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Enhancing Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material during Transport

This article discusses the activities of the IAEA in improving the security of nuclear and radioactive material during transport. It covers topics such as the development of international standards, incident tracking, trainings, and advisory services.

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Enhancing Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material during Transport

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  1. IAEA Activities in Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material during TransportInternational Developments3rd NNSA / GTRI Transport Security Symposium – 5 June 2013 – Washington D.C.

  2. Outline • Introduction • Transport Security Mission • International Conference on Transport Safety and Security • ITDB (Incidents and trafficking DataBase) • Development of NSS Publications • Nuclear Security Series Categories • Top down approach • Process flow and key actors • NSS Publications on Transport Security • Trainings on Transport Security • Peer Reviews and Advisory Services

  3. Transport Security Mission • Assist States in developing and sustaining full scope national nuclear security regimes • Avoiding security gaps between supply chain facilities (from material production, use and storage to final disposition) • Nuclear material • Radioactive material (including radioactive sources) • During international and domestic shipments “…IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk radiological sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply chain…” “…in every country we visited, host country officials identified the transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority for security upgrades.”1 [1] US Government Accountability Office Testimony, March, 2007

  4. International Conference on Transport Safety and Security - Findings • Many countries are just now putting transport security programs in place • IAEA International Conference on Transport Safety and Security (2011) included 60 countries • “Security is and will remain essential.” • “Some Member States have difficulties implementing the requirements and such difficulties should be recognized and responded to…” • "Efforts to foster regional cooperation and coordination, including communication, would be beneficial…" • “…how to improve regulatory coordination (formal agreements among States, common practices and guides, registers of approved shippers, forums for resolution of issues, etc.) should be identified and explored…" • There is recognition and support for regional approaches to transport security • There is much that can be done to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs

  5. International Conference on Transport Safety and Security - Outcomes • NSNS and NSRW action plans for transport safety and security are being developed/updated • Follow-up Technical Meeting (March 2012) provided input, taking into account the findings of the International Conference • The information presented to the Board of Governors with key topics: • Coordinated development of transport safety and security recommendations/standards and guidance • Assistance to Member States • Regional initiatives

  6. Recent Analysis of Thefts with a focus on those thefts occurring in transportation 345 incidents of “Theft” (~ 14 % of ITDB incidents) ~140 or about 40% are in transport ~ 50% of transport cases vehicle is stolen Moisture density gauges (38%), Radiography sources (17%), and Medical sources (9%) account for > 50% of all thefts ITDBConclusions on Theft/Transportation StudyWhat Can Be Learned

  7. HEU Incidents The 2009-2010 incidents are almost all HEU discovered in scrap metal shipments

  8. Plutonium Incidents

  9. The Vision of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security Achieving worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities. A global threat demands a global response.

  10. IAEA Assistance • Encouraging and facilitating adherence to international legal instruments • Development of Nuclear Security guidance • Peer Reviews / Advisory Services • Training and technical assistance • Information management and co-ordination • Major public events • Co-ordinated research projects • Risk Reduction • Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs) • International coordination and cooperation

  11. Development of NSS Publications

  12. International Instruments Platform of international legal instruments, binding and non-binding • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material , and 2005 Amendment – Not yet entered into force • Nuclear Terrorism Convention and other counter terrorism conventions • UNSC Resolutions 1373, 1540, 1977 • INFCIRC/225/Rev 5 published as IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 • Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources • All instruments support IAEA taking leading role for implementation through its programmes: • Development of internationally accepted guidance and standards • Provision of assistance (e.g. peer review & advisory services, equipment…) 14

  13. CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment • Parties to CPPNM: 148 (including Euratom) • Number of ratifications required for entry into force of the Amendment: 99 • Number of contracting parties to the Amendment (as of today): 68

  14. IAEA Guidance Documents TheNuclear Security Series, developed in close consultation with Member States’ experts, are consistent with and complement international nuclear security instruments, and bring together best practices acceptable to the international community for broad implementation. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC), open to all Member States, makes recommendations on the development and review of the Nuclear Security Series. Nuclear Security Fundamentals approved in September 2012 16

  15. Nuclear Security Series Categories

  16. Nuclear Security Series wheel

  17. Nuclear Security Series published

  18. Nuclear Security Series 21 published in English • 1 Fundamentals (translations of text available) • 3 Recommendations (in all 6 UN languages) • 8 Implementing Guides (many translations) • 9 Technical Guidance (some translations) 3 Guides at final stages (1 Implementing, 2 Technical) 7 Guides (6 Implementing, 1 Technical) out for MS comment • Comments due late June/early July • Final drafts to NSGC meeting late October? 13 Guides (7 Implementing, 6 Technical) being drafted • Some drafts to NSGC late October to go for MS comment? 6 Guides (4 Implementing, 2 Technical) starting drafting 29 documents in progress, several more to start in next year

  19. Nuclear Security Fundamentals • 12 Essential Elements of a State’s nuclear security regime • Similar to 12 Fundamental Principles (A-L) in CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 • Generalized to cover all of nuclear security Essential Element 3 Legislative and regulatory framework Essential Element 2 Nuclear security responsibilities Essential Element 1 State responsibility for nuclear security Essential Element 4 International transport of nuclear and rad material Essential Element 5 Offences, penalties and criminalization Essential Element 6 International cooperation and assistance Essential Element 7 Threat identification and assessment Essential Element 8 Target and consequence assessment Essential Element 10 Detection of nuclear security events Essential Element 12 Sustaining a nuclear security regime Essential Element 9 Use of risk-informed approaches Essential Element 11 Planning, preparedness and response to a NSE

  20. Assumptions for this update • The Recommendations fully reflect the Essential Elements from the Nuclear Security Fundamentals as applied to the relevant scope • So, we can work from the Recommendations down • Priorities are • First tier of Implementing Guides • Guidance with a broad scope • Supporting guidance for existing Implementing Guides in key subject areas

  21. Analysis approach • Identify topics from sections in Recommendations • NSS 13 for nuclear material & nuclear facilities • NSS 14 for radioactive material & associated facilities • NSS 15 for nuclear & other radioactive material out of regulatory control • Compare topics from the different Recommendations • Where topics are common to different Recommendations, can common implementing guidance be produced, and will it be useful?

  22. NSS 13 Section 3(Elements of qa State’s PP regime for NM/NF) Establishing nuclear security infrastructure Fundamental Principle A State responsibility for nuclear security Fundamental Principle B Responsibilities during international transport Fundamental Principle C Legislative and regulatory framework Regulatory framework Fundamental Principle D Competent authority Fundamental Principle E Responsibility of licence holders Fundamental Principle G Threat identification and assessment Design basis threat Fundamental Principle H Graded approach Sections 4-6 Fundamental Principle I Defence in depth Risk based systems and measures

  23. NSS 13 Section 3 contd Fundamental Principle F Security culture Establishing nuclear security infrastructure Nuclear security culture Fundamental Principle J Quality assurance Security management Fundamental Principle L Confidentiality Confidentiality Sustaining the regime Sustainability Fundamental Principle K Contingency plans Contingency plans

  24. NSS 13 Sections 4-6(Requirements for Measures against …) Overall view of measures against threats (physical protection) Measures against specific threats Specific measures against threats Measures against unauthorized removal in use and storage Establishing nuclear security infrastructure Preventive and protective measures against insider threats Security of nuclear material during use and storage Computer security Measures against sabotage of facilities and of material in use and storage Use of NMAC for nuclear security Engineering safety aspects of protection against sabotage Measures against sabotage and unauthorized removal in transport Security of nuclear material during transport

  25. NSS 14 Section 3(Elements of a State’s NS regime for RAM, associated facilities and activities) Establishing nuclear security infrastructure State responsibility for nuclear security (FP-A) Assignment of responsibilities (FP-E) Regulatory framework • Legislative and regulatory framework • State • Regulatory body • Operator, shipper and/or carrier • (FP-B, FP-C, FP-D, FP-E) International cooperation & assistance International cooperation & assistance Identification and assessment of threats (FP-G) Threat assessment • Risk based systems and measures • Risk management • Interfaces with safety system • (FP-H, FP-I) Section 4

  26. NSS 14 Section 3 continued Establishing nuclear security infrastructure Sustaining the regime • Sustaining the nuclear security regime • Security culture Nuclear security culture Planning, preparedness & response (FP-K) Contingency plans Detection of NSEs Section 4 Safety-security interface Code of Conduct Import & export of radioactive material

  27. NSS 14 Section 4(Recommendations for the Security of RAM, associated facilities and activities) Overall view of measures against threats (physical protection) Measures against specific threats Specific measures against threats General recommendations Establishing nuclear security infrastructure • Security system for material in use & storage • Detection • Delay • Response • Sabotage Security of radioactive sources Managing disused sources • Security management • Security plan • Training & qualification • Accounting & inventory • Access control • Trustworthiness • Information protection • NSE reporting Security management & security plans Measures against insider threats Information security Recommendations for transport Security of radioactive material in transport

  28. Cross-cutting areas

  29. Topical areas

  30. Specific threats, targets, measures

  31. FUNDAMENTALS (NSS 20) RECOMMENDATIONS common to NSS 13, 14 & 15 Nuclear security infrastructure (NSS 19) Information security (NST022) Sustaining the regime (NST020) Nuclear security culture (NSS 7) International cooperation (NST006) Computer security Framework of law & regulation (NST002) Capacity building (NST009) Glossary NSS 15 RECOMMENDATIONS common to NSS 13 & 14 NSS 14 NSS 13

  32. RECOMMENDATIONS common to NSS 13 & 14 Insider threats (NST030) DBT (NSS 10) Computer security for facilities (NSS 17) Nuclear security culture for facilities (NST026) Regulatory framework for facilities & activities NSS 13 NSS 14 NUCLEAR MATERIAL & NUCLEAR FACILITIES TRANSPORT RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL & ASSOCIATED FACILITIES Security of radioactive sources (NSS 11) Security of nuclear material in use & storage (NST023) Security of radioactive material in transport (NSS 9) Security of nuclear material during transport (NST017) Engineering safety aspects of protection against sabotage (NSS 4) Security management? Security management (NST024) Use of NMAC for nuclear security (NST021) Insider threats Insider threats (NST030) Nuclear security culture for facilities (NST026) Nuclear security culture Regulatory framework Regulatory framework Contingency plans Contingency plans Threat assessment Managing disused sources?

  33. Priorities • Guidance with DPPs already approved • Including some DPPs approved by AdSec – now have resources to accelerate drafting • NST005 Regaining control of material • NST006 International cooperation & assistance • NST009 Capacity building • New Implementing Guides • Regulatory framework for regulated facilities & activities • Computer security • Classification of nuclear security events • Consult Working Group on Radioactive Sources • Review of NSS 11 and NSS9 for consistency with NSS 14 Recommendations? • Adequacy of guidance in particular on • Management of disused sources • Security of sources used primarily in the field • Review of NSS9 for consistency with NSS 14 Rec?

  34. Key actors Board of Governors (BoG) Director General (DG)/Publications Committee (PC) Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) Dominique Delattre Deputy Director General (DDG) Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) Jim Stewart Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC) Miroslav Svab Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) Tony Colgan Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC) Gabriela Siraky Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) Ian Barraclough Coordination Committee (CC) Technical Officer (TO)

  35. Process Flow Outline and work plan (DPP) Prepared by the Secretariat Review by the Committee(s) Planning Drafting or revising by the Secretariat and consultants Drafting Review by the Committee(s) Member States Review and approval Endorsement by the CSS Approvalby the DDG Establishmentby the DG or BoG Endorsementby the DG or BoG Publication

  36. Step-by-step process (1) • Manual for the review process for draft Nuclear Security Series Publications and for the Application of SPESS A for the IAEA Safety Standards (SPESS B) • 14 steps • Each actor and their function • Knowledge management, value added, minimum time for each step • Current revision is 53 pages long,and has 32 footnotes and 3 annexes

  37. Step-by-step process (2)

  38. Process Flow – Deadlines/timings *Safety standards only

  39. Production schedule of “Self-Assessment” ü STEP 1: Preparing a DPP – 1st Draft Done STEP 2: Approval of DPP by the Coordination Committee Done: 08/ 2012 STEP 3: Approval of revised (after comments) DPP by NSGC Done: 12/ 2012 STEP 4: N/A (approval by CSS) - STEP 5: Preparing the draft working materials 08/ 2012 - 07/ 2013 TM on Self-Assessment methodology Done: 04/ 2013 STEP 6: Approval of draft by Coordination Committee 08/ 2013 STEP 7: Approval of draft by NSGC 10/ 2013 STEP 8: Soliciting comments by Member States 11/ 2013 STEP 9: Addressing comments by Member States 02/ 2014 STEP 10: Approval of the revised draft by the Coordination Committee 04/ 2014 STEP 11: Approval of the revised draft by NSGC 06/ 2014 STEP 12: N/A (endorsement by CSS) - STEP 13: Establishment by the Publications Committee 08/ 2014 STEP 14: Target publication date 12/ 2014 ü ü ü

  40. Radioactive Material Transport Activities • Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, NSS No. 14 (2011) • Implementing guide: Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material, NSS No. 9 (2008) • IAEA and GTRI - Training Course developed and being delivered regionally and nationally • Revision of NSS No. 9 (started in 2013) • Top Down approach • Take account of Nuclear Security “Fundamentals” • Update to reflect international developments (UN Model Regulations) • Improve structure (similar to nuclear material implementing guide to support adoption in international modal regulations)

  41. Nuclear Material Transport Activities • Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),NSS No. 13(2011) • Implementing guide on transport security NST017 • Under MSs review (21/06/2013) • Training course for transport security finalized

  42. Defining process for security measures Identify Nuclear Material Categorization Define Physical Protection Measures Based On Nuclear Material Category I or II III or lower • Three steps definition process • identify category, define and implement measures Identify Radioactive Material Security Level Could Sabotage Result in Unacceptable Radiological Consequences? Define Security Measures Based On Nuclear Material Category and Radioactive Material Security Level Yes No NSS No. 9 Define Additional Physical Protection Measures NSS No. 13 Apply All Physical Protection Measures

  43. Activity Thresholds for Nuclear Material Based on Radiological Properties *

  44. Enhanced Security Thresholds Section A.9 of the Appendix in NSS No. 9 3,000 A2 per conveyance for nuclear material except for the following radionuclides: 50

  45. A Regulatory framework for Transport Security Class 7 RadioactiveMaterial Mode specific All 9 Classes All modes All 9 Classes One mode (Land; Air; Sea) National Law All modes UNOB 17th ed. (2011) NSS-14(NSS-09, NSS-11) Nuclear Material All modes National Law In force in 2013 editions NSS-13(through CPPNM) 51

  46. Nuclear Security Series Publications on Transport Implementing Guide – IG FundamentalsSF RecommendationsREC Technical GuidanceTG NSS-20Objective and Essential Elements of State’s NS Regime NST017 NST008 NST008 (Methodology to detect illicit trafficking of NM and other RAM across borders) Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime NSS-13 (NM) NSS-14 (RAM) NSS-15 (Material Out of Regulatory Control) NST017 (TNM) NSS-09 (TRAM)

  47. Verification of Legal Shipments • There are concerns about legal shipments being used to mask illegal activities • added, replaced or removed packages and radioactive content • mis-declaration of contents (value) • falsification of documents, etc. • Draft Technical Guidance developed in collaboration with WCO (World Customs Organization) • “Methodology to detect Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material across Borders” • Applicable only to declared shipments, whether declared or not declared as a radioactive material shipment. • Planned activities include • Under MSs review (05/07/2013) • Finalize draft with final comments for publication (continue to address sustainability of transport)

  48. Trainings on Transport Security

  49. Transport Security Training • A key element in worldwide implementation of transport security: regulatory capacity building • Development of training material • Film (safe and secure transport) • Extended in 2013 with scenario on transshipment road/rail of spent fuel • Available in English and all UN languages in 2013 • Security in the Transport Radioactive Material • Updated in 2012; • Available in English, French, Spanish; • Completion planned in 2013 for other UN languages • Security in the Transport Nuclear Material • Finalized in 2012; • Available in English; • Translation in other UN languages planned 56

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