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Structural Challenges of the Slovenian Economy 8th July 2014. Recent labour market DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY reforms. Sandrine C azes Senior Economist Employment, Labour and Social Affairs OECD. Outline. Latest developments in the labour market situation in OECD countries

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Presentation Transcript
slide1

Structural Challenges of the Slovenian Economy 8th July 2014

Recent labour market DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY reforms

Sandrine Cazes

Senior Economist Employment, Labour and Social Affairs

OECD

slide2
Outline

Latest developments in the labour market situation in OECD countries

A key challenge: growing labour market segmentation

Recent reforms to employment protection legislation

Policy options

Concluding remarks

slide3
The labour market impact of the crisis and recovery has been highly uneven across countries

Unemployment rate, percentage of the labour force

Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics Database (Cut-off date: 5 March 2014).

slide4
Labour market conditions vary dramatically

within the Euro area

Unemployment rate, percentage of the labour force

Unemployment rate, percentage of the labour force

Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics Database (Cut-off date: 5 March 2014).

slide6
Long-term unemployment account for more than one in three unemployed persons in the OECD areaa,b

Percentage of the unemployed

Note: Countries are shown by ascending order of the incidence of long-term unemployment in Q3 2013 .

Data are not seasonally adjusted but smoothed using three-quarter moving averages. OECD is the weighted average of 32 OECD countries excluding Chile and Korea.

2012 for Israel.

Source: OECD calculations based on quarterly national Labour Force Surveys (Cut-off date: 5 March 2014).

slide7
Youth unemployment has reached very high levels in some OECD countries

Percentage of youth (aged 15-24) labour force, Q4 2007a- Q4 2013b

Note: Countries shown in ascending order of the youth unemployment rates in Q4 2013.

a) Q2 2007 for Switzerland.

b) Q3 2013 for Estonia, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics Database (Cut-off date: 5 March 2014).

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…reducing job quality

Temporaryworkers tend to cumulateunfavourableconditions

  • Less job protection and security
  • Wage penalty
  • Lower access/exclusion to social security schemes and pensions or other working conditions (De Jure/de Facto)
  • Temporary workers may not have access to credit, housing, etc.

…and those disparities likely to generate persisting divides

  • Lower transition to permanent contracts
  • Temporary workers receive less training (on average probability of receiving employer-sponsored training - 14%)
slide10
Costs of labour market segmentation
  • Equity issue, but not only
  • Efficiency as well
    • Depress productivity growth
    • Excessive adjustment at the margin (volatility)
  • Reduce the labour market divide and alleviate contractual labour market segmentation
  • Avoid “excessive” use of temporary (non-regular) employment
slide11
A key structural reformresponse: employment protection legislation

EPL & LM segmentation, Argument:

  • Reform of EP via asymmetric liberalisation of temporary contracts (e.g. while maintaining regular EP for permanent workers) leads firms to substitute temporary for permanent workers--increase in the % of workers on fixed-term contracts (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Bentolila et al., 2008)
  • In addition, a large asymmetry between the EP provisions applying to the two types of contracts will reduce the conversion rate of fixed-term contract into permanent ones (Boeri, 2011)
slide12
Recentreforms to Employment Protection
  • Main focus is on reducing regulation on permanent contracts, contrast with “two-tier” reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s:
    • Reduction in up-front severance costs and compensation for unfair dismissal
    • Expansion of definition of fair dismissal, alongside improvements in functioning of courts should allow firms to make dismissals for economic reasons more easily
    • Extension of trial period for new hires, likely to be an important measure for encouraging hiring of youth
  • Different approaches to the gap between temporary and permanent workers
  • Some countries (GRC, PRT and ESP) also reduced scope, cost or complexity of collective dismissals
slide14
Policy options
  • Make hiring on temporary contract more difficult & costly
    • Restricting renewals, duration and/or scope of use of FT.
      • Difficult to enforce
      • May be counterproductive if too restrictive
      • No evaluation yet
  • Reduce the wedge between termination costs of regular and non-regular contracts
    • Single Employment Contract or Unified contract proposals have been put forward (mostly in Europe)
      • Risk of introducing excessive rigidity in hiring decision, could even lead to employment losses & displacement on DSEWs (Single Contracts)
      • Important reforms of judicialreviewnecessary (Single Contracts, UnifiedContracts)
      • Difficult to implement
slide15
Policy options
  • Enhance convergence between contracts (more homogeneous employment protection, notably in terms of termination costs)
    • Few examples of countries with same termination costs
    • As well as in more protective countries
  • Convergence of EP regime likely to reduce duality without negatively affecting efficient reallocation of resources, but will not eliminate all forms of duality (e.g. differences across social security contributions create incentives to employ those under more favourable regime, DSEW)
slide16
Concluding remarks

Over the past decades, many OECD countries have introduced reforms to foster LM flexibility and “activate” the unemployed

Several different options to reform EP as part of a comprehensive package

Very important to evaluate the impacts of those recent reforms (for ex. 2012 Spanish labour market reform seems to be a significant step in the right directionaccording to preliminary assessment, but further monitoring will be necessary)

slide17
Thankyou

Contact: Sandrine.Cazes@oecd.org

OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, via www.oecd.org/els

OECD Employment Outlook, via www.oecd.org/employment/outlook

OECD Employment database, via www.oecd.org/employment/database

www.oecd.org/site/piaac

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Protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals, 2008 and 2013
slide20
The labour market impact of the 2012 reform
  • Estimation strategy: Regression-discontinuity model
    • joint effect of all the provisions included in the reform by comparing labour market performance (wages, worker flows, etc) before and after February 2012 (discontinuous patterns occurring at the time of its enforcement)
    • the business-cycle is modelled through observable controls and non-linear time trends.
  • Robustness tests undertaken using fictitious placebo reforms taking place in a earlier date
  • Not possible to distinguish the impact of the reform from other changes in February 2012 or from subsequent policy adjustments (underestimation?)