1 / 28

Evolutionary and Economic Analysis of Automata in Repeated Games

Explore evolutionary stability in finite automata playing the Prisoner's Dilemma, Nash equilibrium structure, and invasions in repeated games. Detailed insights from notable studies.

lea
Download Presentation

Evolutionary and Economic Analysis of Automata in Repeated Games

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Evolution & Economics No. 4

  2. Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata Automata K. Binmore & L. SamuelsonJ.E.T. 1991

  3. C C C,D D D D C D C D C Grim Tit For Tat (TFT) C C C C D D D D C C D D Tweedledum Tat For Tit (TAFT) Finite Automata playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma transitions states (& actions)

  4. C C C,D C,D D D C D C D Tweedledee CA C,D C,D C D C D Automata playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma

  5. Two Automata playing together, eventually follow a cycle • (handshake) • The payoff is the limit of the means. • The cost of an automaton is the number of his states. • The cost enters the payoffs lexicographically.

  6. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata Dilip Abreu & Ariel Rubinstein Econometrica,1988

  7. (-1,3) (2,2) (0,0) (3,-1) The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata Dilip Abreu & Ariel Rubinstein Econometrica,1988 N.E. of repeated Game N.E in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Abreu Rubinstein)

  8. Binmore Samuelson:

  9. x x ? y a x x x x ? y y ? b a If then:

  10. x x ? y a x x x x ? y ? y b a If then:

  11. x x ? y a Q.E.D.

  12. C D D C D C Tit For Tat (TFT) C,D C,D C D C D Cis not an ESS, it can be invaded byD. Dis not an ESS, it can be invaded byTit For Tat.

  13. Q.E.D.

  14. C D C C,D D D C D C D C Grim Tit For Tat (TFT) Q.E.D. In the P.D. Tit For Tat and Grim are not MESS (they do not use one state against themselves)

  15. For a general, possibly non symmetric game G. Define the symmetrized version of G: G # #. A player is player 1with probability 0.5 and player 2 with probability 0.5 • The previous lemmas apply to (a1,a2) • An ESS has a single state │a1│=│a2│=1 • If (a1,a2) is a MESS it uses all its states when playing against itself, i.e. a1,a2 use all their states when playing against the other.

  16. Q.E.D.

  17. C C,D D C D C C,D D C CA C,D D AC C,D D C C C AA D C C C D C D D D C D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D C,D CC CD It can be invaded by:

  18. C C,D D C D AC C C D D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) It can be invaded by:

  19. C C,D D D C CA C C D D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) It can be invaded by:

  20. C C D C C D C D D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D CC It can be invaded by:

  21. C C D D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) No other (longer and more sophisticated) automaton can invade. Any exploitation of TAFT (playing D against his C) makes TAFT play D, so the average of these two periods is (3+0)/2 = 1.5 < 2, the average of cooperating.

  22. C C,D C C,D D C D D D C AC CA C C D C C C D C D D D C D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D C,D CC CD A population consisting of: can be invaded only by: If AC invaded, it does not do well against CD D C D C ……. C D C D …….

  23. C C,D C,D D D C CA C,D D C C C AA D C C C D C D D D C D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D C,D CC CD A population consisting of: can be invaded only by CA If AA invaded, it does not do well against CC D C C C C……. C D D D D…….

  24. C C,D D D C CA C C D C C C D C D D D C D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D C,D CC CD A population consisting of: can be invaded only by CA but if CA invaded then a sophisticated automaton S can invade and exploit CA . S starts with C. if it saw C it continues with C forever (the opponent must be CD or CC ). If it saw D, it plays D again, if the other then plays D it must be TAFT. S plays another D and then C forever. If, however, after 2x D, the other played C, then it must be CA, and S should play D forever.

  25. C C,D D D C CA C C D C C C D C D D D C D C D Tat For Tit (TAFT) D C,D CC CD A population consisting of: can be invaded only by CA When S invades, CA will vanish, and then S which is a complex automaton will die out.

More Related