Puzzles in International Relations

1. Puzzles in International Relations Sara McLaughlin Mitchell University of Iowa

2. Overview • What are puzzles? • Connecting puzzles and theory development • Reciprocity/arms race example • Exercises (bloody borders, democratic peace)

3. What are puzzles? • Pieces of information, the belief that the pieces fit together in a meaningful picture, but the inability to fit the pieces together initially (Zinnes, 1980:316) • Perplexity over specific and patterned outcomes (Rosenau, 1979:17) • Being more radically inductive…treating existing evidence as a good detective would treat clues (Vasquez, 1993:4)

4. Advantages of a Puzzle Approach • It helps us think about theory in process terms. • It helps build accumulation of knowledge. • It makes us think about “facts” that do not accord with our theoretical approach.

5. Stages of Scientific Research • Identify generalizations (puzzles!) • Construct an explanation, or theory, of the observed generalizations based on a set of assumptions. • Derive a testable hypothesis • Test the hypothesis against empirical evidence • Add new evidence to our set of “clues”

6. Example: Do Nations Interact? • Some initial observations: • Britain and Germany increased their naval expenditures significantly prior to WWI (arms race). • Great powers directed increasing hostility toward each other, escalating in the outbreak of WWI & WWII. • The Soviet Union and United States reacted to each other’s military spending, resulting in an arms and space race in the Cold War. • Research Question: How do nations interact?

7. The Reciprocity/Routine Puzzle • Our initial observations lead us to anticipate reciprocity (action-reaction). • Theory #1: Reciprocity States’ behaviors respond, in some part, in kind to the actions of other countries. • We might also expect internal politics to influence states’ foreign policy behavior. • Theory #2: Routine States’ behaviors are essentially driven by bureaucratic routine and other internal factors.

8. Richardson’s Assumptions • Arms accumulate because of mutual fear. • There is resistance from society against constantly increasing arms expenditures. • There are factors independent of expenditures that contribute to the buildup of arms.

9. The Reciprocity/Routine Puzzle Richardson’s arms race model dx/dt = ay – kx + g dy/dt = bx – ly + h x = state A’s military expenditures y = state B’s military expenditures a, b represent fear (or reciprocity) k, l represent fatigue (or routine) g, h represent underlying grievances

10. Reciprocity • We can utilize this model to understand reciprocity. • When a>0, state A increases its military spending in response to state B’s spending • When b>0, state B increases its military spending in response to state A’s spending • These terms represent reciprocity. Larger a’s & b’s produce more quickly escalating arms races.

11. Routine • We can also use the model to understand routine. • When k>0, state A is constrained by what it spent last year • When l>0, state B is constrained by what it spent last year • This means budgets tend to be highly correlated over time, or they follow a routine. If kl>ab, or routine>reciprocity, then the arms race will be stable (in equilibrium).

12. Empirical Tests • Scholars applied this general model to: • Arms races (military expenditure data annually for various pairs of rival states, US-USSR, India-Pakistan, Israel-Egypt, Greece-Turkey, etc.) • Interstate conflict/cooperation (amount of hostility & cooperation two states direct towards each other, based on news events) • Intrastate conflict/cooperation (amount of hostility & cooperation states and dissidents direct towards each other)

13. Evidence for Arms Races? • No reaction between US and Soviet military expenditures in the Cold War (Cusack & Ward, 1981; Fischer & Kamlet, 1984; Majeski, 1983; Domke et al, 1983; Freeman, 1983; Majeski & Jones, 1981; Fischer & Crecine, 1981; Nincic & Cusack, 1979), although there is reciprocity in Middle Eastern dyads (Rattinger, 1976) and in the British-German naval race (Moll, 1974). • Correlation between error terms of US-Soviet military spending equations, but no direct reciprocity (McGinnis & Williams, 2001) • Evidence of minor power arms races is mixed (e.g. Greece-Turkey arms race, yes (Kollias, 1996), no (Georgiou et al, 1996))

14. Evidence for Events Interaction? • Little or no reciprocity between states in the pre-crisis phase, except in Middle Eastern region (Zinnes, 1980) • The USSR reacted more strongly to US behavior than the US did to the USSR (Rajmaira & Ward, 1990; Starr, 1982; Thompson & Rapkin, 1982). • Bilateral reciprocity between US-USSR, US-China, and China-USSR (e.g. Goldstein & Freeman, 1991; Ward, 1982)

15. Working Through the Puzzle • Theory and historical anecdotes suggest that reciprocity should exist, and yet there is little empirical evidence that it does! • Perhaps nations are reacting, but they are anticipating their rivals’ military spending accurately, and only respond to large deviations from this expected pattern.

16. A Rational Expectations Model • Great powers’ behaviors only appear to be self-driven but actually reflect rational expectations about other powers’ behaviors. • Great powers react to unexpected policy innovations in ways that connote reciprocity. In other words, countries respond to errors in expected spending levels. • Prediction: Estimates of a,b will not be significantly different from zero (no direct reciprocity), but the error terms in the two equations will be highly correlated.

17. A Rational Expectations Model • In other words, if the US anticipates Soviet buildups, then it will incorporate that expectation into its own routine (represented by the coefficient, k). • It will only react to significant deviations in Soviet behavior (really large military buildups or very large military cutbacks). • Evidence: this model fits well with both arms race (e.g. McGinnis & Williams, 2001) and events data (e.g. Moore & Lanoune, 2003)

18. What is missing? • All of these models assume only two actors (bilateral interactions). What about triadic reciprocity (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 1997)? Are Soviet-Chinese interactions influenced by US-Soviet or US-Chinese interactions? • How do third parties alter dyadic interactions, such as states and non-state actors (e.g. IGOS)? • What if states bully their enemies, reciprocating cooperation with hostility? • Many of these models use annual data, which may not accurately capture action-reaction processes over time. • Research on enduring rivalries uncovers multiple patterns of hostility dynamics (Diehl & Goertz, 2001). How can we explain differences across dyads?

19. Conclusion • When developing your theory, think like a detective, and assemble pieces of the puzzle. • This will come from existing studies, but also from what you know about particular cases. • Expand your research horizons, even into areas that don’t seem directly relevant (e.g. studying interstate arms races to understand state-dissident interactions). • Draw a picture or diagram to help you build a story and think about the assumptions you are making. • If a case is anomalous, think about why it is different (e.g. Middle Eastern dyads).