March To Bruinsburg II 19-30 April Rodney

46. N XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) SPT SPT Jackson Mississippi River Campaign of Maneuver 1 May Port Gibson

47. N XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) SPT SPT Jackson Mississippi River Big Black River Willow Springs Campaign of Maneuver 2 May Big Bayou Pierre

48. N XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) SPT SPT Jackson Mississippi River Big Black River SPT Campaign of Maneuver 3 May Big Bayou Pierre

49. N XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) SPT SPT Jackson Mississippi River Big Black River SPT Campaign of Maneuver 4 May Big Bayou Pierre

50. N XX Smi For XX XX XX XXXX XXX XXX XXX Pemb McC McP Sher Lor XX Stv Bow 10 0 Scale (miles) SPT SPT Jackson Mississippi River Big Black River SPT Campaign of Maneuver 5 May Big Bayou Pierre