Self-deception as self-signaling: a model and experimental evidence

1. Self-deception as self-signaling:a model and experimental evidence Kyle Krueger, Michael Ritchie, and Lance Braud

2. Self-Deception • Gur& Sackeim’s (1979) definitionAn individual: • holds two contradictory beliefs • holds them simultaneously • is unaware of holding one of the beliefs • is motivated to remain unaware of that belief

3. Motivational Bias Explanation • There is no conscious intention to self-deceive. Instead, an individual makes judgments based on unconscious motivations. • Examples • Self-serving bias • Attributing successes to internal factors, and failures to external factors • Confirmation bias • Tendency to interpret events (our own actions) in ways that confirm our beliefs

4. Self-Signaling Theory • Our choices affect our beliefs • A choice not only causes an action, it also expresses a belief • Levels of Belief • Deep belief • State belief • Experienced belief

5. Self-Signaling Theory • Levels of Belief • Deep belief • Stated belief • Experienced belief • If stated belief does not match deep belief, then there is attempted self-deception • If experienced belief is equal to stated belief, it is a successful self-deception.

6. Self-Signaling vs Motivational Bias • Motivational bias does not account for three characteristics of self-deception • Defensiveness associated with challenged beliefs • The special significance of beliefs about the self • You wouldn’t state that someone was guilty of self-deception if they were convinced the moon landing wasn’t real • Self-deception can fail • A bias should necessarily alter belief

7. The Self-Signaling Formal Model • Bodner& Prelec (1995) • Model of non-causal motivation • Three primary assumptions • There exists a characteristic that is personally important • This is not possible to introspectively evaluate • It can be examined through one’s actions

8. The Formal Model of Self-Signaling V(x, θO) = u(x, θO) + λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x)

9. The Self-Signaling Formal Model • x = the action or outcome • θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic • θ = the experienced belief about some characteristic • λ = the individual’s level of self-deception

10. Diagnostic Utility λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x) • This must account for two emerging paradoxes • The static state paradox • The ability to hold two opposing beliefs • Explained by our two separate terms, θO and θ • The dynamic paradox • The ability to remain unaware of a held belief • To explain this, there must be two variants of self-signaling • Face-value • Rational

11. Diagnostic Utility λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x) • Face-value • Our knowledge of θO is a probability distribution, p(θ) • p(θ|x) = our inferred value of θO given the action x • This is derived with the assumption that our action is to solely provide maximum outcome utility • “By choosing x I demonstrate deep beliefs such that x maximizes standard expected utility given these deep beliefs”

12. Diagnostic Utility λ∑θu(x,θ)p(θ|x) • Rational • Inferences about motivation are exactly the same as in an interpersonal scenario • Only paradoxical if action and belief are inconsistent • As such, belief θ influences the action x, and action x derives belief θ • Not ignorant of diagnostic utility and so can be mitigated rationally. This variation is through λ

13. The Formal Model Revisited • x = the action or outcome • θO = the “deep” belief about some characteristic

14. The Experiment

15. Purpose • Designed to induce self deception in individuals, where self deception has a cost. • Designed to examine failed self deception, where the subject is aware of their own attempted self deception.

16. Design Female rated symbols Male rated symbols

17. Phase one • 85 subjects view 100 Korean symbols. • The subject classifies the symbol as male or female and then rates their confidence on a 5 point scale. • Subjects are awarded $0.02 for every correct classification.

18. Phase Two • The subjects are asked to predict the gender of a symbol, then they are shown the symbol and asked to confirm or reject their prediction. • Again subjects rate their confidence. • $0.02 are awarded for every correct prediction and correct guess.

19. $40.00 bonus • In Phase two a $40.00 bonus is awarded to 3 individuals in two different groups. • In the first test group it is awarded to the subjects with the highest number of correct post – prediction classifications. • In the second group it was awarded to the subjects with the highest rates of correct predictions.

20. “In the absence of self-signaling the subject will categorize the sign as male if, and only if the probability of male is greater than .5. With self - signaling, one has to factor in the diagnostic utility of selecting male.” • The subjects desire for their prediction to be accurate prompts them to self deceive. • This deception makes the subject less likely to correctly confirm or reject their prediction.

21. Application of the Formal Model • Stated simply: • A subject will choose a confirmatory response if there is more total utility in a confirmatory response • We know there is no optimal outcome utility, so we must examine the individual components of the equation

22. Application of the Formal Model

23. What does this mean? λa(E(θm|x=m) - E(θm|x=f)) • Face-value • As mentioned earlier, in this system x implies θm, therefore, self-deception occurs • Rational • Given rational discounting of (E(θm|x=m),the effect may be diminished, but will always be positive. There will always be confirmatory self-deception to somearbitrary degree.

24. Results The inconsistent responses give a baseline for subject error. There are proportionately more self deceptive classifications than the error baseline. The effect is greater in the anticipation group.

25. Results • Red: Anticipation bonus • Green: Classification bonus • At p=.001 27% of the subjects in classification group, and 45% of people in the anticipation group are self deceptive.

26. Results • Looking at individual changes in confidence between phase one and two: • Moderately self deceptive individuals show an increase in confidence following confirmation. +2.11 • High self deceptive individuals show a decrease in confidence following disconfirmation. -1.76 • It is expected that a confirming response will decrease confidence.

27. Results • Figure 3 shows that confirmation gives a confidence boost at moderate rates.

28. Results • High self deception correlates with fast response time, implying a suppression of evidence.

29. Discussion

30. Discussion • Self-deception can be induced when a large, financial award is offered • People who have statistical bias achieve higher confidence by self-deception – to a point • Moderate self-deception possibly related to increased self-esteem and mental health • Many participants exhibited a statistical bias • This model can be applied to intrapersonal self-deception as well as interpersonal deception

31. Two Agents • An actor • An observer • Evolutionary explanation • It is easier to deceive others in a mental state that is ignorant of the individual’s true beliefs • Goal-setting argument • Two mental structures are required for successful goal setting: one to choose which actions to take, one to evaluate and reward the self for performance.

32. Alternative explanations • Perceptual bias • Motivationally biased perception of characters • Does not explain faster response time and is confounded by randomized presentation of stimuli • Priming • Exposure to one’s prediction makes that gender more salient during the selection phase • Does not explain effects seen in scaling of incentive

33. Applications • How far does the model extend? • Confirmation bias • Denial • Cognitive dissonance • More?