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Outline. In-Class Experiment on Centipede Game Test of Iterative Dominance Principle I: McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) Test of Iterative Dominance Principle II: Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1988). Motivation. Constant-sum games Control for altruistic behavior Does experience matter?
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Outline • In-Class Experiment on Centipede Game • Test of Iterative Dominance Principle I: McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) • Test of Iterative Dominance Principle II: Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1988)
Motivation • Constant-sum games Control for altruistic behavior • Does experience matter? • Finite-threshold versus infinite-threshold Allow violations of higher level of iterated dominance • Group size and learning
pBC Contest • Every player simultaneously chooses a number from 0 to 100 • Compute the group average • Define Target Number to be 0.7 times the group average • The winner is the player whose number is the closet to the Target Number • The prize to the winner is US$10 + $1 x Number of Participant
A Sample of Caltech Board of Trustees • David D. Ho Director The Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center • Gordon E. Moore Chairman Emeritus Intel Corporation • Stephen A. Ross Co-Chairman, Roll and Ross Asset Mgt Corp • Sally K. Ride President Imaginary Lines, Inc., and Hibben Professor of Physics • David Baltimore President California Institute of Technology • Donald L. Bren Chairman of the BoardThe Irvine Company • Eli BroadChairmanSunAmerica Inc. • Lounette M. Dyer Chairman Silk Route Technology
Infinite-Threshold Games (Inexperienced Subjects, p=0.7, n=7)
Infinite-Threshold Games, (Experienced Subjects, p=0.7, n=7)
Infinite-Threshold Games (Inexperienced Subjects, p=0.9, n=7)
Infinite-Threshold Games (Inexperienced Subjects, p=0.7, n=3)
Infinite-Threshold Games (Inexperienced Subjects, p=0.9, n=3)
Summary of Basic Results • Result 1: First-period choices are far from equilibrium. Choice converge towards equilibrium point over time. • Result 2: On average, choices are closer to the equilibrium point for games with finite thresholds, and for games with p farther from 1. • Result 3: Choices are closer to equilibrium for large (7-person) groups than for small (3-person) groups • Result 4: Choices by experienced subjects are no different than choices by inexperienced subjects in the first round, but converge faster to equilibrium.
Assignment of Type in Bin b Bin 1 Bin 0 x 100
Special Cases • Cournot Best Response (R=1, b1 = 1.0) • Fictitious Play (bs= 1/R) • Weighted Fictitious Play (bs=bs)